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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE INTERWAR BRITISH ECONOMY AND 
THE ·PROBLEM OF MA,SS UNEMPLOYMENT 
7 
Next to war, unemployment has been the most widespread, 
most insidious, and most corroding malady of our 
generation: it is the specific social disease of 
western civilisation in our time. (1) 
The validity of The Times's verdict of 1943 is 
incontrovertible: both contemporaries and postwar writers 
have judged, and condemned, the interwar period as a bleak 
episode in our national history. This view principally 
derives from the particular characteristics of Britain's-
interwar unemployment problem, its quite unparalleled 
magnitude, its prolonged nature, and its attendant social 
misery; it is clearly reflected in the literature of the 
period, in popular memory of it, and in the attitudes of 
later politicians and labour representatives who have 
continued to allude to the interwar period as an example, 
indeed object-lesson, of the failures of unregulated 
capitalism. 
In part, this view also derived from, and was 
strengthened by, the subsequent 'Keynesian revolution' : 
'~he hard-fought victory of the theory of effective 
demand'',( 2 ) and its translation into practical economic 
management during the war years. The achievement of full 
employment since the war (to say 1970), by what were judged 
to be Keynesian means, (3 ) served to vindicate the case for 
fiscal expansion put by Keynes and ot~ers between the 
(4) 
wars, and the view passed into orthodoxy that interwar 
unemployment could have been stabilized at a much reduced 
level by fiscal means. 
As yet, the recent reappraisal by economists, and near 
2 
complete rejection by British governments,<5 ) of the belief 
in the stabilizing effectiveness of fiscal policy, has not 
challenged this orthodoxy to any substantial degree.(G) 
That it will do so in time seems likely; the present study, 
however, does not attempt such an exercise, although, where 
helpful, reference is made to postwar experience. Rather, 
the object is twofold: to assess the fiscal policy that was 
followed in Britain in the 1930s; and to investigate the 
theoretical, political, and bureaucratic determinants of 
that policy. For this purpose the budget accounts have 
been reconstructed so as to remove window-dressing and to 
permit the application of the concept of a constant 
employment budget (with which to assess changes in fiscal 
stance); and, as with other recent studies of interwar 
economic policy, the government policy documents from the 
Public Record Office have been the main source for information 
on policy-making. 
The dissertation is arranged as follows. In the 
remainder of this chapter the interwar British economy is 
surveyed. Chapters 2 and 3 also consider background issues: 
the Treasury's institutional position and the expenditure 
side of the budget in the case of the former; and the 
revenue departments and taxation in the case of the latter. 
The following three chapters constitute the central body 
of the dissertation. Chapter 4 considers the interwar 
budget accountsJ budgetary practices, and the question of 
budgetary orthodoxy. Chapter 5 presents a narrative account 
of 1930s budgetary history, while in chapter 6 the constant 
employment budget estimates are employed as a measure of 
changes in fiscal stance. Finally, in chapter 7, the public 
works issue is considered and the fiscal policy debate 
examined from a broader perspective. 
* * * 
An analysis of the magnitude and characteristics of 
interwar unemployment is a necessary prelude to our 
investigation of policy. This is undertaken in the first 
section of this chapter; the second surveys the cyclical and 
trend course of the British economy 1929-39; and the final 
section draws the discussion together and suggests a number 
of features of the economy of this period which need to be 
taken into a~count in any assessment of the effectiveness 
of the policies pursued and the motives underlying their 
adoption. 
1. Unemployment 
Without in any sense attempting to diminish the 
historical significance of this experience of mass unemploy-
ment, three points should be made at the outset of this 
inquiry: firstly, as was recognised as earl~ as 1950, '~he 
persistence of heavy unemployment [may legitimately have] 
given the interwar years a bad name", but concentration on 
this one feature of the period has also served to obscure 
the contemporaneous progress in productivity and real 
(7) 
wages; secondly, contemporaries tended to misunderstand 
and in some ways exaggerate unemployment in statistical 
(8) 
terms; and thirdly, modern microeconomic studies of 
unemployment show the conventional indicators of 
unemployment to be imperfect and potentially misleading, 
both as a basis for the investigation of the causes of 
unemployment, and as a means of identifying the policies 
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required to mitigate unemployment.< 9 ) 
The course of employment and unemployment are given in 
Chart 1.1 for the period 1921-38. Two different series are 
presented for unemployment : (A) Feinstein's estimates 
based on the total working population; and (B) the national 
insurance returns, the former being a revision of the latter 
which did not cover the whole of the labour force. The 
national insurance series is an imperfect indicator of inter-
war unemployment:(lO) on the one hand, its incomplete 
coverage results in an understatement of the numbers 
unemployed, and on the other, as Census data reveal, the 
rate of unemployment for insured persons was nearly one third 
higher than that for the labour force as a whole, so that the 
series overstates the unemployment rate. Thus, throughout 
the rest of this study, Feinstein's series is used, this 
being a reasonably accurate representation of unemployment 
amongst the total labour force;(ll) on occasion, however, 
it is also necessary to use the more limited national 
insurance series since this was the most important monthly 
macroeconomic indicator available to interwar governments . 
. Both series in Chart 1.1 show the marked cyclical 
fluctuation of the unemployment rate: the range of 
variations for series (A) is from a lowpoint of 6.8% in 
1927 to a peak of 15.6% in 1932, while the figures for 
series (B) are 9.7 and 22.1% respectively. The average rates 
of unemployment for the period 1921-38 will therefore also 
differ significantly as between the two series, being 10.0% 
for (A) and 14.2% for (B). 
Although the exact magnitudes remain uncertain,(l2 ) the 
trend rate of unemployment between the wars undoubtedly 
exceeded that of the prewar period; it also, of course 1 
Chart 1.1 
Employment and unemployment 1921-38 
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l 
;_~t~~~--L~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
1921 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
.SOURCES: A. Feinstein (1972: Table 57). 
B. Department of Employment and Productivity (1971: 
Tables 160, 16J). 
compares most unfavourably with the postwaY record of 
unemployment to 1970. The concern felt by contemporaries 
for the high level of unemployment was not without 
foundation; the unemployment problem cannot be explained 
away by reference to the inadequacies of the data,< 13 ) the 
economic loss of unemployment was of too great a dimension.* 
* As Thomas (1981) calculates, a comparison of the actual 
course of GNP over 1921-38 with a hypothetical full 
employment path -assuming a prewar average of 4.7% 
unemployment - yields the result that the loss due to 
unemployment over this period was equal to the level of 
GNP in 1938. Moreover, this is a lower-bound estimate: 
a higher average level of capacity utilization might 
legitimately be expected to raise factor productivity, 
thus resulting in an upward shift in the full employment 
trend rate of growth and a greater loss of output as 
compared with the actual employment path of the economy. 
---~~~~~~~~~~~-
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Nor, as has recently been argued, can the high level of 
interwar unemployment be explained in terms of the 
disincentive effects of unemployment benefits on the search 
(14) for employment. 
With these preliminary comments in mind, the point 
should now be made that, whilst there was an immense 
economic loss as a result of mass unemployment and while 
modern stabilization theory would suggest that this could 
have been reduced or eradicated by deficit spending, the 
unemployment problem was not monolithic, nor monocausal. (l5 ) 
In particular, it is contended that it is erroneous to 
interpret the period solely in terms of deficient demand, 
for such interpretations seek a uniformity of experience 
which was non-existent and fail to take full acc~unt of the 
varied and changing characteristics of interwar unemployment. 
·These will now be explored in some detail, beginning with 
the relationship between popul~tion and labour supply.(lS) 
A study of Feinstein's series for civilian employment 
reveals the following features:(l 7 ) firstly, it was not 
until as late as 1935 that the level of employment prevailing 
in 1920 was again obtained; secondly, employment growth was 
marginally faster in the 1920s than in the 1930s;* and 
thirdly, over the whole period 1920-38 total civilian 
employment grew by 7.4% but the total working population 
grew by a far greater amount (by 14.0%). Thus, on trend, 
*Employment grew at an annual average rate of 1.21% over 
1924-9, but only 1.15% over 1929-37. These are the 6nly 
legitimate dates for intertemporal comparisons during 
the interwar period, being trade cycle peaks and years of 
comparable capacity utilization (Dowie 1968: 63). In 
later chapters, where endogenous budget items are 
considered, these dates are also employed so that their 
trend course can be distinguished from their cyclical 
behaviour. 
unemployment rose: from 1.4m in 1924, to 1.5m in 1929, 
and 1.8m in 1937 (unemployment rates moving in line, at 
7.2, 7.3, and 7.8% respectively). 
A comparison with prewar trends provides a partial 
explanation for this upward shift in the trend of 
unemployment. Firstly, demographic factors need to be 
takeQ into account. Before 1914 the rate of growth of the 
labour force had approximately equalled that of the growth 
of population: at annual averages of 0.99 and 0.85% 
respectively over 1880-1914. During the interwar years 
population growth declined quite sharply,* to an annual 
7 
rate of growth of 0.46% over 1920-39; and if prewar trends 
had continued, a fall in the rate of growth of the labour 
force would have resulted. Prewar trends, however, did 
not continue: against the 9.2% increase in population over 
1920-39 there was a 14.1% rise in the working population. (l 8 ) 
The divergence between these two rates stemmed from two 
influences: firstly, the fall in the birth rate led to an 
increase in the proportion of the population of working age 
(from 63.8% in 1913 to 69.5% in 1939);(19 ) and secondly, 
there was a rise in the proportion of women taking paid 
employment, female participation rates rising from 32.6% 
in 1921 to 35.8% in 1938.(2 0) 
It is therefore legitimate to conclude that, '~ad the 
pre-war relationships between the two variables remained 
the same the growth of the labour force would have been 
(21) lower and unemployment less severe.'' Furthermore, 
* The fall in the birth rate was so sharp in the 1930s as 
to give rise to widespread fears that the population 
would actually soon begin to fall (see Reddaway 1939 for 
a detailed discussion of population trends and their 
econ6mic consequences). The 'population question' was 
of some importance to economic policy during the 1930s, 
a source of concern as regards the burden of the national 
debt and the potential of the economy for further growth. 
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Matthew's (1964) estimates of GDP growth and the 
contribution of factor inputs suggests that demand factors, 
in the form of an upward shift in the trend rate of 
productivity growth, may have also exacerbated unemployment, 
at least in the short- to medium-term. In the period 
immediately preceding the war (1899-1913) the 1.1% average 
annual rate of growth of GDP principally derived from the 
growth of the labour input, the growth of GDP per unit of 
labour being minimal (at 0.1% per annum). By contrast, 
over the period 1924-37, when the growth rate of GDP 
accelerated to 2.3% per annum, the growth of GDP per unit 
of labour was primarily responsible (at 1.1% per annum), 
the growth of the labour input remaining relatively stable 
at 1.2% per annum as compared with 1.0% in the preceding 
period. ( 22 ) Thus if productivity had maintained the same 
trend as prewa~ the growth of the labour input would have 
risen and the unemployment problem would have been less 
serious. (23) 
Although serious when viewed in the aggregate, the 
interwar unemployment problem was made more acute by its 
uneven incidence as between industries and regions, indeed 
this is now seen to be its most important feature. These 
disparities were a vivid manifestation of the serious 
structural problem confronting the interwar British economy: 
the secular decline of certain basic industries - the 
foundations of nineteenth century g~owth - which, because 
of the manner in which the industrial structure evolved, 
were to be concentrated in four regions: South Wal~s, 
Scotland, North-east and North-west England. 
Regional employment trends are summarised in Tables 
1.1 and 1 .2.< 24 ) The regional disparities are immediately 
Table 1.1 
Regional unemployment rates (insured persons), 
Ministry of Labour Divisions, 1929, 1932, 1937 
June June 
1929 1932 
London and South east 4.5 13.0 
South west 6.8 15.8 
Midlands 9.1 21.5 
North east 12.6 29.8 
North west 12.6 25.9 
Northern 
All Northern England 12.6 27.8 
Scotland 11.0 26.8 
Wales 18.2 37.4 
Northern Ireland 13.8 27.4 
Inner Britain 6.3 16.0 
Outer Regions 12.9 28.5 
UNITED KINGDOM 9.7 22.4 
Source: Beck ( 1951 : Table 18) 
Table 1.2 
~ional employment growth (insured persons), 
Ministry of Labour Divisions, 1929-37 
June 
1937 
5.4 
6.8 
6.6 
12.0 
12.8 
16.7 
13.2 
14.0 
20.7 
21.7 
5.9 
14.5 
10.1 
% change in employment 
1929 1932 1929 
-32 -37 -37 
London -1.9 22.9 20.6 
South east 0.3 25.3 25.7 
South west -2.3 22.1 19.3 
Midlands -8.8 30.8 19.3 
North east -12.4 24.0 8.6 
North west -12.1 17.2 3.0 
Northern. ,...21.6 31.3 3.0 
Scotland -13.2 22.6 6.5 
Wales -18.9 25.1 1.5 
--·----
GREAT BRITAIN -8.9 23.9 12.9 
SoL!f~.: Calculated from Fogarty (1945: Table 5, p .15) 
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apparent from both the figures for unemployment and employment 
growth: on the one hand must be placed the high levels of 
unemployment in the declining staple industries;* on the 
* The Ministry of Labour estimated in July 1929 that 
unemployment in the main staple trades (coal, cotton, 
woollen, and worsted textiles, shipbuilding, iron and 
steel, and mechanical engineering) accounted for 
approximat~ly one half of total unemployment amongst 
other, account should be taken of the fact that those 
industries which were expanding, the so-called 'new' 
industries, (2S) were located almost exclusively in the 
areas with already lower than average unemployment. 
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The regional problem thus assumed two dimensions: the 
very high rates of unemployment of the industries centred on 
these depressed regions and _their below average rates of 
employment growth. In addition, cyclical factors were also 
of importance in contributing to the regions' problems. 
The depressed regions were heavily committed to producer 
goods industries which, as with investment in GDP, experienced 
the most pronounced cyclical fluctuations in output and 
employment; by contrast, the more prosperous regions of the 
South and Midlands had more diversified industrial bases -
in particular a growth of consumer goods industries - and 
this lessened their susceptibility to the worst effects of 
cyclical depression. 
The extreme concentration of unemployment on the staple 
industries, with its consequences for certain regions, forms 
the centrepiece of recent arguments which have sought to 
question the traditional view of interwar unemployment as 
primarily demand deficient and as unduly high as compared 
with the preceding period. ( 26 ) Whilst this reinterpretation 
may have been carried too far, the significance of the 
regional problem, and its implications for the effectiveness 
of stabilization policies, is reinforced by study of the 
dynamics of interwar labour markets. 
insured workers (cited in Aldcroft 1970a: 146). The 
greatest decline in employment occurred in the coal, 
textile, and shipbuilding industries; these released 
a total of 0.69m workers between 1924-38, a fall in 
employment of 34.1% (calculated from ibid. Table 22). 
It is axiomatic that the number of people on the 
unemployment register rises or falls as the flow of newly 
unemployed coming onto the register exceeds or falls short 
of the flow of people leaving the register to take up 
employment, and that the duration of unemployment is as 
important an indicator of labour market conditions as the 
absolute numbers unemployed. ·As Cripps and Tarling_· stress: 
Ari understanding of the dynamics of this process is 
important both for judging policies designed to 
mitigate the evils of prolonged unemployment and for 
interpreting the unemployment statistics as a measure 
of the pressure of demand in the labour market. (27) 
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A comprehensive full employment policy requires not only 
that unemployment be stabilized at some (politically and 
economically acceptable) target level, but that the average 
duration of unemployment be monitored and, if possible, 
regulated so as to prevent the impairment of workers' skills 
that inevitably results from long-period unemployment. In 
both spheres, the interwar experience of unemployment failed 
to meet these criteria; and, as will now be argued, the 
true significance of the unemployment problem lay not only 
in the high absolute levels of unemployment in certain 
depressed regions but in the prolonged nature of this 
unemployment and its worsening as the period progressed. 
Although no data are available prior to 1929, Table 
1.3 shows that the average duration of unemployment rose 
significantly over the 1930s; other evidence suggests that 
this deterioration was in fact evident from the early 1920s 
(28) 
onwards. In September 1929, 89.1% of the total had been 
unemployed for less than 6 months (short-period unemployment) 
and only 4.7% for more than 12 months (long-period 
unemployment); by August 1937, short-period unemployment 
stood at 65.7% of' the total while long-period unemployment 
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Table 1.3 
Unemployment by duration 1929, 1932, and 1937 
as % of total unemplo~ed* 
less than 3 months 6 months ·g months 12 months 
and less and less and less 3 months than 6 than 9 than 12 or more 
Sept. 1929 78.5 10.6 3.8 2.4 4.7 
Aug. 1932 59.0 11.1 7.3 6.2 16.4 
Aug. 1937 56.3 9.4 6 .. 0 4.0. 24.3 
Source: Beveridge (1944: Table 8) 
Notes: *The estimates actually covered 85.4, 90.5, and 93.2% 
respectively of the insured unemployed. 
had grown to 24.3%, and had in fact worsened over the recovery 
period (from 16.4% in 1932). In terms of absolute numbers, 
the long-period unemployed had grown from 45,100 in 1929 to 
287,821 in 1937, by which date they had become "the most 
serious element in the problem of unemployment."(29 ) As 
Beveridge commented 'The legacy of the Great Depression was 
a host of long-period unemployed - nearly 300,000 men and 
women in enforced idleness - for whom continuous money payments 
were a manifestly inadequate provision."(3 0) 
The policy implications of this long-period unemployment 
problem stemmed from its regional nature: for example in 
1937, 83.8% of those unemployed at 21 June in London (which 
had a mean unemployment rate for the year of 6.3%) had been 
unemployed for less than 6 months and 71% for less than 3 
months, while in Wales (mean unemployment rate of 22.3%), 
only 36% had been unemployed for less than 3 months and 
47.3% for less than 6 months, with 39.3% unemployed for over 
1 ?. . +} (31) ~ mon ... 1s. 
In broad measure, all the depressed areas experienced 
similar problems to those of Wales: regional unemployment 
rates significantly in excess of the national average, and 
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characteristics of unemployment in these areas - by age and 
skill, as well as duration - such as to cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of a centrally directed stimulus to aggregate 
demand as a sufficient solution for these areas' problems. 
This becomes clearer when unemployment is viewed at the 
sub-regional or local level, the level at which the 
disastrous effects of an unsatisfactory industrial structure 
were most pronounced. The astronomical rates of unemployment 
recorded in certain towns at the depth of the depression 
(January 1933) are well known -for example, 91% in Saltburn, 
and 77% in Jarrow;(32 ) less well known, and infrequently 
cited, was the accompanying long-period unemployment problem 
for many depressed area towns. This was vividly brought to 
the public's attention by a Pilgrim Trust survey of November 
1936 which found that, even after four years of strong 
national recovery, 71% of the unemployed in Crook and 45% in 
the Rhondda had been un~mployed for five years or more, as 
compared with only 3% in the prosperous southern town of 
Deptford. (33 ) 
The structural problems confronting the British economy, 
made manifest in the case of these and other depressed area 
towns, and the search for possible solutions, forced inter-
war governments against a range of problems far wider in 
scope than those posed simply by the desirability or otherwise 
of a management of demand. To the economic authorities, the 
desirability of a revival of demand at local levels was not 
in doubt; more questionable was whether the existing 
industrial base of many of these areas was capable of 
responding, to the degree required, to a general stimulus 
of demand, and if not, whether government should assume 
direct responsibility for industrial reconstruction or 
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whether it should retain its previous laissez-faire, stance. 
The stil1 current problem of declining staple industries was 
first faced by interwar governments; having begun to widen 
their responsibilities for economic and social affairs in 
the early years of the century, a laissez-faire stance 
would have been inappropriate and politically unrealistic. 
Yet the characteristics of interwar unemployment made 
comprehensive solutions more difficult; of course, at the 
same time, its seriousness made them more imperative. Of 
vital concern also were the cyclical course of the British 
economy and the various constraints upon policy, subjects 
to which we now turn. 
2. The British economy 1929-39 
Whilst, for exegetical purposes, it was important in 
the previous section to establish the magnitude of interwar 
unemployment and its main characteristics by isolating them 
from broader economic considerations, they should now be 
viewed in relation to the cyclical and trend course of the 
British economy over this period. As a result of detailed 
study in recent years, the record of the interwar economy 
is well known and need not be recounted in any detail. 
Accordingly, the following discussion is limited in scope, 
and focuses on those features of the economy which are 
pertinent to the issues treated in later chapters. 
Reference was made earlier to the fact that the 
persistence of heavy unemployment acted to obscure other 
more favourable developments of the period. Undoubt·edly, 
the traditional interpretation paid excessive attention to 
the declining staple industries and poor export performance.<34 ) 
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The more recent, and now generally accepted, view, is that 
the period "was by no means as black as has been painted"; (35 ) 
that substantial progress was made, at both a micro and macro 
level. In this view, one particularly associated with the 
work of Aldcroft and Richardson, stress is placed upon, on 
the one hand, the growth of the 'new' consumer goods 
in"d ustries and the enlargement of the service sector' and' 
on the other, the acceleration of the underlying growth rate. 
Put simply, in this view, the improved growth performance 
derived from a combination of these structural changes at 
the industry lev~l and an upward shift in total factor 
productivity associated with more rapid technological change. 
There is much of substance in this view, and initially 
it found substantial favour; as Alford noted in 1972, it had 
"almost developed into a new orthodoxy."(36 ) Yet, as is now 
being more fully appreciated, this reinterpretation has been 
carried too far. The importance of the 'new' industries, 
the centrepiece of the arguments about structural change and 
improved productivity growth, have seriously been called into 
question; there are considerable difficulties associated 
with growth calculations between the wars because of the 
wide amplitude of cyclical fluctuations; and, more generally, 
whilst growth might have been respectable as compared with 
earlier or later periods, the point remains that demand still 
failed to grow at a rate sufficient to match the growth of 
(3 '7) 
the labour force. 
A thoroughgoing reappraisal of the Aldcroft-Richardson 
'new orthodoxy' has yet to be undertaken; nevertheless, 
serious doubts have been raised about its essentials. Two 
aspects in particular require further comment since they 
relate to policy issues. 
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Firstly, Aldcroft contends that '~he sharp contraction 
of some of the older industries was a positive long-term 
advantage", since by releasing resources they permitted an 
acceleration of structural change, and the creation of a 
development 'bloc' of new, high growth, industries which 
underlay the rapid recovery from the 1929-32 depression.(3 S) 
As Howson coinments : 
The flaw in this argument is the assumption of a 
limited stock of resources, limited in the aggregate 
by exogenous technical progress and within that 
aggregate 'over-committed' to the production of the 
old staples by 'structural' factors. Technical 
progress and structural factors are not independent 
of aggregate demand and with one million unemployed 
there could have been more expansion in the new 
industries even if the old were not declining, if 
aggregate demand had been growing sufficiently to 
create profit expectations favourable to investment 
in the new industries (primarily domestic-based). (39) 
Furthermore, the Aldcroft view ignores the fact that: 
(1) In terms of employment, investment, and output, the 'new' 
industries were still of limited quantitative significance 
(40) 
even by the later 1930s, and their contribution to the 
absorption of labour released by the staple industries was 
overshadowed by the employment growth of the service 
sector. (41 ) 
(2) A recovery of the staple industries would have stimulated 
demand for the products of the 'new' industries, both 
directly (induced demand) and indirectly through the 
operation of the multiplier process on aggregate demand. 
(3) Since the external balance was precarious throughout the 
1930s, a recovery of the export industries was necessary to 
prevent an external constraint to increased domestic demand. 
The authorities' preoccupation with a revival of the 
staple industries was thus not misplaced. 
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Secondly, quantitative reference should be made to the 
interwar growth performance. The problems presented by such 
an exercise are particularly acute in the case of this 
period: apart from the perennial problem of attempting to 
isolate the trend from the cycle, cyclical fluctuations were 
particularly marked during this period, thus presenting 
difficulties in-·the selection of suitkble itiitial and 
terminal dates for intertemporal comparisons. Indeed, much 
of the initial overstatement of interwar growth stemmed from 
Aldcroft's choice of a "variety of base years and sub-periods 
which distort[ed] the long-term trend."(42 ) 
As was resolved earlier, the only legitimate dates for 
intertemporal comparisons are 1924 and 1937 (with an 
intermediate date of 1929). On this basis, real GDP grew at 
2.2% per annum, a result which compares favourably with the 
earlier period 1856-99,<43 ) especially when account is taken 
of the economic loss resulting from the persistence _of mass 
unemployment. 
Whilst, on trend, the behaviour of GDP approximated to 
that of earlier periods, cyclical fluctuations were far more 
pronounced. Matthews calculates that the amplitude of GDP 
fluctuations was over twice as strong 1920-37 as 1872-1914, 
and 6ver three times as strong as more recent cycles 
(1951-64), (44 ) the primary explanation being the strong 
cyclical behaviour of exports.( 4S) The seriousness of 
interwar cycles is clearly evident from Chart 1.2, the 
range of fluctuations in GDP (over 12 percentage points) 
being far greater than any post-1945 experience.* 
* In addition, Matthews (1969: 122-3) has estimated that even 
after allowance for lags, proportional fluctuations in 
employment in the postwar period have been not much more 
than one third of those in GDP, while in the interwar 
period employment fluctuated about as much as GDP. 
Ofc, 
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Chart 1.2 
Fluctuations in real GDP and unemploymen~ 1924-37 
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SOURCE: Feinstein (1972: Tables 5, 57). 
NOTES: A. GDP measured at l9J6 market prices. The deviation of GDP 
from trend is measured as the percentage by which actual 
GDP varied from what it would have been had GDP grown 
constantly at the observed average rate of growth between 
1924 and 19J7. 
B. Numbers unemployed as a percentage of the civilian 
working population. 
Turning now to the more limited period under review 
(1929-39), the general picture of cyclical movements is 
summarised in Chart 1.3 which records annual figures for 
real GDP and its components. Three sub-periods, or cyclical 
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Chart 1.3 
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episodes, ( 4G) can be delineated: depression 1929-32, 
recovery 1932-7, recession and rearmament 1937-9. The main 
features of each episode are now considered in turn. 
(i) Depression 1929-32 
The generally accepted interpretation of this episode 
is that the "economic blizzard of 1929-32 was something that 
struck Britain from outside", (47 ) depression being trans-
mitted from the U.S.: (1) indirectly via the curtailment of 
U.S. foreign lending from mid-1928 which led to a reduction 
in the purchasing power of those countries which had a large 
demand for U.K. exports; and (2) more directly by cutting 
U.S. import demand for U.K. goods once depression had become 
established in the U.S. <48 ) 
Exports both led at the upper turning-point (1929 III) 
and experienced the most pronoLmced losses over the subse-
quent depression pe~iod. As Table 1.4 shows exports fell 
by 32.2% over 1929-32 as compared with a fall of only 4.9% 
in GDP (the falls at current prices were much greater, 
respectively 47.3 and 9.5%).* Depression was not initiated 
by the bursting of a domestic boom; Britain had in fact 
failed to share fully in the world boom of 1925-9. Further-
more, as Richardson argues, the relative weakness of the 
previous upswing was to be a major factor moderating the 
depression after 1929.<49 ) 
The mildness of the depression can be seen from Table 
1.4, depression being only serious in the indicators for 
unemployment and exports. There were no autonomous internal 
sources of falling income, and a high floor to activity was 
* Given the downward course of interwar prices, real values 
are used throughout this study; nevertheless, the point 
should not be forgotten that the price falls of 1929-32 
undoubtedly created the impression amongst contemporaries 
that the depression was more severe than it actually was. 
A. National income and 
comJ2onents ~constant 
1938 Prices) 
1. GDP 
2. Consumers ' 
expenditure 
3. Imports 
4. Exports 
5. Public 
authorities' 
current 
expenditure 
6. GDFCF 
B. Other 
7. Indus trial 
production index 
(constant 1913 
prices) 
8. Employment 
9. Unemployment 
(series A) 
10. Unemployment 
(series B) 
11. Retail prices 
12. Terms of trade 
13. Gross profits 
Table 1 .4 
Economic indicators 1929-39 
% changes 
1929-30 1930-1 1931-2 1929-32 1932-3 1933-4 1934-5 1935-6 1936-7 
-0.1 -5.1 +0.3 -4.9 +1.1 +6.8 +3.8 +3.1 +4.3 
+1.5 +1.1 -0.6 . ±2 .. 0 +2.6 +2.9 +2.8 +2.9 +1.7 
-1.4 +3.8 -10.8 -8.6 +0.1 +4 .4 +4.9 +2.5 +3.6 
-13 .9 -19.4 -2.2 -32.2 +1.3 +3.8 +12.8 -2.9 +5.1 
+2.5 +2.4 0 +5.0 +1.1 +2.3 +6.8 +9.1 +11.6 
+0.4 -1.9 -12.8 -14.1 +3.3 +21.8 +4.0 +9.1 +3.4 
-4.3 -6.5 -0.4 -10.8 +6.6 +10.0 +7.6 +9.0 +6.0 
-1.6 -2.7 +0.5 -·3. 7 +2.2 +3.2 +1.5 +3 .0 +3.4 
+60.0 +37.5 +3.0 +126.7 -8.8 -16.1 -7.7 -12.5 -14.3 
+58.3 +42.1 +3.7 +133.3 ""10.7 -16.0 -4.8 -15 .o -17.6 
-3.7 -6.5 -2.8 -12.4 ·-2 .8 +0.7 +1.4 +2.9 +5.6 
+9.2 +9.9 +0.7 +20.8 +2.8 -2.7 -1.4 -2.8 -5.8 
-ll.9 -10.1 -4.4 -24.3 +9.5 +8.5 +8.9 +12.2 +6.7 
1932-7 1937-8 1938-9 
+20.4 +3 .0 +3.9 
+13 .5 +0.8 +0.5 
+16.5 -2.2 +8.9 
+21.1 -6.5 -7.5 
+34.5 +19.5 +51.4 
+47.5 +1.4 -10.5 
+45.8 -2.7 .. 
+14 .1 0 +3 .8 
-47.1 +22.2 -40.9 
-50.0 +35 .7 -26.3 
+7.8 +0.7 +3.3 
-9.7 +9.2 -1.4 
+54.9 -4 .o .. 
-- - ------------- --
Sources: (1)-(6) Feinstein (1972: Table 5); (7) Ibid. Table 8; 
(ll) Feinstein (1972: Table 65); (12) Ibid. Table 64; 
(8)-(10) as Chart 1.1; 
(13) Ibid. Table 26. 
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ensured by the continued growth of consumers' expenditure, 
a result of the downward inflexibility of wages and 
favourable movements in the terms of trade. 
Furthermore, the U.K. depression was mild compared with 
the experience of other industrial nations: industrial 
production and incomes fell less than half as much as in 
Germany and the U.S. ( 5 0) The experiences of unemployment, 
however, were fairly similar. Unemployment (series B) rose 
from a lowpoint of 9.6% in June 1929 to a maximum of 23.0% 
in January 1933, an increase of over 1.8m to 2.979m insured 
unemployed. Wh~n adjusted for seasonal factors, the actual 
maximum of cyclical unemployment was reached in 1932 III, 
the lower turning-point for other economic indicators. 
Given the severity of the depression experienced by 
the export trades,* and their geographical concentration, 
the most serious impact of the depression came at the 
region~l level (Tables 1.1 and 1.2). As is argued later, 
the form of the depression posed problems for any attempt 
to stabilize demand by conventional (Keynesian) measures. 
(ii) Recovery 1932-7 
Following the depreciation of sterling in September 1931 
there occurred a short-lived recovery (1931 III-IV), evident 
particularly in the export industries. The contemporaneous 
tightening of monetary and fiscal policy ensured that this 
recovery was not supported by a domestic stimulus and thus 
proved unsustainable, depression forces, being temporarily 
(51) 
re-established from early 1932. 
It was not until 1932 III that recovery became established. 
*For example, the volume of coal exports fell by 35.5% over 
1929-32, while iron and steel fell by 54.8% and cotton 
piece goods by 52.5% over 1929-31 (calculated from Mitchell 
and Deane 1962: 121, 148, 183). 
The subsequent upswing (to 1937 III) was both strong and 
of (historically) long duration. Over 1932-7 GDP grew by 
20.4%, industrial production by 45.8%, and employment by 
14.1%. Unfortunately, the reduction of unemployment was 
not as impressive: from a (seasonally unadjusted) peak 
of 2 .979m (23. O%) in January 1933 insured unemployment 
fell to a minimum of 1.404m (9.7%) in September 1937.* 
Although impressive when viewed in aggregate terms, 
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the recovery was uneven in its rate of progress and affected 
different sectors to varying degrees, characteristics which 
were to have important implications for economic policy. 
The first stage of recovery, from 1932 III to 1933 IV, saw 
a vigorous revival of activity, and by the end of 1933 '~he 
economic situation was more favourable than at any time 
since June 1930. Abroad, on the other hand, the economic 
outlook remained bleak ... (52 ) The recovery was thus initially 
domestically based, the export trades remained de.pressed - a 
reflection of the slow revival of ~orld trade and the not 
unconnected increasing economic nationalism of the period. 
At a national level, the unemployment rate fell from 23.0% 
to 17.5% over January-December 1933, but this fall was 
extremely uneven as between the various regions. Against a 
23 .2% reduction in the aggregate numbers of insured 
unemployed, the regional figures were 32.4% for London, 
34.3% for the South-east, 18.8% for the North-west, and 
only 9.3% for Wales. <53 ) 
These disparities continued throughout 1934, a year in 
which the rate of recovery slackened as the initial 
stimulatory forces became exhausted, exports failing to rise 
* The comparable figure for June 1929, the previous upper 
turning-point, was l.l76m. 
as an offset to the reduced growth of domestic demand. 
Recovery was resumed, however, from the spring of 1935 
and tended to assume different characteristics from the 
preceding phase. Firstly, costs began to rise with 
increasing intensity from late 1935 and shortages of 
skilled labour developed. Secondly, world trade began 
to recover and the export industries to revive, thereby 
ensuring a more broadly based reduction in regional 
unemployment rates. Finally, residential construction, 
which had been crucial in the upturn, started to slacken, 
but a revival of non-residential construction and producer 
goods output acted as an offset so that recovery was able 
to continue unabated until 1937 III. There then occurred 
a short, sharp recession. 
(iii) Recession and rearmament 1937-9 
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As with the turning-point of 1929-30, exports played a 
crucial rale in initiating the downswing of 1937-8,<54 ) and 
for depressing demand thereafter. From the behaviour of 
GDP in Table 1.4 it is not immediately apparent that 1937-8 
constitutes a recession period; the course of unemployment, 
however, portrays a different and more illuminating picture. 
In fact, the downturn of 1937-8 was sharper than that of 
1929-30, but the recession was not genera1.< 55 ) While 
export volumes and consumer durables were both seriously 
affected, output of some industries continued to grow under 
the stimulus of the rearmament programme. 
Insured unemployment rose from a lowpoint of 1.404m 
(9.7%) to a (seasonally unadjusted) peak of 2.134m (14.2%) 
in January 1939. The recession had, however, run its 
course by mid-1938, although a definite upturn was not 
evident until 1938 IV. Thereafter, recovery proceeded 
rapidly and, as is shown in later chapters, was largely 
determined by fiscal operations. ( 56 ) 
3. Policy issues and policy constraints: a conspectus 
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It remains in this final section to discuss some broader 
aspects of the British economy of the 1930s, their relation 
to policy issues, and the way in which certain economic 
conditions - conditions largely unrelated to theoretical 
questions -were to constrain policy. 
Firstly, the course of the British economy should be 
placed in an international context. The mildness of the 
depression in Britain, as compared with the experience of 
other industrial economies, has already been noted; mention 
should also be made of the fact that recovery occurred 
earlier in Britain than in many other countries, was stronger, 
and more complete.<57 ) In particular, the case of the U~S. 
economy under the Ro-osevelt administration was instrLtctive: 
its limited recovery was taken as an object lesson by the 
British authorities of the dangers associated with 
unorthodox policies.* It therefore also served to reinforce 
the authorities commitment to orthodox policies in Britain.<58 ) 
Whilst the case for orthodox policies in Britain was 
reinforced by the apparent failure of the more ambitious 
'New Deal' policies in the U.S., a more direct constraint 
was to limit policy and the scope for complete economic 
recovery: that of the precarious external balance (see 
*The Treasury's resolve to avoid deficit-financing was also 
strengthened by the fact that the debt position was con-
siderably less favourable in Britain than in the U.S. 
Even with a doubling of the federal debt over 1932-9, 
largely as a result of the 'New Deal' policies. the debt/ 
GNP ratio only rose from 0.334 to 0.446 (calcuiated from 
U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975: I, 224; II, 1117), whereas 
in Britain, largely as a result of the heavy burden of war 
debts, the debt/GDP ratio averaged 1.53 over 1933/4-1938/9 
(see Middleton 198lb). 
Table 1.5 
Balance of payments: current account 1929-39 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
Current balance 
as % of GDP 
2.0 
0.8 
. -2.4 
-1.2 
-0.2 
-0.5 
0.5 
-0.6 
-0.9 
-1.0 
-4.2 
Source: Calculated from Feinstein (1972: Tables 3,15) 
Table 1.5). Contrary to the Aldcroft-Richardson 'new 
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orthodoxy' that the traditional view of the interwar period 
placed undue emphasis on poor export performance, the 
behaviour of exports - both on trend and over the cycle -
was the most disturbing feature of the economy at that 
time, and one of the most potent constraints to the achieve-
ment of full employment. 
Exports consisted primarily of capital and 'high-income' 
goods, overseas demand for which was highly income elastic.<59 ) 
Imports, on the other hand, were still dominated by food-
stuffs and raw materials, the income elasticity of which was 
much lower.( 60) An autonomous fall in world incomes, 
therefore, led to an immediate worsening of the British 
balance of payments: for example, the depression phase saw 
a move from a £96m current account surplus in 1929 to a 
deficit of £103m in 1931 (a deterioration unparalleled with 
anything of post-1945 experience). In these circumstances, 
a reflation of British domestic demand (uncoordinated with 
an international relation),* might have involved serious 
* See Committee on Finance and Industry (Macmillan Committee), 
Report, Cmd. 3897 (1931), esp. paras. 306-19. Economists 
in the early 1930s pressed for a coordinated international 
reflation. bv a combination of monetarv and fiscal measures. 
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consequences for the balance of payments, and considerable 
risks for the continued pre-eminence of London as a world 
financial centre. 
Nor, on trend, was the export position satisfactory. 
Over the period 1924-37, exports fell by 12.2%, while 
imports rose by 17.5% and GDP by 27 .7% (at constant prices). 
Accordingly, the importance of the foreign trade sector 
declined: the export/GDP ratio, which had been 0.324 in 
1913, fell from 0.272 in 1924 to 0.232 in .1929, and 0.159 
in 1937.( 6l) The full significance of Britain's deteriorating 
export position is evident when viewed in the context of 
world trade: U.K. exports as a proportion of total world 
trade fell from 13.9% in 1913 to 10.2% in 1937, and in 
world manufactures from 29.9% .to 22 .4%. ( 62 ) Since the 
current balance was also deteriorating over this period, 
from a surplus of 9o3% of GDP in 1913 to a deficit of 0.9% 
in 1937, and since at least one millipn were. unemployed 
throughout, a higher level of activity could only have been 
sustained by measures to rebuild Britain's export industries 
and/or curtail imports. Even after the insulation of the 
domestic economy and the more flexible exchange rate policy 
after 1931, a trade-off between full employment and external 
balance, such as has plagued the post-1945 economy, was a 
distinct possibility. 
A second possible constraint to the achievement of 
full employment concerned the elasticity of aggregate 
supply and the related question of the seriousness of 
-----------
but sueh a policy never received unilateral governmental 
support, as instanced by the collapse of the 1933 World 
Economic Conference. It should be said, however, that the 
reluctance of governments to adopt this approach stemmed, 
not from doubts about its potential benefits, but from 
general uncertainty and domestic political pressures which 
made it difficult to abnegate the freedom to pursue an 
independent policy. 
Britain's structural unemployment problem. Contemporary 
economists assumed a practically horizontal supply function 
in the early stages of recovery, ( 63 ) an assumption borne 
out by the stability of prices over 1932-5. From mid-1935 
onwards, however, costs and prices began to rise with 
increasing intensity,* not only as import prices rose but 
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also as structural imbalances developed in labour markets,** 
there being sufficient excess demand in some sectors to 
force up wages despite the continuance of heavy unemployment 
in many other sectors.< 64 ) By the time the upper turning-
point had been reached in 1937, "there [were] widespread 
complaints of shortages of labour and delays in production", <65 ) 
and this at a time when there were still lim or so unemployed 
nationally. 
Supply constraints thus came into operation long before 
anything approaching full employment had been attained; 
indeed Richardson argues that : 
the similarity between the unemployment levels of 1929 
and 1937 suggests that cyclical unemployment had been 
eliminated by the middle of 1937 and that the contin-
uance of heavy unemployment is to be explained by other 
causes rather than by a failure of recovery. (66) 
In this view, cyclical full employment had been reached by 
1937 III, and a further stimulus to aggregate demand 
(irrespective of whether it was private or public sector 
induced) would not, at least in the short-term, have led to 
further increases in aggregate output, rather supply 
constraints would have ensur~ed that the addi tiona! demand 
was l . ....,.t d . . . . (67) ex11u1 e 1n r1s1ng pr1ces. 
* The Board of Trade index of wholesale prices rose 27% 
between July 1935 and its peak in July 1937. 
** A similar development is noticeable in the U.S. economy 
during 1936-7, a time when there was still considerable 
general excess capacity (Arndt 1944: 59). 
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Underlying such an argument is the distinction between 
structural and cyclical une~ploy~ent.(SS) Although it is 
difficult to develop satisfactory criteria for the empirical 
testing of the structural and cyclical components of total 
unemployment, a practical distinction can be drawn between 
them. Structural unemployment can be defined as that form 
of unemployment specific to certain industrial sectors and 
resulting from technological and market forces which are 
exogenously determined. Cyclical unemployment, on the other 
hand, is more general and more readily responsive to change 
in aggregate deffiand.(sg) 
It should not be inferred, however, that structural 
unemployment cannot be reduced by an aggregate demand 
stimuli. N.ei ther economic theory, nor g.eneral experience 
since 1945, would warrant such a conclusion. Nevertheless, 
it is also clear that certain qualifications need to be made 
about the efficacy o£ an aggregate demand stimulus in the 
circumstances of the interwar period: these circumstances 
were in some sense unusual (the seriousness and nature of 
the regional problem), while the subsequent continuance of 
regional imbalances in unemployment rates in the postwar 
period (when the average pressure of demand has been 
significantly higher than prewar) suggests that there is 
no automatic mechanism whereby a uniform equilibrium 
results in all sectors of labour markets.< 7o) 
This line of inquiry has largely been neglected to 
dat·.e, ( 7 l) a11d \"hl'le d t '1 d 1 · · h t+ t d _ • no e ·a1 e ana ys1s 1s ere a ~emp e , 
reference should at least be made to certain relevant 
considerations: firstly, income multipliers for disadvantaged 
regions are generally smaller than their national counter-
parts;(72) secondly, the depressed areas were handicapped 
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by an unfavourable industrial base, one dominated by 
declining industries dependent upon export markets; thirdly, 
although migration from the depressed to the more prosperous 
areas was not insubstantial, ( 73 ) there was a discernible 
'mismatch' between the labour released by the contracting 
industrial sectors and that required by the expanding sectors; 
and fourthly, the prolonged nature of unemployment in the 
depressed areas resulted in a marked deterioration in the 
quality and potential employability of this substantial 
constituent of total interwar unemployment. ( 74 ) Here, as 
with the previous difficulty, substantial retraining and 
government assistance would have been required, existing 
provisions being manifestly inadequate. <75 ) 
These questions are explored. further in the final 
chapter of this study, where they are related to official 
views on the constraints that might lessen the efficacy o£ 
deficit-financing and public works schemes. Before turning 
to policy issues, we conclude that while, ceteris paribus, 
a stimulus to aggregate demand was a not inappropriate 
remedy for Britain's interwar unemployment problem, it seems 
also that this would have had to be supplemented by both 
selective demand management measures and action to lessen 
supply constraints. 
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CHAPI'ER 2 
THE TREASURY, ECONOMIC POLICY, AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
A review of the expenditure side of the budget accounts 
is a necessary first step in any investigation of both 
budgetary policy and its impact on the course of economic 
activity. The chapter starts with a discussion of the 
Treasury as an institution, its functions, and the forum and 
conditions under which economic. policy was form,ulated. The 
course and pattern of public expenditure are then surveyed, 
and their behaviour related to the trend and cyclical path 
of GDP. Finally, there follows a discussion of expenditure 
control and the suitability of existing arrangements for 
demand management purposes. 
1. Economic policy and the Treasury(!) 
Amongst the many charges that have been levelled against 
the Treasury, perhaps the most important has been, and 
continues to be, the criticism of its inherent scepticism 
towards new ideas, its reactive character, and almost anti-
intellectual bias.< 2 ) It is because of this, and as a 
reaction to the supposedly unenlightened policies of the 
interwar years, that there were frequent complaints 
regarding the dominance of the Treasury in economic affairs.<3 ) 
The achievement of this dominant position by the 
Treasury has a long lineage, (4 ) but need not concern us 
here; it is sufficient to note that during the interwar 
period the Treasury's influence, in terms of both financial 
control and the power exercised by virtue of its position as 
the central department of state, was strengthened by the 
appointment in 1919 of Sir Warren Fisher as both official 
Head of the Civil Service and Permanent Secretary of the 
Treasury, ( 5 ) and by a number of administrative reforms 
instituted to augment and modernise the existing system of 
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financial cont~ol which had been largely unchanged since the 
Gladstonian reforms of the 1860s. ( 6 ) 
Two questions suggest themselves: firstly, the 
consequences of Treasury pre-eminence for the acceptance of 
the 'new' economics;* and secondly, the validity of the 
traditional interpretation of the authority and influence 
exercised by the Treasury. The former question is considered 
in later chapters; with regard to the latter, much confusion 
has arisen in interpreting the development of Treasury 
thinking because many previous studies have viewed the 
Treasury from too narrow a perspective, in that they have 
largely ignored the fact that economic policy resulted not 
from economic forces alone but from the continual interplay 
of political and economic forces operating at a number of 
levels of government and ultimately being resolved as much 
with reference to the political expediency of a policy as 
to its economic efficacy. To take but one example, the 
Treasury has repeatedly been accused of unnecessarily 
restricting the growth of expenditure during the interwar 
years and for misguidedly enforcing rigorous economy cuts 
in 1921-2 and 1931-2 - occasions when the stabilization 
* Throughout the following chapters, the term the 'new' 
economics is used generally as consisting of the writings 
of Keynes from the late 1920s onwards; the work of the 
main disciples, Joan and Austin Robinson, Richard Kahn, 
Roy Harrod, James Meade, and Nicholas Kaldor; and others 
such as Arthur Salter and Harold Macmillan who, while not 
themselves directly contributing to the developments in 
theoretical economics of the period, actively supported 
the new approach at a political level and were influential 
in its eventual official acceptance. An excellent account 
of the theoretical work of many of these economists is 
contained in Shackle (1967), while Harris (1947), Lekachman 
(1964; 1967), and Davis (1971), look more broadly at Keynes 
and the 'new' economics. 
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objective demanded the opposite course. Yet as one official, 
active in the 1930s, put it many years later: 
The idea that it was a strong Treasury holding down 
spending between the wars misunderstands what was 
happening. It was in fact an economic doctrine 
permeating everywhere -Parliament, ministers, 
officials, press -everyone. Even to labour and trade 
union people the economic laws seemed clear-cut. They 
really believed these economic laws and were ready to 
cut expenditures. (7) 
Furthermore, nor is the accusation well-founded that 
expenditure growth was excessively constrained, at least 
when measured against income growth. The observed elasticity 
of public expenditure growth relative to GDP growth was 1.60 
for the interwar period (1924-37) and only 1.21 for the 
period 1960-76.(S) 
The fact that the Treasury was compelled to respond to 
a variety of pressures - Parliamentary opinion, the City, 
industrial interests, and the reconciliation of conflicting 
departmental interests - as well as the strictly economl.c 
needs of the time, made the Treasury cautious in its outlook, 
averting risks wherever possible, and deeply sceptical of 
the demands of politicians and economists, such as Lloyd 
George and Keynes, who the Treasury believed failed to take 
account of the full ramifications of the policies they were 
-advocating. 
These characteristics applied to all spheres of policy 
formulation and execution. One area in which this bias 
towards risk aversion was particularly evident was in the 
Treasury's attitude towards new directions in budgetary 
policy. For example, during the interwar period, the 
proposal was frequently made that, as a measure to stimulate 
demand, the authorities should reduce income tax, even 
though it necessitated initially unbalancing the budget, 
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because it would greatly stimulate economic activity which, 
in turn, by acting on endogenous budget items (notably the 
income tax yield and outlay on unemployment benefits), 
would more than fully compensate for the initial deficit.( 9 ) 
The Treasury contemptuously termed this the 'act of faith 
theory',(lO) for they felt that the potential benefits (if 
any) of such a policy were far out-weighed by the 
accompanying risks. (ll) It is at this point that adherence 
to budgetary orthodoxy assumed a political significance, a 
theme explored in later chapters. (l2 ) 
The locus of Treasury authority within Whitehall was 
its institutional position at the financial and political 
centre of government. This position rested on the control 
of expenditure, for_it was this which endowed the Treasury 
with political power, and made it the most politically 
conscious of all the departments.< 13 ) This followed not 
only from the fact that "Most actions of government have 
financial aspects which automatically bring them into the 
Treasury's orbit", (l4 ) but also from certain essential 
features of bureaucratic government, whereby "political 
institutions are [not] mere filters through which economic 
forces are automatically translated into policies ... as 
though these filters have little if any effect upon the 
outcomes."(lS) 
In general, Chancellors of the Exchequer during the 
interwar period had little direct experience of financial 
policy questions.* In these circumstances it might be 
supposed that Treasury power was strengthened; for example, 
Amery's comment about Chamberlain: "the Treasury and City 
* The sole exception was Sir Robert Horne, Chancellor from 
April 1921 to October 1922. 
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influences were too strong for a Chancellor ... who, unlike 
Horne, never really understood monetary problems."(l6 ) The 
official papers show this view to be fallacious; Chancellors 
were not mere ciphers, the vehicle whereby Treasury officials 
transmitted policy advice to the Cabinet. Although there 
were occasions in which Chancellors did not immediately 
concur with Treasury advice on important policy issues, there 
was no question of a Chancellor (or the Cabinet) acquiescing 
in a policy which they deemed unacceptable. Where a 
Chancellor was initially unconvinced by the correctness of 
a policy (e.g. Churchill and the return to the gold 
standard), (l 7 ) it is quite clear that in order to gain the 
eventual assent of the Chancellor the Treasury officials had 
to construct·extensive justifications for a policy. Treasury 
officials, then, derived their authority and influence not 
from the weakness of Chancellors in technical questions,* 
but from their political strength within.Cabinet and 
Parliament. 
As a result of Fisher's administrative reforms, which 
consolidated and strengthened the Treasury, a wider range of 
policy questions came into the Treasury's domain. In addition, 
changes brought about by the First World War, and longer-term 
trends which had been in operation before 1914, led to a 
* A Chancellor lacking in authority would have seriously 
weakened the Treasury's position. Such a possibility 
might have arisen after May 1937 when Simon replaced 
Chamberlain as Chancellor; it was prevented by the fact 
that Chamberlain was now Prime Minister and that defence 
and financial policy questions had become so inextricably 
interconnected. Simon (1952: 227) recorded in his memoirs 
his apprehension at, and lack of experience for, becoming 
Chancellor. His misgivings may not have been unfounded, 
for by January 1940 his unpopularity was such that 
Chamberlain, Horace Wilson [Permanent Secretary, Treasury 
1939-42) and Norman [Governor, Bank of England] were 
involved in secret negotiations to replace him by Stamp 
(Chairman, L.M.S. Railway, and government adviser on 
economic policy) (Colville 1976: 72-3; Jones 1964: 337-40). 
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significant widening of the Treasury's responsibilities in 
economic affairs. The '~reasury's traditional areas of 
responsibility - budgetary control and debt management -
changed both in substance and in magnitude", while at "the 
same time, the Treas~ry's responsibilities extended into new 
areas which either did not exist before the war, or else were 
not regarded as being the concern of central government."(lS) 
Yet the Treasury has repeatedly been criticised for the "lack 
of any perception of the impact which [their] administration 
might have on the economy, [and for) the absence of any idea 
of the macroeconomic implications of their actions''.(lS) 
Such a conclusion may have been permissible in the years 
before the Treasury papers were made available to researchers, 
for undoubtedly there was a paucity of material with which to 
judge the Treasury's interwar performance;( 2 0) yet the fore-
going assessment was made in 1972, and as such is totally 
unacceptable. It erroneously assumes, both that it is 
permissible to view_the interwar Treasury by the standards 
of modern economic management and that preVailing political 
conditions can be discounted, conditions which prior to the 
late 1930s were unpropitious to the development of those 
very objectives of economic management against which policy 
is here being appraised. Similarly, to cite Heath's (1927) 
minimalist definition of the Treasury's rSle, as being '~he 
Department which, subject to the control of the executive 
and to the authority of Parliament, is responsible for the 
administration of the public finances of the country," and 
from this to argue that the failures of interwar policy 
h dl . . (21 ) . t t . 1 d. are ar y surpr1s1ng, 1s o crea e a m1s ea 1ng 
impression of the actuality of Treasury responsibility for 
the economy. In formal terms, these responsibilities may 
37 
have been narrowly defined, but the point at issue is the 
actual nature of Treasury responsibility and its implications 
for the economy. 
It is this attempt to try and view the Treasury as 
operating in a vacuum, unrelated and unresponsive to 
prevailing political conditions, that lies at the heart of 
much confusion and misunderstanding of the Treasury's 
economic position between the wars. Reference was made 
earlier to the fact that the outcome of economic policy 
decisions was as much a function of political pressures as 
economic conditions.<22 ) In reaffirming this point, it 
should be stressed that it would be mistaken to postulate 
a situation whereby the Treasury forced their view against 
Cabinet opposition. While certain politicians complained 
·-
of the limitations placed upon policy by Treasury 
cautiousness,* in general terms there was a coincidence of 
interests and views about the essentials of economic policy. 
Treasury authority was also subject to certain 
additional constraints, the most important of which was 
that 'Treasury control had no basis save the authority in 
the Cabinet of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If this 
authority is overborne, the Treasury must comply."(23 ) 
The two main Chancellors of the period - Snowden (1929-31) 
and Chamberlain (1931-7) - were both politically strong 
figures, largely unchallenged within their Cabinets, the 
latter rising to Prime Minister (1937-40). Although 
criticised for excessive financial orthodoxy, ( 24 ) by both 
* For example, MacDonald and certain junior ministers felt 
strongly in 1932-3 that the Treasury was being 
unnecessarily restrictive in its opposition to a limited 
resumption of public works (P.R.O. 30/69/1753, MacDonald 
Diary, 29 Jan. and 5 Feb. 1933). 
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their colleagues and wider political opinion, they were able 
to carry their Cabinets on all major policy issues. There 
was also the ultimate threat, that of resignation, ( 25 ) 
which, with its serious repercussions both politically and 
on confidence, could be evoked in order to strengthen the 
Treasury's case. Such a threat was used by Chamberlain in· 
1935, both in order to prevent Lloyd George being admitted 
to the Cabinet and to limit the extent of any resumption.of 
public works expenditures, (26 ) a subject under review as a 
consequence of the political threat posed by Lloyd George's 
'New De a 1 ' . ( 2 7 ) 
Equanimity within Cabinet was not simply a reflection 
of the general consensus of opinion on financial issues, 
it was also a result of the way in which Treasury officials 
sought first to generate such a consensus at a departmental 
level. Whilst each department had a separate identity and 
outlook ('~ store. of knowledge and experience in the 
subjects handled ... a departmental point of view"), ( 28 ) 
there was also what might be termed a 'Whitehall view', a 
practical philosophy of government .that transcended 
departmental boundaries. Within the higher civil service 
there was "a strong tendency to reach agreement and, where 
conflicts occur, to find as quickly as possible a generally 
agreed resolution", the objective being to obviate the need 
for ministerial intervention. (29 ) This bureaucratic 
characteristic was reinforced during the interwar period by 
Fisher's resolve that relations between the departments be 
improved, "that the administrative class of the Civil 
Service should be looked on as a single corps d 'elite", (3 0) 
and that policies should be coordinated through inter-
departmental committees. 
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Apart from exclusively budgetary matters, questiorn of 
economic policy were frequently discussed by inter-
departmental committees (at both official and Cabinet levels) 
representing the main economic departments~ This form of 
decision making carried with it certain implications: 
The great value of the Whitehall process with its 
numerous inter-departmental committees and its stress 
on clearing matters at all levels with interested 
departments is that any course of action finally agreed 
upon is usually practicable, at least it is 
practicable in the eyes of Whitehall. Included in the 
term practicable is the acceptance of the policy by 
all the departments who will have some part in its 
administration. The danger inherent in the process, 
indeed in any process in which a large number of 
interests and considerations have to be taken into 
account, is that the ideal course of action may be 
completeiy lost sight of in the discussion of 
departmental difficulties and objections. (31) 
(Emphasis Added) 
Lt is contended that this style of decision making.invariably 
resulted in a bias against policies, which, irrespective of 
their economic merits, posed considerable administrative 
difficulties. This, and the civil service's highly 
. . (32) 
developed sense of caution, explains the poor response 
to the considerable administrative challenge posed by 
Britain's interwar economic difficulties.< 33 ) 
The existence of policy views, widely shared and 
extending onto an inter-departmental level, also raises 
problems of a different order: those for the interpretation 
of the origins of policy and the channels whereby advice was 
transmitted to the Cabinet. Firstly, such problems of 
exegesis derive from the fact that a departmental view was 
"not something which ha[d) been imposed on a Department by 
any one individual ... (but) in most cases [was] the result 
of nothing more startling than the slow accretion and 
accumulation of experience over the years". (34 ) The manner 
in which a departmental view evolved is of especial relevance 
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to any assessment of Treasury economic policy, and most 
particularly the 'Treasury view' on public works. From the 
way in which Hopkins* gave evidence to the Macmillan 
Committee in 1930, (35 ) it might be supposed that the 
'Treasury view' originated from Hopkins, or alternatively 
from very senior Treasury officials. In fact, this was not 
the case; as will be shown in a later chapter, (36 ) the 
opposition to large-scale public works was essentially a 
'Whitehall view'. Whilst the theoretical, or strictly 
economic, constituent of this view was publicly expressed 
by the Treasury, the views so expressed reflected inter-
departmental experience of administering public works 
schemes since the early 1920s. 
In interpreting the basis of the 'Treasury view', 
indeed a wide range of economic policy issues, the question 
arises as to whether the Treasury adhered to a formal and 
explicit theory of economic operations, or whether policy 
decisions and v·iews were founded on a practical and 
administrative philosophy of government which owed little 
to such considerations. In resolving this question, it 
should be noted from the outset that the Treasury documents 
are not an entirely satisfactory source for this purpose. 
Both in its internal papers, and in public statements by 
Chancellors, the Treasury rarely expressed its general 
views about economic policy or theoretical issues; almost 
without exception, statements were limited to an opinion 
about specific questions. Thus discretion needs to be 
exercised, and the records used assiduously, whenever 
conclusions of a general nature are drawn. <37 ) 
* Sir Richard V. N. Hopkins, Controller of Supply Services, 
Treasury 1927-8; Second Secretary 1928-42; Permanent 
Secretary 1942-5. 
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Finally, reference should be made to a related 
difficulty: that many subjects are only infrequently 
mentioned in the papers, even important issues such as the 
reasons for the continuing allegiance to balanced budgets. 
This seems to have been a result of certain characteristics 
f th ·r · t · <38 ) d f th o e reasury as an organ1sa 1on, an o e 
personalities of its senior officials.* The nature of 
policy deliberations, and the way in which a departmental 
view emerged, were such that senior officials, (39 ) in 
large measure, shared a common ground in their approach 
towards specific issues. This common ground was based on a 
number of unstated assumptions - for Treasury officials 
"shared a commonality of background, education and ideals 
that tended to produce homogeneity and conformity in advice 
and practice"(4 0) -, which it was felt unnecessary to record 
in the papers.( 4 l) 
2. Th~ course of expenditure 
The First World War resulted in an unprecedented 
expansion of the public sector,<42 ) an expansion manifested 
both in the extension of the range of economic activities 
subject to state control and in a near doubling of the 
ratio of public expenditure to GDP.** Whilst in the years 
* Of these, Hopkins was undoubtedly the most important: 
"with varying titles and in differing forms of organis-
ation, he was the chief adviser to the Chancellor ... 
on all important aspects of financial policy and on the 
control of Government expenditure" ('Sir Richard Hopkins' 
1956: 117); or as Beloff (1975: 213) put it: "It is hard 
not to believe that [Hopkins] ... must have been more 
important in his own right than many cabinet ministers." 
Apart from Hopkins and Fisher, other Treasury officials 
of note were: Sir Frederick Phillips (Assistant Secretary 
1919-27; Principal Assistant Secretary 1927-31; Deputy 
Controller 1931; Under Secretary 1932-9); Sir Frederick 
Leith-Ross (Deputy Controller of Finance 1925-32; Chief 
Economic Adviser to H. M. Government 1932-46); and Sir 
Ralph Hawtrey (Director of Financial Enquiries 1919-45). 
** Public expenditure as defined in Table 2.1 
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immediately preceding the war the expenditure ratio had 
followed an upward course, this increase (largely due to 
the Liberal welfare reforms) was to be completely over-
shadowed by developments occasioned by the war. 
Table 2.1 
Public exEenditure by economic category as 
~ of GDPI selected years 1913-37* 
Current Gross Subsidies Current 
goods and capital and grants grants Debt Total to private paid interest services formation 
sector abroad 
1913 8.1 1.2 0.9 1.7 11.9 
1920 8.2 1.7 4.7 0.2 5.7 20.5 
1924 9.0 2.2 4.3 0.2 7.9 23.6 
1929 9.2 2.6 4.9 0.1 7.7 24.5 
1932 10.1 2.8 7.2 0.1 7.8 27.9 
1937 11.7 3.3 5.6 0.1 5.3 25.9 
Source: Feinstein (1972: Tables 3, 14, 39). 
Notes:* Public expenditure is here defined as current and 
capital expenditure by central and local government 
plus capital expenditure by the public corporations. 
From 0.119 in 1913 the expenditure ratio rose to a peak 
of 0.436 in 1918. Following the end of the war expenditure 
was sharply curtailed: as Table 2.1 shows the expenditure 
ratio had fallen to 0.205 in 1920, by which time (nominal) 
expenditure stood at over four times its 1913 level. There-
after, further reductions in expenditure were hindered, 
firstly, by the conflicting nature of the government's social 
and fiscal policy objectives and, secondly, by the unfortunate 
concatenation of a change in economic conditions (1920-1) 
which was to make neither of these objectives attainable. 
On the one hand, the government's social policy, known 
popularly as a 'Land fit for Heroes', implied an increase 
in its expenditure commitments;( 43 ) on the other hand, 
since the Cunliffe Committee Interim Report of November 1918 
the prevailing economic view had been that expenditure must 
be drastically reduced, (44 ) for only by this method could 
inflation be controlled* and there eventually follow a 
reduction of taxation from its wartime levels and a return 
to the gold standard at prewar parity.<45 ) In the debate 
that ensued within government, the latter group of 
objectives prevailed and budgetary policy was tightened 
considerably (on both the revenue and expenditure sides) 
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during 1919-20. Of course, the irony was that the recession 
that followed (1920 II-1921 IV), (46 ) a recession at least 
partially induced by deflationary fiscal operations, <47 ) 
was itself to frustrate temporarily further efforts to 
reduce expenditure. 
The net effect of these developments was that the 
expenditure ratio continued to rise, by a further 5.1 
percentage points of GDP over 1920-2. Expenditure, in 
nominal terms had fallen (by 4.6%), but the fall in GDP was 
very much greater (23.5%). Thus at an early stage there 
appeared a problem.that was to bedevil all interwar govern-
ments in their budgetary policies, the problem o£ the 
irreconcil a bili ty of the balanced budget rule with a 
budget structure, the characteristics of which was its 
sensitivity to cyclical fluctuations. In the prewar period, 
the interrelationship of the budget to the economy, and the 
implications of this for budgetary policy, was a problem 
that never raised itself to any important degree. The 
enlargement of the public sector brought about by the war, 
* Postwar inflations were not limited to the continental 
European countries, such as Germany. Indeed, the most 
rapid rate of inflation ever experienced by Britain in 
modern times occurred in the postwar boom of 1919-20. 
According to the Board of Trade wholesale price index the 
inflation rate was 42.5% between April 1919 and April 1920, 
and at its worst (July 1919-February 1920) it reached 55.2% 
on an annualised basis (data from Pigou 1947: App.III, 
Table IV). The experience of this inflation was to be a 
potent reminder throughout the interwar period of the 
consequences, ceteris paribus, of large-scale deficit 
finance. 
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however, changed conditions fundamentally: public 
expenditure had reached such a proportion of GDP that this 
interrelationship could not be ignored. Indeed, in a sense, 
the history of subsequent developments revolves largely 
around the authorities attempts to come to terms with this 
essential (Keynesian) economic truth. In addition, 
difficulties are also raised for any assessment of the impact 
(48) 
of fiscal operations; a subject explored later. 
After further economies were made during 1922-3, the 
expenditure ratio then exhibited a slight upward trend for 
the remainder of the period under review, rising from 0.236 
in 1924 to 0.259 in 1937. Around this upward trend the 
ratio fluctuated pro-cyclically: as with the fall-off in 
economic activity of 1920-1, the depression of 1929-32 was 
also accompanied by a sharp upward movement; this was 
followed by a fall in tha middle 1930s as recovery progressed; 
and finally the later 1930s were to witness a resumption of 
the upward movement, this time mainly as a result of rearmament 
although the 1937-8 recession was also a contributory factor 
(see Chart 2 .1) . 
From Table 2.1 the enlargement of the public sector, as 
compared with prewar, can be seen to be the result of the 
greatly increased expenditures on debt interest and on 
subsidies and grants to the private sector. Both categories 
of expenditure constitute transfer payments, and as such do 
not represent direct claims upon resources (current 
expenditure on goods and services and public authorities' 
capital formation). Whilst transfer payments increased 
more than direct expenditures over 1913-20 (respectively 
from 2.6 to 10.4% of GDP and from 9.3 to 9.9% of GDP), over 
the subsequent period the trends were reversed: between 
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1924 and 1937 transfer payments fell from 12.2 to 10.9% of 
GDP while direct expenditures rose from 11.2 to 15.0% of 
GDP. Thus within the total of public expenditure, and in 
relation to GDP, the public sector's claim on resources was 
growing throughout the interwar period.* 
A number of general features underlay the upward trend 
of expenditure between the wars, factors which can be grouped 
under two headings: those that were largely exogenous or 
independent of policy, and those endogenous factors which in 
large measure were the consequences of policy and of the 
problems of the British economy. 
Under the first heading, account should be taken of the 
various war-related expenditures, such as pensions and 
disability allowances, and of certain demographic changes 
which were to influence the pattern of expenditure. In 
particular, as was noted above, (49 ) the falling birth rate 
resulted both in a rising proportion of the population who 
were economically active and of those of retirement age, 
the net effect being additional demands for pension support 
and, given excess supply in labour markets, for outlay on 
unemployment benefits. 
With regard to the largely endogenous influences, of 
particular importance was the continuously high level of 
unemployment, which was to affect total expenditure both 
* Mention should be made, however, of one sphere in which 
the general trend of an extension of the public sector did 
not operate to such a marked degree, that of employment 
(see Abramovitz and Eliasberg 1957). Public sector 
employment had expanded during the war (from 4.2 to 6.9% 
of total employment 1911-20), but as with expenditure, was 
curtailed in the immediate postwar period. Thereafter, 
public sector employment was only to rise marginally 
faster than total employment, increasing its share from 
5.1 to 5.3% over 1924-37 (Feinstein 1972: Tables 57, 59, 60). 
There were, however, important compositional effects: 
employment in local government rose continuously and increased 
both relatively and absolutely, whereas central government 
employment fell until the later 1920s and the defence forces 
until the early 1930s. 
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directly and indirectly. The direct influence operated 
th-rough benefit payments and relief work expenditures for 
the unemployed; the indirect influence was broader in effect 
and of greater significance. 
Whilst it might be supposed that the difficult economic 
conditions of the period would have served to frustrate 
demands for further social reforms, and therefore to have 
acted as a constraint to the continued growth of 
expenditure, in fact the opposite seems to have been the 
case. As was noted by contemporaries, (SO) and in large 
measure has been confirmed by more recent experience, 
economic failures such as heavy unemployment or a 
deteriorating standard of living can be a potent force 
intensifying demands for increased social expenditures. 
Accordingly, the upward trend of expenditure may be seen 
as another manifestation of the failure to resolve the 
unemployment problem. It should be noted, however, that 
the translation of these demands into increased expenditure 
Table 2.2 
Observed elasticities of public expenditure growth 
relative to GDP growth (current prices), 1924-37 
A. {1924-9 2 
Current 
Capital 
Total 
B. {1929-37) 
Current 
Capital 
Total 
c. {1924-37) 
Current 
Capital 
Total 
Central 
government 
1.27 
1.24 
1.46 
5.04 
1.52 
1.41 
3.05 
1.45 
Local 
government 
2.84 
4.19 
3.14 
1.34 
2.86 
1.71 
1.98 
3.72 
2.38 
Total public 
expenditure 
1.39 
3.83 
1.61 
1.29 
3.49 
1.53 
1.36 
4.03 
1.60 
Source: Feinstein (1972: Tables 3, 12-14, 34, 36, 39). 
was by no means automatically assured; it only resulted 
because there had occurred certain fundamental changes in 
political circumstances which were conducive to increased 
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expenditure. The widening of the franchise and the emergence 
of the Labour Party, the two most conspicuous developments 
of the early twentieth century, were to create conditions of 
increased party rivalry and a political atmosphere whereby 
promises of increased expenditure were a powerful means of 
gaining electoral support. 
The background to the interwar growth of the public 
sector has now been surveyed and the expenditure ratio used 
as an illustrative measure.* Table 2.2 gives estimates of 
an alternative measure: the observed elasticity of expenditure 
growth relative to GDP growth. Estimates are presented for 
1924-37 along with two sub-periods; for total public 
expenditure and for expenditure by central and local 
* Account has not, however, been taken of the relative price 
effect because of the uncertain direction in which it 
operated during this period. 
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government; and for current, capital, and total expenditures. 
The results show that in each case the observed elasticity 
was greater than unity; that for total public expenditure 
the elasticity was historically high;( 5 l) that capital 
expenditure saw the most rapid expansion; and that it was 
local rather than central expenditures which were growing at 
the most rapid rate. The latter trend was of some importance 
and should now be discussed. 
(i) Central government 
From Tables 2.2 and 2.3 and Chart 2.1 two general 
features can be established: firstly, that the cyclical 
timing of the central government expenditure ratio was 
similar to that for total expenditure, the major difference 
be~ng that the amplitude of fluctuations were greater in the 
case of the latter; and secondly, on trend central 
expenditures grew at a slower rate than total expenditure 
over the period as a whole, although in the 1930s the rates 
equalised as the pace of expansion quickened in the case of 
the former. 
As was established above, the increased expenditure, 
as compared with prewar, was largely a function of greater 
outlays on debt interest and an extension of grants to the 
private sector. ·The significance of the greatly magnified 
debt burden is considered in a later chapter;(52 ) as regards 
the other transfer payments, the most important were the 
national insurance benefits and other expenditures related 
to social objectives, and the grants to local authorities 
h · h · d · d bl ft the 1929 reforms. (53 ) w 1c were ra1se cons1 era y a er 
The relative position of transfer payments was,however, to 
diminish as the period progressed - over 1924-37 current 
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Table 2 .3 
Qyclical behaviour of expenditure ratios 
1 . Total ~ublic ex~enditure 
dates 1920-1 1921-5 1925-9 1929-31 1931-4 1934-8 
expansion % points 5.3 0.9 3.7 3.0 
contraction of GDP 2.2 3~2 
2. Central government 
dates 1920-1 1921-5 1925-9 1929-32 1932-5 1935-8 
expansion % points 3.0 0.6 3.0 2.1 
contraction of GDP 2.1 2.3 
3. Local government 
dates 1920-2 1922-3 1923-.9 1929-31 1931-4 1934-8 
expansion % points 3.0 1.3 1.3 
contraction of GDP 0.5 1.0 
Source: Calculated from Feinstein (1972: Tables 3, 12-14, 34, 
36' 39). 
expenditure on goods and services and capital formation 
increased its share of total central expenditure from 25.5 to 
35.1%, the main explanation being the reduced debt burden 
resulting from the lower interest rates of the 1930s.<54 ) 
The course of the expenditure ratio for central 
government suggests that this sector exercised a stabilizing 
influence on demand during the depressions of 1920-1, 1929-32, 
and 1937-8. This, however, needs to be qualified, for the 
ratio will show an upward movement not only if the numerator 
(expenditure) increases but if the denominator (GDP) falls. 
Such, in fact, was the case with the first two of these 
cyclical episodes, so that difficulties are raised in 
assessing the stabilizing nature of expenditure. These can 
be illustrated with reference to the developments of the 
early 1920s. 
0.5 
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Account should firstly be taken of the fact that, 
whilst the expenditure ratio rose by 3 percentage points of 
GDP between 1920-1 expenditure (expressed in nominal terms) 
only rose by 1.9%, and whereas between 1921-2 the expenditure 
ratio only fell by 0.3 percentage points the fall in 
expenditure was much greater (12.0%). The behaviour of GDP 
is thus crucial, but here there are also difficulties: at 
current prices GDP fell by 14.2% over 1920-1 and by 10.8% 
over 1921-2, but at constant prices GDP only fell by 5.8% 
over the former period and rose by 3.5% over the latter.<55 ) 
The behaviour of prices, therefore, would also appear 
to be of some importance. Government expenditures, unlike 
revenue, ( 56 ) were largely unresponsive to price changes, but 
as already noted they varied directly with the level of 
economic activity. Nevertheless, the behaviour of the 
expenditure ratio over 1920-3 was not solely a reflection 
of these automatic changes; at the same time, the 
authorities were attempting to make discretionary adjustments 
to expenditure, both in total and in detail. 
Mention should be made here of the Geddes Committee, (57 ) 
appointed following the alarm expressed during the budget 
debates of 1921 at the continued high level of expenditure 
at a time of falling revenues.(58 ) In its three reports it 
recommended economies totalling £86m, of which £46.5m was 
to come off Defence Votes and £18m from the provision of 
education services. The political reaction to these reports, 
and the government's defensive response, were to be a portent 
for the second major attempt at economy nearly a decade 
(59) later, that of the May report of 1931. Whilst in 1922 
a consensus undoubtedly existed that expenditure should be 
reduced, for this would permit the reduction of taxation 
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required to stimulate economic recovery, there was no such 
consensus about the form that the economies should assume. 
Consequently, there was a strong adverse reaction to these 
reports, even from within government (from the Admiralty), (6 0) 
and there was thereafter a marked reluctance to make economy 
a live political issue. In these circumstances it is 
understandable that the further efforts made at economy, of 
1926 and 1928' (61 ) were 11· m1' ted · · t t d t t d 1n 1n en , an concen ra e 
more on creating an atmosphere of parsimony which would 
constrain the further growth of expenditure than on making 
actual cuts in planned expenditures. 
In essence, these difficulties epitomised the political 
changes of the early twentieth century which had created 
such powerful forces for the growth of expenditure: the 
strengthening of vested interests, the changed nature of 
party rivalry, and the beginnings of the debate about the 
1\ legitimate role of the state in economic affairs. This 
debat~ was undoubtedly of great significance, not only for 
the genesis of demand management, but also because a con-
sensus had to be established on the criteria by which the 
growth of expenditure was to be evaluated. Without such a 
consensus, periodic crises, such as those of 1922 and 1931, 
were inevitable.< 62 ) 
(ii) Local government 
It remains to look at the local government sector, the 
expenditure of which, if not of equal weight to that of 
central government, was nevertheless of comparable importance. 
Indeed, as has been noted by previous writers,< 63 ) if transfer 
payments are discounted, then the direct command of resources 
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by this sector actually exceeded that of central government.* 
The weight of capital expenditures as between the two 
sectors was primarily responsible for this. 
It should be noted, however, that the importance of 
local expenditure was diminishing in relation to total public 
expenditure when viewed from a rather longer historical 
perspective than that purely of the interwar period. The 
long-term growth of public expenditure (in relation to GDP) 
was accompanied, and in part caused, by a 'concentration' 
process, whereby there was an increased transference of 
responsibilities (and thereby expenditure) to the central 
authority.< 64 ) This process was, on the one hand, limited 
by the strength of local autonomy, and, on the other, 
fostered by: 
economic development£ s which) prod uce(d) changes in the 
technically efficient level of government, and also 
produce(d] demands for equality of treatment (e.g. in 
services such as education) over wider geographical 
areas. (65) 
The strength of these opposing pressures is of some 
importance to the British case, and are considered later.<66 ) 
The estimates in Table 2.2 showed that over 1924-37 the 
elasticity of expenditure growth relative to GDP growth was 
significantly higher for local than for central expenditures, 
and that the greatest difference between the respective 
elasticities was in the 1920s. We should therefore expect 
a rising ratio of local to total expenditures; however, at 
the same time, local government was also becoming increasingly 
* Current expenditure on goods/services and capital formation 
as % of GDP: 
1913 
1920 
1924 
1929 
1937 
central government 
4.2 
4.8 
4.4 
4.2 
6.5 
local government 
5.1 
5.0 
6.8 
7.6 
8.3 
(Calculated from Feinstein 1972: Tables 3, 12-13, 34, 36, 39). 
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dependent upon central grants, particularly after the reforms 
of 1929. Such grants only constituted 17.4% of local 
government current revenue in 1913; this had g~own to 
24.6% by 1920, to 27.2% by 1929, and to 30.4% by 1937.<67 ) 
This situation arose because of the failure of local rates to 
keep pace wit·h expenditure, a failure which stemmed partly 
from the technical deficiencies of rates as an income source 
and the erosion of that base - the 1929 de-rating scheme - by 
central directive. Thus local authorities were forced into 
a position of greater dependency upon central government, ( 6S) 
a dependency that was to have implications for economic 
management. 
(iii) Public authorities' investment 
For any comprehensive assessment of the stabilizing 
effects on demand of government policies the analysis should 
not be confined to the behaviour of expenditure but should 
encompass. the. complete range of policy instruments. Never-
theless, in the first instance, it is legitimate to consider 
separately the behaviour of public authorities' investment, 
for a successful stabilization policy requires not only the 
stabilization of total demand but also its constituent parts. 
The balance of supply and demand in capital goods markets is 
thus of some importance. 
The first step in such an analysis requires details of 
the composition of gross domestic fixed capital formation 
(GDFCF) and the demand leverage exercised by the public 
sector. Table 2.4 shows, firstly, that the private sector's 
contribution to GDFCF was significantly greater during the 
interwar period than during the more recent period 1967-77; 
thus, even given the absence of a commitment on the part of 
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Table 2.4 
Gross domestic fixed capital formation by sector 1929-38 
Public Central Local Total GDFCF Private corpor- govern- govern- TafAL % of 
at ions ment ment (%) as GDP 
1929 72.2 0.5 3.4 24.0 100.0 10.4 
1930 69.7 1.4 3.4 25.5 100.0 10.3 
1931 65.2 2.5 3.4 28.9 100.0 10.5 
1932 65.7 3.5 3.5 27.4 100.0 9.2 
1933 73.7 2.8 2.8 20.7 100.0 9.5 
1934 77.3 1.9 2.8 18.0 100.0 10.7 
1935 74.8 1.5 3.1 20.6 100.0 10.9 
1936 72.9 1.5 3.5 22.1 100.0 11.9 
1937 69.7 1.6 4.0 24.7 100.0 12.2 
1938 66.6 1.7 4.9 26.9 100.0 11.9 
averages for 
periods: 
1924-9 70.0 3.8 26.2 100.0 10.1 
1929-38 70.8 1.9 3.5 23.9 100.0 10.8 
1967-77 57.4 18.1 5.6 18.9 100.0 19 .o 
Sources: 1924-38: Feinstein (1972: Tables 3, 39) 
1967-77: c.s.o., National Income and Expenditure 
1967-77 (1978)' Tables 1 .1' 10.1, 10.3. 
governm~nt to the counter-cyclical control of its investment, 
autonomous fluctuations in GDFCF were likely to be of greater 
amplitude than if the private sector had been of smaller 
dimension. ( 69 ) The second feature of note is that the volume 
of capital investment undertaken directly by central 
government was small in relation to that of local government; 
for example, during the depression period 1929-32 an average 
of 3 .4% of GDFCF was controlled by central government 
compared with 26.5% by local government. In terms of demand 
leverage, this gives figures of roughly 0.4 and 2.7% of GDP 
respectively, considerably less than that for the 
contemporary British economy. Two further points should 
also be made: firstly, whilst variations in public 
investment undoubtedly influenced GDFCF, it by no means 
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follows that such investment could have been expanded 
sufficiently to fully compensate for autonomous fluctuations 
in private investment; and secondly, the fact that local 
authorities, rather than central government, largely 
controlled public investment had certain unfavourable results 
for economic management. 
While Table 2.4 brings out the weighting of the various 
sectors in GDFCF, the presentation in Chart 2.2A better 
illustrates their cyclical and trend path.* Even this, 
however, is not completely adequate for our purposes: 
although the upward trend and cyclical fluctuations of GDFCF 
are clearly represented, the respective contributions of 
private and public investment are not immediately evident. 
Accordingly, the method adopted to assess the stabilizing 
effectiveness of public investment on GDFCF was to estimate 
the deviations (in volume terms) of public and private 
investment from their respective linear trends (at constant 
prices). The result~ are presented in Chart 2.2B. For 
stabilization purposes, an optimal result would be for the 
deviations of the public sector to offset those of the private 
sector, so that the two summed to zero, and where the 
elasticity (or coefficient) of public sector deviations with 
t t . t . 1 (70) respec· o pr1va e 1s - . 
For the data shown in Chart 2.2B it proved impossible 
t bt . t t . t . 11 . . f . t 1 t . h. ( 71 ) o o a1n a s a 1s 1ca y s1gn1··1can re a 1ons 1p. 
However, the introduction of a one year lag, of public 
against private investment, did yield a statistically 
* Chart 2.2 represents a slightly wider definition of public 
investment than that of Table 2.4, the principal difference 
being the inclusion of the public utilities (see Feinstein 
1965: 46). Although many were private companies, their 
investment progra~nes were subject to some degree of 
governmental influence (Bretherton et al 1941: ch.V). 
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significant equation, with a coefficient of +1.4.* Thus, 
even when permitted a delay in responding to an autonomous 
fluctuation in private investment, the public authorities 
were destabilizing over the period as a whole.< 72 ) 
Nevertheless, policy did respond correctly on occasions 
(1920-1, 1929-31, 1936-8) and was only seriously 
destabilizing on one occasion, 1931-2 (the trough of the 
depression). Furthermore, when judged against the 
destabilizing course of public investment in more recent 
periods, ( 73 ) the interwar period does not compare that 
unfavourably, although the amplitude of fluctuations was 
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greater. The question, which is explored in later chapters, 
is whether the stabilizing effectiveness of public invest-
ment would have been improved if there had been a commitment 
to a counter-cyclical policy or whether certain institutional 
factors would have militated against such an outcome. 
3. ~Treasury and expenditure control 
The Treasury's administrative responsibilities for 
financial control were both complex and of wide compass, 
permitting the Treasury to extend its authority from purely 
financial to policy questions. Treasury contro1,< 74 ) 
however, was far from complete, nor was it uniform as 
between the various spending agencies constituting the 
public sector. In particular, as will now be shown, the 
degree of control exercised over central and local 
expenditure varied considerably, and this was to have 
certain ramifications. 
* Y = O.ll8Xl.4 
(0.035) t:-l 
2 (R = 0.4099; DW = 0.9761; t = 3.32) 
where Y = public sector deviations and X = private sector 
deviations. Annual data was used for 1920-38, giving 18 
observations when account is taken of the one year lag. 
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(i) Central government 
The "saving of candle-ends" has been taken as the 
(75) 
epitome of Treasury attitudes towards expenditure control; 
as Bridges complained as late as 1950, it was but: 
a picturesque phrase ... embodying the attitude of 
extreme frugality which has led to the reputation of 
cheese-paring or meanness that the Treasury has so 
long enjoyed (if that is the right term). It recalls 
at once the wish, believed by so many to be still 
endemic in Treasury Chambers, to refuse all proposals 
of expenditure however worthy the object. (76) 
In the following, it will be argued that this term is 
manifestly inappropriate to the reality of interwar 
expenditure control. 
It has been traditionally maintained that expenditure 
control was excessively strict between the wars, .both in 
total and in detail;(77 ) for example, Roseveare argued that 
the period: 
saw the painful and laboured reassertion by the 
Chancellors of both governing parties of the 
Gladstonian tradition of public finance, and they 
saw its ultimate eclipse. (78) 
Detailed scrutiny of the available evidence seriously weakens 
such arguments and finds the traditional interpretation 
largely wanting. Firstly, reference has already been made 
to the fact that, when judged against a more recent period, 
the growth of expenditure was rapid between the wars.< 79 ) 
Secondly, the traditional view rests on a basic confusion 
between the Gladstonian administrative structure of expenditure 
control and the attitudes guiding that control. While the 
Gladstonian era may well have represented the apotheosis of 
economy in expenditure, (SO) it should be recognised that 
there occurred certain fundamental changes during the period 
of the Liberal administrations of 1906-14, and that these: 
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led to a much wider view of the proper objects and 
extent of Government expenditure in the modern State: 
and as a result Treasury Control became less concerned 
with the prevention of all public expenditure, and more 
concerned with ensuring the most prudent and economical 
spending of money on approved projects. (81) 
Whilst it is indisputable "that Gladstone contributed more 
to the development of the modern Treasury than any one man 
before or since", the legacy of the Gladstonian era was not 
an excessively severe attitude towards new expenditure, but 
the "inheritance of ... a unified system of efficient 
administration, spreading outwards from the Treasury to all 
parts of the Government machine, and a unified system of 
control of expenditure to match and support it."(82 ) 
This system of financial control, which after its long 
evolution was well-suited to normal peacetime conditions, 
was to be subject to severe strains during the First World 
War, for the war not only required expenditure on an 
unprecedented scale but also forced the abandonment of many 
traditional control mechanisms.< 83 ) In the immediate 
postwar period, the Treasury naturally sought to reimpose 
these peacetime controls; they also attempted a more 
radical strengthening of expenditure control. Firstly, 
the position of Accounting Officer in each department was 
strengthened, the object being that policy and its 
financial consequences should not be treated separately 
but in conjunction with each other, a reform that '~id much 
to induce a greater sense of financial responsibility into 
Departments generally ... (and1 fostered an atmosphere of 
greater confidence between Departments and the Treasury". <84 ) 
Secondly, Treasury control was strengthened at a Cabinet 
level with the resumption of the prewar arrangement whereby 
all schemes involving expenditure had first to be discussed 
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with the Treasury. (SS) This was not an attempt to impose 
economy upon unwilling politicians; rather it was an 
important means whereby Treasury officials were able to 
relate possible expenditures to available resources and to 
inform the Cabinet of the action that would be required were 
the proposal to receive approval.(SS) 
While there is little evidence to support the view that 
Treasury control of aggregate expenditure was unnecessarily 
constraining, given prevailing economic conditions and the 
unanimity of political opinion on the desirability of 
limiting expenditure growth, there is rather more substance 
in the charge that control was excessive in detail. The 
rearmament programme, undertaken from the mid-1930s, is a 
case in point; for both officials, politicians, and outside 
observers assigned to Treasury 'tightfistedness' much of the 
blame for the programme's slow progress, its deficiencies, 
and the inadequate level of preparations at the outset of 
war.<
87 ) The point at issue is not whether Treasury control 
frustrated the defence departments in their efforts to 
expedite a rearmament programme per ~~ for this is admitted 
even by writers who have favourably judged the Treasury's 
stance on rearmament, (88 ) but whether the way in which 
control was exercised, operated to the actual detriment of 
Britain's preparedness -both military and economic- for 
'total' war. The economic and budgetary problems posed by 
rearmament are discussed in later chaptersf89 ) it is 
sufficient to note here that the judgement of recent 
research has been that Treasury control, given the financial 
limits on expenditure, acted in a beneficial manner by 
enforcing priorities upon the defence departments and, by 
limiting the extent of disturbances to the civilian economy, 
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preserved Britain's economic strength. Therefore, as Peden 
concluded: 
It would be rash to conclude that laxer Treasury control 
before the war would have quickened the pace of 
essential parts of the rearmament programme, for the 
Treasury made every effort to see that essentials 
received due priority, and that less important proposals 
were not allowed to clog the programme. (90) 
The nature of Treasury control operated to put departments 
on the defensive, their expenditure plans being restrained by 
t . . t. f T . t. . ( 9 l) A t f th an 1c1pa 1on o reasury cr1 1c1sm. par rom e 
special difficulties raised by rearmament for Treasury control, 
it appears from the official papers that relations with the 
spending departments were generally harmonious and that 
Fisher had promoted '~earn work throughout the Civil Service 
with conspicuous success."(92 ) Nevertheless, it would be 
quite wrong to suppose that conflicts never arose; two 
examples, those concerning the Ministry of Labour Estimates 
for 1932/3 and 1933/4 and the expenditure of the Road Fund 
in 1935, are considered in later chapters.<93 ) 
Heclo and Wildavsky have identified five maxims of 
modern day Treasury control;( 94 ) these are equally 
applicable to the case of the interwar period: 
(1) the full implications of an expenditure proposal must 
be investigated in order to ensure that no large expenditure 
commitments are approved unknowingly because the expenditure 
seemed small in the early years; 
(2) there is the strongest possible bias against open-ended 
expenditure commitments; 
(3) there is the avoidance of precedent setting behaviour, 
the avoidance of settlements with one department which would 
have the effect of raising expenditures in another; 
(4) an antipathy towards disguised expenditure (such as 
.. 
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subsidies and loans) which by being unidentified cannot be 
controlled; and 
(5) a basic attitude of mind which sought to avoid risks in 
the planning of future expenditure commitments: 
The Treasury as an institution has never believed in 
the philosophy of economic growth. Its officials may 
not be against growth as such, but they are vehemently 
against committing resources on the basis of what one 
deputy secretary called a 'hoped-for, phony paper 
growth rate, which only leads to false expectations, 
disappointments, cuts, and further disillusionment.' 
They want to see the colour of the money first and 
relish pointing out the risks of actions based on 
hypothetical increases in wealth. (95) 
To conclude this part of the discussion, mention should 
be made of the general inflexibility of central expenditure 
control and planning systems. ( 96 ) Space precludes a detailed 
discussion of the 'supply cycle', the term used to describe 
the compilation and eventual presentation to Parliament of 
the departmental Estimates.< 97 ) The essential points for 
our purposes concern the chronology of events. Firstly, 
consideration of the Estimates began, as at present, in the 
early autumn and after discussions between the Treasury and 
the spending departments (and the Cabinet in respect of the 
defence Estimates) they were presented to Parliament in the 
following February or March. Secondly, this chronology had 
certain important consequences, in particular that Parliament 
considered expenditure proposals prior to the budget, which 
was therefore only a tax budget.< 9 S) 
The supply procedures of the House of Commons were more 
rigid and inflexible than at present, and without modification 
would have been unsuitable for counter-cyclical purposes 
where the necessity would often arise for making adjustments 
in expenditure programmes at short notice. Once expenditure 
programmes had been settled, further supply would only be 
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granted on application of a Supplementary Estimate. Whilst 
no major Supplementary was refused during the interwar 
. (99) per1od, they were used infr~quently and with definite 
reluctance. (lOO) 
This general inflexibility in the setting of expenditure 
programmes was reinforced by the fact that central govern-
ment had no specific powers to borrow funds without 
Parliamentary sanction, (lOl) and, as was noted above, the 
possibilities were severely limited for its stabilizing 
private investment by varying its own capital outlays. 
(ii) Local government 
Although economic policy was formulated at the centre, 
the British financial system had evolved in such a way as 
to limit the channels through which central government 
might operate its fiscal policies: neither the Treasury nor 
Parliament directly controlled local expenditure, either on 
current or capital account, and despite the increasing 
importance of central grants, local authorities had not 
(102) become simply the spending agencies of central government. 
In considering central-local government financial 
relations it should be noted from the outset that: 
in practice there will never be a great divergence 
between the general policy of the Government and the 
opinions expressed by the generality of Local 
Authorities. There may be time-lags, there may be the 
differences which creep in owing to the different 
mechanics of actually registering electoral opinion. 
But there is little or no chance, for example, of 
Local Authorities representing the great majority of 
the population wanting a large housing programme being 
confronted by a Government strongly opposed to such a 
programme. There will, of course, be differences of 
opinion on the administration of and finance of any 
policy and these differences may affect the harmony of 
the two sets of democratic institutions but the basic 
agreement should be there. It is therefore unreal to 
refer to central-local relations as though a Government 
Department may have to coerce Local Authorities 
representing the great majority of the electorate. 
Should there be a head~on clash between a Department 
and the mass of Local Authorities on any general 
issue the Minister may be mis-interpreting public 
opinion or the fault may be on the side of the Local 
Authorities. But it cannot be assumed that the 
Minister must necessarily be right. In the long run 
it is axiomatic that the two sets of views must be 
in broad agreement. (103) 
The second feature of note is that, as at present, 
"while local authorities are the creatures of Parliament, 
they are in no sense under the absolute control of the 
central government's administrative departments. "(l04) 
Local autonomy was strong, and seen as of some importance 
in British constitutional practice. Central ~ontrol was 
limited to that granted by specific legislation; there 
were no general powers permitting central direction of 
the localities.* In these circumstances, the degree of 
central influence on the economic activities of local 
authorities rested upon the effectiveness of persuasion, 
exhortation, and financial inducement. 
Before discussing the operation and effectiveness of 
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the channels whereby central government sought to influence 
local activities, a third feature of central-local relations 
should be mentioned, that of the fragmentation of central 
responsibility for local government and the wide-ranging 
and disparate nature of the local spending units themselves. 
At a central level, control of the localities was dispersed 
across a wide range of departments, including the Treasury, 
the Ministries of Health and Transport, and the Scottish 
Office, none of which were charged with overall responsibility 
or a coordinating function. At a local level, the fvrm of 
* Of particular importance was the fact that central 
departments had no powers either to determine the level 
of rates which an authority might decide to levy or to 
prescribe directly how the funds so raised should be 
expended (Chester 195la: 47). 
------
the prevailing administrative structure was even less 
propitious for direct central control. Firstly, as Sykes 
concluded, local authorities were '~ot ordinarily the 
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optimum economic spending units", there being no fewer than 
25,340 separate units in 1927 having powers to enter into 
financial transactions, and even after the major reforms of 
1929, this number was only reduced to 11,619.<105 ) Secondly, 
not only were there an inordinate number of separate spending 
units, each of varying size, but there was a complete absence 
of any uniformity in their financial circumstances. For 
example, in its evidence (1927) to the Royal Commission on 
Local Government, the Ministry of Health detailed the cases 
of a sample of 72 local authorities, the smalle& of which 
had ald. rate produce of £11 and the largest £382, while 
42 had less than £100.<106 ) The small size of many local 
authorities, combined with financial weakness due to 
depressed local economies, was in many instances to limit 
their ability to provide statutory social s~rvices and, even 
w~th central grants, works projects to mitigate unemployment. 
Reference has already been made to the increasing 
importance of central grants to local authorities; the 
question should now be posed whether this growing formal 
dependence upon central government was of a form which 
permitted the centre to further its economic policy 
objectives. In particular, this question is of especial 
relevance to the ability of central government to stimulate 
local authority capital outlays as a means of stabilizing 
employment . 
In approaching this question, it should first be stressed 
that grants were rarely designed to cover the full cost of 
a local service or capital project, so that it is necessary 
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to take into account the form of the grant and the 
financial position of local authorities, both in general 
and those specifically seeking assistance. To local 
authorities, the attractiveness of a grant might be said 
to be dependent upon: (1) the likely increase in rates 
resulting from a decision to proceed with a service or 
project eligible for grant assistance; and (2) the existing 
level of rates. 
These conditions were best satisfied by specific grants, 
variable rather than fixed, and available for a limited 
period. Perhaps the most successful of such grants was the 
subsidy payable to local authorities under the Housing and 
Town Planning Act, 1919.* Under this Act, local authorities 
received a subsidy equivalent to the difference between the 
capital cost of a house spread over a period of years and 
the amount of income the house earned when let at rents that 
the working class could afford above the proceeds of an 
additional penn~ levied on the rates. The local authorities' 
liabilities were small and fixed and there was no obligation 
to economise on capital costs. While, on the one hand, "as 
a sheer creator of living accommodation", the Act was the 
"most successful measure of its kind that Britain saw until 
after the Second World War", on the other, it forced up 
building costs, caused disruption in capital markets as 
local authorities took part in an "uncoordinated scramble 
for house building money", and resulted in cons~derably 
(107) greater expenditure than was felt to be necessary. 
Herein lay the root of the problem of central-local 
* More generally known as the Addison Act, named after its 
promoter Sir Christopher Addison (President, Local 
Government Board 1919; Minister of Health 1919-21). 
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financial control, the conflict between the requirements of 
'normal' expenditure control (economy and ease of adminis-
tration) and the objective of securing a large and immediate 
response from local authorities. These problems remained 
unresolved throughout the interwar period; yet, as will be 
argued shortly, the economic debate of the period should also 
have been accompanied by a far reaching investigation of the 
suitability of existing methods of financial control. 
The use of grants to stimulate local capital expenditures 
as a means of mitigating unemployment also raised difficulties 
at a local level. As Chester has written: 
The memories of Local Authorities of the inter-war 
years are not particularly happy so far as Exchequer 
grants and central control were concerned. One year 
they were being encouraged - indeed pressed - to push 
ahead with great schemes of expansion for several · 
services, with large grants being promised in return. 
Then, just as they got going, schemes approved, 
building well under way and commitments of all kinds 
entered into, the central Government would start an 
. economy campaign, in which grants would be cut, and 
sanctioning of loans and expenditure for grant 
purposes would become very stringent. The total effect 
of this central policy of fits and starts was, on 
occasion, to cause the progress over the period in 
question to be less than if there had been a steady 
policy; the Local Authority might even have suffered 
some financial injury, and it cannot be wondered that 
many Local Authorities saw substantial merits in a 
grant which was fixed for a period and on which they 
could base their programme. (108) 
Having established, at least in general terms, the quite 
serious limitations facing central government in its control 
over local expenditures, the discussion can now be widened 
and brought to a conclusion by considering the expenditure of 
the public sector in its entirety and the possibilities for 
its effective counter-cyclical regulation. 
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(iii) Counter-cyclical expenditure control 
Both the officials and economists responsible for the 
compilation of plans for postwar stabilization assigned 
considerable importance to the counter-cyclical variation 
of public expenditure (particularly capital expenditures); 
by contrast, public expenditure as a counterweight in 
balancing demand has actually held a subordinate position 
since 1945, and the volume and pattern of public expenditure 
have continued to be principally dependent upon a composite 
of the economic and social objectives associated with 
. d. . d l d. t (l09 ) A · . t . 1n 1v1 ua expen 1 ure programmes. case 1n po1n 1s 
that of public investment, where there was a growing 
appreciation of the resource costs associated with counter-
cyclical regulation - the continual compromising of medium-
term plans by destabilizing and disruptive short-term 
interventions - and the apparently insoluble problem of 
devi~ing forms of expen~iture control which gave both the 
requisite degree of flexibility and ensured the efficient 
allocation of resources. (llO) 
The starting point for our discussion is that interwar 
public expenditure management should be viewed in relation 
to this postwar experience. A distinction, however, should 
be drawn between the problems associated with increasing 
expenditure in a situation of chronic under-investment or 
prolonged cyclical depression, and the rather different 
problems posed by the mechanics of fine-tuning. In broad 
terms, the former might be taken as the case of the interwar 
period, and the latter as representative of the postwar 
period. 
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The higher average pressure of demand in the postwar 
period, as compared with the interwar period, and the fact 
that the trade cycle has been of shorter duration and 
lessened amplitude, (lll) has magnified the possibility that 
discretionary changes in public expenditure programmes 
might in fact be destabilizing. Such a situation was not a 
possibility of any importance during the interwar period; 
consequently, the following comments about this period apply 
largely to the administrative, technical, and political 
difficulties which would have arisen if it had been decided 
to stimulate public expenditure as a counterweight to a 
permanent, if variable, deficiency of demand. 
At this stage of the argument, it is assumed that the 
balanced budget constraint (at both a central and local 
level) effectively precluded either counter-cyclical 
variation of current public expenditure or a significant 
increase in the overall demand leverage exercised by the 
public sector on current account, the latter option being 
discounted because of the requirement for additional 
revenue to finance the enlarged expenditures. The 
remaining option concerned an enlargement of public sector 
capital outlays, and it is on this that the following 
discussion concentrates. 
The decision to adopt a public works programme of 
sufficient magnitude to exert a significant ei'fect on 
aggregate demand would have required either: 
(1) a system of generous grants to local authorities; or 
(2) a fundamental change in the financial relations of the 
centre to the localities, bringing a greater volume of 
public investment under direct central control. 
The first option involved a variety of dangers for 
normal expenditure control; the second was the subject of 
considerable political controversy and was implacably 
opposed by the Treasury, on grounds of both efficiency and 
the fact that it would threaten local autonomy.(ll 2 ) 
Further considerations also need to be taken into 
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account. Firstly, while an immediate response from spending 
agencies has been an essential pre-requisite of an effective 
stabilization policy in the postwar period, due to the fact 
that lags in implementing a policy could actually make it 
destabilizing, it is arguable that, although economic 
conditions were very different, this would also have been 
the case in the interwar period. The explanation, however, 
is rather different: assuming, for example, that the 
Treasury had become convinced by the case for large-scale 
loan financed public works, and it is likely, that strong 
centres of 6pposition to such a policy remained, the policy 
would have been seen very much as an experiment, the 
validity of which would have been crucially dependent upon 
its visible results. There would undoubtedly have been 
the natural expectation that if a large programme was 
instituted, visible benefits would be both fairly immediate 
and of not inconsiderable magnitude; were such expectations 
to be unrealised, itis not inconceivable that the reaction 
against the programme would have been sufficient to have 
threatened its continuance, and there might even have been 
a serious second order effect with adverse results for the 
level of economic activity. Thus, the question of timing is 
not one that can be dismissed. 
Secondly, if the speed of a policy's implementation was 
of some importance, in particular in the case of an expansion 
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of expenditures, it follows that a physical planning agency 
would have been necessary to prepare and coordinate local 
authority investment plans, and that the form of central 
control over local borrowing might also be of some 
importance. Unfortunately, in both areas there were major 
d f . . . ( 113 ) A H. d d e 1c1enc1es. s 1cks conclu e : 
It does not appear that the present methods of 
control over local finances are capable of carrying 
through a very effective cyclical policy. While 
over-borrowing is amply guarded against, and long-
period expansion probably not hindered by loan 
regulations, sudden changes such as are necessary 
for a public works policy to be effectiv~ are not 
easy to bring about. Sudden expansion means that 
local plans must already be worked out, and this is 
difficult to secure when the number of authorities 
is large. Sudden contraction can be somewhat more 
easily secured, but it is difficult to avoid waste 
when planning is uncentralized and investment 
vicarious. The chief necessity for successful 
cyclical policy is an adequate planning department 
But it must be noticed here that Great Britain 
appears to be deficient in co-ordinating machinery 
relative to those countries which have so far most 
successfully worked a cyclical expenditure policy. (114) 
Proposals for a National Investment Board, to assume 
such functions, (ll5 ) were put on a number of occasions but 
were treated unenthusiastically by all interwar governments. 
Similarly, while the call for increased central control of 
public expenditure received widespread support from many 
quarters, outside of certain sections of the Labour and 
Liberal parties it was treated with disdain by the mass of 
politicians. The maintenance of local autonomy was an 
important political issue, a serious impediment to change; 
in addition, the fact that a major reform of central-local 
relations had already been undertaken with the Local 
Government Act, 1929, was to create the attitude that the 
new system should be tested for some years before further 
modifications were contemplated. 
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These administrative and political questions were 
rarely debated publicly, or indeed on any substantial 
level within government. Even when so debated, they were 
seen in some sense as separate from the issues raised by 
the economic debate of the period. More particularly, 
there was a failure on the part of economists to appreciate 
that major administrative reforms - increased centralization 
and greater flexibility in expenditure control - were a 
necessary concomitant to acceptance of the 'new' economics 
and its successful translation into practical economic 
(116) 
management. The unbalanced and one-sided nature of 
the policy debate that resulted from the divorce of economic 
from administrative and political issues has received 
almost no attentio11 in the literature of the period. Yet, 
as is argued later, this omission is partially responsible 
for the confusion that still surrounds the interwar Treasury. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TAXATION, THE REVENUE DEPARTMENTS AND POLICY 
As a subject for detailed study, accounts of the inter-
war budgetary system have tended to focus on the expenditure 
side of the account; with few exceptions, taxation has been 
largely ignored. (l) The result of this somewhat narrow 
approach is that the rSle of taxation in the budgetary process 
remains largely unknown, while excessive attention has been 
paid to the determinants and course of expenditure. 
Accordingly, the purpose of the present chapter is to survey 
the revenue side of the account; ~ to look at the role of the 
revenue departments in the formulation of budgetary policy; 
methods of forecasting tax yields; the structure of receipts; 
and contemporary attitudes towards taxation and economic 
activity.(2 ) 
1. The revenue departments 
By the interwar period the revenue departments had, 
like the Treasury, fully matured as departments of finance 
and, in large measure, had assumed the functions and 
responsibilities that they currently hold. (3 ) The Boards 
of Customs and Excise and Inland Revenue, along with their 
Secretaries' offices, constituted the central coordinating 
machinery of the two revenue departments. They were 
responsible not only for macro policy matters and for 
advising the Treasury, but also for the more detailed 
organisation and administration of the tax laws. From this 
followed a certain duality in their position. While the 
Boards were responsible to the Chancellor, (4 ) they also 
had a distinct constitutional existence of their own, the 
purpose of which was that the administration of the tax 
system be "kept free from any suggestion that political 
influence might be exercised in relation to particular 
cases . "( 5 ) In matters of taxation policy, however, the 
revenue departments were subordinate to the Treasury, both 
constitutionally and in practice. 
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There are few instances, at least recorded in the 
papers,(B) in which the Treasury pursued a course of action 
in the face of strong objections by the revenue departments. 
Where disagreements arose, two general factors were primarily 
responsible: firstly, Treasury officials frequently voiced 
the concern that the revenue departments were too cautious, 
in particular with regard to the forecasting of tax receipts; 
secondly, and of more importance, as was noted in the previous 
chapter, ( 7 ) the Treasury as a department had to respond to 
much wider considerations than those confronting most other 
departments. In the field of taxation, the imperative of 
maintaining budgetary equilibrium (particularly in the early 
1930s) often forced the adoption of tax changes and revenue 
devices which, in less difficult times, would have been 
considered totally unacceptable. 
It should be stressed, however, that as with the 
Treasury's relations with the spending departments, disputes 
were rarely serious; in general, there was a coincidence 
of interests between the financial departments, a coincidence 
strengthened by the interchange of staff between the various 
departments.* 
* A number of Treasury officials had formerly served in Inland 
Revenue - Fisher had begun his career there and risen to 
Chairman in 1918, moving in 1919 to the Treasury as Permanent 
Secretary; Hopkins had followed a similar course, rising to 
Chairman by 1922 and then moving to the Treasury in 1927; 
more junior staff such as E. Rowe-Dutton had also served in 
the Inland Revenue. Nor was the movement of staff uni-
directional: Grigg who had· served in the Treasury (1918-30) 
moved first as Chairman of Customs and Excise (1930) and 
then of Inland Revenue (1930-4). 
Where disputes occurred they took a number of forms: 
(1) as a counterweight to the inherent cautiousness of the 
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revenue departments in forecasting tax yields, in almost all 
the years under review they were instructed to 'stretch' 
their estimates, thereby balancing the budget ('on paper') 
or reducing the extent of discretionary action required to 
ensure (~ante) budgetary equilibrium.(S) In general, this 
practice was not pursued excessively although there were 
instances in which it was thought to be inadvisable. ( 9 ) 
(2) on occasion, Inland Revenue were instructed to vary the 
rate of collection of income and surtax, the objective being 
to transfer revenue between years according to the exigencies 
of the budgetary situation. (lO) There were considerable 
risks associated with such a practice - namely that it might 
adversely affect the revenue of subsequent years;(ll) 
consequently, recourse to such an expedient was avoided 
wherever possible. 
(3) although disagreements rarely resulted over the 
advisability of a tax increase or modification of existing 
taxation arrangements, when they did occur the revenue 
departments did not easily succumb to Treasury persuasiveness 
and would fight the issue until overruled by the Chancellor. 
Such an incident occurred in early 1931 over the means 
whereby the April budget was to be balanced: a time when 
the budgetary position was acute and it was felt could only 
be balanced if a number of expedients were adopted. The 
dispute, between Inland Revenue and the Treasury, centred on 
the appropriate expedients, in particular upon the proposal 
to secure a non-recurrent gain by varying the dates of 
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collection of (Schedules B, D and E) income tax.* Although 
the Treasury ultimately overruled the Inland Revenue's 
technical objections to such an expedient, (l2 ) the episode 
is of interest because, had circumstances been more 
propitious, they would undoubtedly have accepted the 
legitimacy of these objections. The Treasury view prevailed, 
therefore, because on a balance of risks such an expedient 
was the least disadvantageous method of securing additional 
revenue. 03 ) 
The revenue departments, however, were far from passive 
in the budgetary process. Constitutionally they had to 
follow Treasury directives; nevertheless, by virtue of 
their expertise in taxation matters, they were able to 
exercise an important influence in budgetary deliberations, 
an influence much wider than that of specific taxation 
questions. This is clear from the advice tendered by the 
revenue departments·during the 1931 financial crisis. 
As is well established, discussions over the balancing 
of the budget during the 1931 crisis largely centred on the 
expenditure side of the account;(l4 ) there also occurred, 
however, debate about the appropriate taxation measures. 
The May Committee in forecasting a prospective deficit of 
£120m for 1932/3 had recommended economies of £96.5m, 
leaving a residual of £23.5m to be found from additional 
(but unspecified) taxation. The Labour Cabinet had failed 
to agree to such economies, whilst in addition the 
prospective deficit had risen to £170m, so that a greater 
* Income was taxable under five Schedules: A (ownership of 
land and tenements); B (occupation of land); C (interest 
and dividends payable out of the public revenue); 
D (profits and other interest); and E (employment and 
pensions)- see Magill et al (1934: 17-18). Under the 
Finance (No. 2) Act, 1915, income tax was payable in two 
equal instalments, on 1 January and 1 July. 
~~------------------------
sum was required to be found from taxation. In these 
circumstances, it might be supposed that the Cabinet would 
. 
have given equal weight to the question of taxation in 
their discussions and actively considered the form of 
additional taxation. In fact, questions of taxation 
rarely feature in the Cabinet discussions, (lS) and it fell 
largely to the revenue departments and the Treasury 
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(including the Chancellor) to determine the form, though not 
the magnitude, of the additional revenue. As a result of 
the Cabinet's effective abnegation of much of its powers in 
the financial sphere, the financial departments were able, 
at a time of national political crisis, to assume 
responsibility for the taxation proposals, thereby ensuring 
that the form of taxation would proceed along orthodox lines 
and that radical solutions (such as that adopted in 
Australia during the crisis of 1930)(16 ) would be easily 
dismissed. 
Apart from the amount of additional taxation to be 
imposed, discussions centred upon three interrelated 
questions: the feasibility of a tax upon 'rentier' incomes, 
the likely effects of an increase in income and surtax, and 
the way in which additional taxation should take a form 
compatible with the Cabinet's policy "that the Budget must 
be balanced by the application of the principle of a common 
sacrifice and effort ."<l 7 ) 
The case for a tax upon 'rentier' incomes* differed 
somewhat from that of the capital levy proposed in the early 
*The term 'rentier' was used in a wide variety of senses, 
as were a wide range of schemes suggested for their 
taxation. The common features of all such schemes were 
the dual preoccupation with the increasing real burden of 
the national debt and the desire to tax those income 
groups which could be identified as having benefited 
from the falling price level. 
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1920s:(lB) previously concern had centred on the debts' 
enlargement in nominal terms as a result of war expenditures~ 
it now centred on the rising real burden of the debt 
resulting from the downward price trend.(l 9 ) Within 
government, the proposal to tax the real gains of the 
rentier class had first been put by a Cabinet Committee in 
January 1931; (2 0) the proposal (in various forms) was 
renewed later that summer with the financial crisis, 
receiving support over a broad political front, e.g. from 
(21) 
opinions as diverse as Samuel* and the T.U.C. 
The Inland Revenue favoured the principle of 'equality 
of sacrifice', but were concerned about the results of 
additional taxation on higher income cohorts, and more 
generally opposed a special tax on rentier incomes. Whilst 
this opposition was expressed in technical, rather than 
political, terms it seems that there was opposition to the 
use of taxation for redistributive purposes.** 
When asked to report on the question in late August 
1931 they pointed out, firstly, that the income tax system 
already strong!~ discriminated against investment incomes, 
and secondly, that few individuals had investment portfolios 
limited to fixed income securities. In fact, they contended, 
higher income cohorts had suffered badly from the depression<22 ) 
-for example, dividends had fallen by 20% over 1929-31 -so 
that "it is extremely doubtful whether the average investor 
has on balance gained in purchasing power over the last few 
years." A universal tax on all investment incomes would 
pose serious administrative problems; a more preferable 
course would be a change in income tax allowances.< 23 ) 
* Sir Herbert Samue 1 (Liberal M.P., Home Secretary 1931-.2). 
** As late as 1942 the Inland Revenue were still strongly 
of the opinion that "the purpose of the income tax is 
not the redistribution of income" (Sayers: 1956: 97-8). 
79 
Apart from these technicalities, it was also felt that 
there were serious risks associated with further taxation 
of higher incomes, mention in particular being made of the 
stimulus this would give to tax avoidance and evasion. <24 ) 
This problem, a relatively new one for Britain,* was thus 
felt to constrain higher direct taxation - a view frequently 
expounded to the Treasury and one which they were forced to 
accept by early 1932. ( 25 ) On these grounds, Inland Revenue 
argued against an increase in surtax rates. They expressed 
the fear that a further increase in income or surtax would 
have an adverse effect on the rate of collection of these 
taxes, thus deflating their yield, (26 ) but conceded that it 
was possible: 
that taxpayers would be willing to meet the extra demands 
upon them if the increased tax formed part of a scheme 
of equal sacrifice and they felt that they were not 
singled out to bear an undue share of the burden. (27) 
On this basis, when the financial departments sent in 
their proposals for additional taxation of £37m in 1931/2, 
the Iriland Revenue's position clearly dominated their 
approach: 
we are not yet aware of the nature of the Government('s] 
proposals in the sphere of economy and we wish to make 
it very clear that in our view the yields of direct 
taxation shown in this note will not be obtained unless 
the whole Government plan is received as a fair and 
just plan demanding equal sacrifices from all section 
of the community. (28) 
Thus not only were the Cabinet pressured externally to agree 
to acceptable economies (both in amount and in detail), it 
seems also that pressure was applied from within, from the 
bureaucracy. The document previously cited clearly hinted 
that unemployment benefits must be cut; other evidence 
suggests that Inland Revenue also stressed the urgency of 
* Almost all the Finance Acts of the 1930s contained clauses 
to combat tax evasion and limit the scope for avoidance. 
immediate action, that the Finance Act must be passed 
quickly if direct taxes were to yield additional revenue 
because all income tax liabilities would have to be 
reassessed. ( 29 ) 
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As had occurred previously, Inland Revenue objections 
to raising taxes on income were overruled: the September 
1931 Budget saw an increase in the standard rate of income 
tax, a reduction of allowances, and a surcharge on surtax. 
But the Treasury's victory was far from total, certain 
concessions were made: the wear and tear allowances on 
plant and machinery were increased as a partial offset to 
the increased standard rate, while Hopkins had been forced 
to accede to the Inland Revenue's view that '~irect taxation 
can no longer be relied upon as before."(3 0) 
From this brief survey it can be seen that while the 
revenue departments were very definitely junior partners in 
the budgetary process; their role was not completely passive, 
and on occasion they could be an important influence on 
events. In the shaping of budgetary policy, Inland Revenue's 
contribution greatly surpassed that of Customs and Excise, 
whilst in addition, Customs and Excise was more frequently 
subject to Treasury directives about its estimates and was 
in a generally weaker position than Inland Revenue. The 
difference in influence exercised by the two departments is 
not easily explained, but it would seem to follow from the 
fact that the issues involved with taxes on expenditure were 
more straightforward, and the relationship between these 
taxes and the level of economic activity better understood, 
than was the case with taxes on income where the issues were 
more open to debate. 
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Finally, it should be stated that the key to under-
standing relations between the financial departments lies 
not in any conflict of interests between them but in the 
fact that there was a conflict of objectives as between the 
revenue departments and the Treasury. The Treasury's con-
cerns were largely immediate and short-term: the balancing 
of the budget over a one, or possibly two, year time period. 
In the difficult conditions of the 1930s attainment of this 
objective often compelled the Treasury to overrule the 
revenue departments even though, had conditions been more 
favourable, they would quite possibly have accepted the 
viewpoint of the revenue departments. In this sense 
conflict was unavoidable. The revenue department's concerns 
were less immediate; they operated over a much longer time 
horizon; and their concern was not solely with the yield 
of a tax, but also with its efficiency, equity, and ease of 
administration. 
2. The course and structure of receipts 
The course of expenditure has already been examined in 
some detail, (3 l) and, since both the expenditure and receipts 
ratios followed broadly similar paths, we need not repeat 
the earlier exercise as fully in the case of revenue. 
The 'displacement effect' of the war on the level of 
taxation is clearly evident in the course of the receipts 
ratio: the ratio of public sector receipts to GDP almost 
doubled as a result of the war, from 0.113 in 1913 to 0.204 
in 1919. (32 ) Whilst following the war, public expenditure 
was rigorously curtailed, no such development occurred on 
the taxation side of the account.(33 ) After a short interval, 
the receipts ratio continued its upward trend, rising from 
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0.209 in 1920 to 0.256 in 1922. This movement differed in 
one important respect from that of the previous period of 
increase; it was a reflection not only of higher tax rates 
but also of falling money GDP. This was a pattern to be 
repeated in later depression periods (e.g. 1929-32 when the 
receipts ratio rose from 0.238 to 0.274). Apart from this 
later depression, the receipts ratio followed a fairly 
steady upward trend over the interwar period (from 0.233 
in 1924 to 0.244 by 1937). 
This upward trend resulted from increased rates on 
existing taxes and some widening of the tax base. Over the 
course of the war taxes on expenditure had remained fairly 
stable at about 5% of consumers' expenditure; thereafter 
they exhibited a marked upward trend: from 7% in 1920 to 
8.8% in 1929 and 10.7% in 1937. (34 ) The most important 
development, however, concerned the income tax which 
"changed out of all recognition."(35 ) Between 1913 arid 
1918 the standard rate was increased from 6% to 30%, and 
the yield from £47.3m in 1913/14 to £291.2m in 1918/19.<36 ) 
The standard rate was maintained at 30% until 1922, when it 
was reduced to 25% and a year later to 22!%. Thereafter, 
it fluctuated for the greater part of the period in the 
range 20-25%, before being raised in the later 1930s with 
rearmament (to 27!% in 1938 and 37!% in September 1939).<37 ) 
Looking now in more detail at the 1930s, and at central 
government, there were a number of important developments 
in the field of taxation. The base for taxes on expenditure 
was widened with the adoption of a protective tariff in 
1931-2,<38 ) and the reintroduction of the tea duty in 
1932, (39 ) while an additional tax on incomes, the National 
Defence Contribution levied on profits, was inaugurated in 
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1937.<40 ) These changes were reflected in the structure 
of receipts (Table 3.1): taxes on expenditure increased 
from 7.3% of GDP in 1929/30 to 9.3% in 1933/4 and then 
remained fairly stable until 1936/7 before falling back to 
8.1% of GDP in 1939/40 as increasing prices began to affect 
the specific duties. Taxes on income followed a similar 
course in the earlier period, rising to a peak of 9.5% of 
GDP in 1931/2, but thereafter fell significantly before 
resuming their upwardtrend in the later 1930s as rates were 
increased markedly, especially on income tax. Taxes on 
capital exhibited a slight downward trend (varying between 
1.4 and 2.2% of GDP), while national insurance contributions 
rose to a peak of 2.4% of GDP in 1936/7 and then fell back, 
again as a result of rising prices. Finally, mention should 
be made of the class of miscellaneous revenues, consisting 
of a variety of tax and non-tax revenues; these do not fit 
conveniently into a functional analysis of revenue and, for 
certain reasons, require separate treatment.<4 l) 
Changes in the structure of receipts reflected not only 
discretionary action on the part of the budgetary authorities, <42 
but also the effects of variations in economic activity on 
endogenous revenue items, which in turn depend upon the 
characteristics of the main revenue classes.<43 ) 
The increasing importance of income and surtax (from 
32.9 to 39.8% of total receipts, 1929/30 to 1931/2)<44 ) in 
the early years of the depression reflected not only rising 
tax rates but also the fact that payment of these taxes was 
lagged with respect to income.* Thus, even without 
* See App. II. The method of assessment had been modified in 
1927, with the effect that income tax became more sensitive 
to cyclical variations, while increased progression in 
surtax also heightened.its sensitivity. Prior to 1927, 
income tax had been assessed on the average of the preceding 
3 years' income, resulting in both a lower sensitivity and a 
delayed response to income changes (Hicks 1938: 300; 
Bretherton 1937: 177-8). 
Table 3.1 Central government_ revenue as % of GOP, 1929/30-1939/40 
1929/30 1930/1 1931/2 1932/3 1933/4 1934/5 1935/6 1936/7 1937/8 1938/9 1939/40 
1. Taxes on income 7.0 7.9 9.5 8.3 7.4 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.5 8.3 8.6 
2. Taxes on expenditure 7.3 7.4 8.1 9.2 9.3 8.9 8.8 8.9 8.5 8.1 8.1 
3. Taxes on capital 1.9 2.0 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.4 
4. National insurance 
contributions 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.2 1.9 
5. Miscellaneous 
revenues 2.9 2.9 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 
6. TOTAL (T )* 21.1 22.1 23.6 23.9 23.2 22.2 22.1 22.3 22.0 22.0 21.9 
Source: Financial Accounts; Table 6.1 below. 
~: * For the definition of receipts, see pp.101-02 below. 
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discretionary action, the yield of these taxes would have 
risen in the early depression phase, indicative of the 
destabilizing characteristics of the main taxes on income.* 
Data on the payment of taxes on income by sector show 
that total payments rose from £295m to £352m (an increase 
of 19.3%) over 1929-32 but that the amount paid by the 
corporate sector fell marginally (from £67m to £64m). The 
personal sector thus bore the increased burden. Nevertheless, 
an increased rate of tax was being paid on a depressed level 
of profits: gross trading profits fell by 24.3% over 1929-32, 
from £1,145m to £867m.< 45 ) 
Income tax continued as the major tax on income. The 
importance of surtax diminished, despite higher tax rates.<46 ) 
This was a source of some concern and, after 1931, the 
authorities were reluctant to impose additional burdens 
upon surtax payers. The final tax on incomes, the National 
Defence Contribution, remained relatively sma11.<47 ) 
From 1932/3 to 1935/6 the relative weight of taxes on 
income fell as against taxes on expenditure, a result of 
the slow response of income and surtax to recovery, and the 
reduction in direct tax rates which was not matched by 
significant reductions in indirect taxes. After 1936/7 
the process was reversed: both direct and indirect tax 
rates rose but taxes on income increased by 1.6 percentage 
points of GDP whereas taxes on expenditure were reduced by 
0.8 percentage points of GDP. The reasons for this divergence 
become clearer as we examine taxes on expenditure. 
* Profits earned in the peale of 1929 were paid in 1930/1 and 
1931/2, years of worsening depression; similarly, in the 
peak year of recovery, 1937/8, the taxes paid were levied 
on the profits of 1935 and 1936, the former a year of 
comparative depression. Postwar arrangements for taxing 
profits have displayed similar, but more serious, 
destabilizing characteristics -see Hansen (1969: 406-07, 
435, 446-7) and Ward and Neild (1978: 23). 
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Throughout the period there was a clear preference for 
taxes levied on a specific rather than an ad valorem basis, 
a reflection of the fact that the latter were more difficult 
to administer.<48 ) Moreover, from the standpoint of the 
authorities' objective of maintaining a stable revenue in 
the face of fluctuations in economic activity, specific 
duties were preferable as they were less sensitive than 
those levied ~ valorem. This followed from the fact that 
specific duties did not directly reflect changes in the 
price of the taxable commodity;(49 ) rather, changes in the 
price level operated through the effective rate of duty 
which rose as prices fell, and vice versa. 
In large measure, the behaviour of taxes on expenditure 
during this period was determined by the course of prices. 
For the specific duties, effective rates rose until the 
mid-1930s as prices fell; thereafter, prices rose and this 
was reflected in the diminishing importance of taxes on 
expenditure (from 8.9% of GDP in 1936/7 to 8.1% by 1939/40), 
the ad valorem duties being of insufficient weight to fully 
compensate for the erosion of revenue by rising prices. 
Changes in the terms of trade were also of some 
importance. These improved by 24.2% over 1929-33, but then 
deteriorated down to 1937 (by 12.1%) before improving again 
by 7.6% over 1937-9.( 50) Thus, during the periods when the 
budgetary authorities were most hard pressed, revenue from 
imports was being reduced (most import duties were ad 
valorem), although at the same time the improved terms of 
trade had favourable effects on consumers' expendi"t ure and 
h . t" "t (51) ence on econom1c ac 1v1 y. · 
The problem was that the base for taxes on expenditure 
was too narrow; the main commodity taxes were too selective 
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to respond to a general movement in consumers' expenditure, 
and, with the sole exception of the motor vehicle licence 
duties, there were no taxes which could pick up revenue 
from the increasing expenditure on consumer durable goods. 
Unfortunately, there are no estimates of the proportion of 
total consumers' expenditure allocated to taxable goods;<52 ) 
it may be conjectured, however, that this proportion was 
falling.* 
The narrowness of the base for taxes on expenditure 
had a number of implications for budgetary policy: firstly, 
the limited range of commodities subject to tax was such 
that the yield of taxes on expenditure only just matched 
the growth of GDP; (53 ) secondly, "The wider the base of the 
tax - the larger the consumption taxed - the lower the rates 
needed to bring in a given revenue";(54 ) and thirdly, there 
were considerable difficulties associated with any attempt 
to increase rates of duty on the main taxes. The system 
was inflexible; what was required was a form of sales tax.** 
This carne with the purchase tax, introduced in 1940. 
When extra taxation was required, Customs and Excise 
feared the political repercussions of increasing the 
commodity taxes. For example, in early 1938 they advised: 
"In view of the alarurns in the political world about the 
rising cost of living it is to be presumed that both tea 
and sugar are not really practical politics."(55 ) Hydro-
carbon oils, a product with a low price but high income 
* An indication of this is given by the fact that over 
1929~37 expenditure on durable household goods and 
transport and communications rose from 12.7 to 14.0% 
of total consumers ' expenditure (Stone and Rowe 1966: 
Table 71). Neither broad category of expenditure was 
subject to taxation of any importance. 
** During the later 1920s a wide range of new taxes were 
considered by Customs and Excise but rejected on grounds 
of administrative impracticability or paucity of yield 
(see documents in W.V./216). 
elasticity of demand, were seen as the "only item worth 
serious consideration'', while tobacco, spirits, and beer 
all carried the risk that an increased rate of duty might 
. d dd. . 1 ( 56 ) y1el no a 1t1ona revenue. 
Nor did the import duties, greatly expanded 1931-2, 
live up to expectations. The duties had two functions: 
firstly, the protection of the domestic market and 
encouragement of import substitution and reorganisation of 
the 'basic' industries; secondly, the raising of revenue. 
In terms of the authorities' expectations, the tariff was 
somewhat of a disappointment, proving to be more effective 
at protection than at revenue raising.<57 ) 
Finally, despite these various difficulties, over the 
period 1929/30 to 1937/8 tax revenue~ expanded at a faster 
rate than GDP (at 2.1 and 1.5% per annum respectively). 
Nevertheless, this was not solely a result of the auto-
matic growth of revenue (with an aggregate tax elasticity 
of greater than unity);( 5 S) it was also a reflection of 
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discretionary changes which increased the average tax 
burden.C59 ) As is shown in chapter 5, throughout the 1930s 
it was a source of some disquiet to the Treasury that the 
growth of expenditure constantly threatened to outpace 
that of revenue. 
3. Revenue forecasting 
At a time when budgets were finely drawn, the importance 
of accurate revenue forecasting - a function performed by 
the revenue departments' Intelligence Branches- cannot be 
overstressed.(SO) Given prevailing circumstances, the 
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record of revenue forecasting was fairly impressive;* 
nevertheless, the effective formulation of budgetary policy 
was to be hampered by the limited, and perforce rather 
crude, forecasting techniques available to the revenue 
departments. The revenue departments' documents abound with 
statements to this effect. For example, an Inland Revenue 
paper of October 1930 was forced to conclude: 
Any attempt to revise this (tax) forecast at the 
present date involves guess work as to the effect of 
the trade depression on the profits of the curTent 
year ... and as to the length of time which must 
elapse before the depression passes away. (61) 
A detailed account of forecasting techniques is not 
possible here;(62 ) instead, the following discussion 
foe uses on a number of general problems, the nature of which 
help to explain the cautiousness exhibited by these depart-
ments. 
Although the determinants of individual tax yields were 
well understood, and rules of thumb applied with some 
precision as to likely yields, the number of variables 
involved and the possibility of unforeseen developments 
('budgetary disturbances' such as forestalments), made 
forecasting problematical prior to the final quarter of 
the financial year. Indeed, it was not until the final 
month (March) that the revenue picture, for the year about 
to close, assumed any degree of certainty, and informed 
judgements could be made concerning the forthcoming year. 
As a result, the final stages of budgetary planning were 
* From a study of total receipts the predictable pattern 
emerges whereby over the depression phase (1929/30-1932/3) 
revenue failed to meet the estimates (by an average of 
1.8%) while over the recovery phase (1933/4-1937/8) 
receipts consistently exceeded the estimates (again by 
an average of 1.8%). Variations in detail, however, 
were much greater. 
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invariably hurried: uncertainty left little time to consider 
new policy directions and tended to reinforce budgetary 
orthodoxy. Only once was a serious attempt made to forecast 
revenue over the medium-term, thus permitting a rather 
longer time horizon for budgetary planning and consequently 
the possibility that a wider range of policy options might 
be . d d (63) cons:t ere . 
Inadequate and incomplete statistical information lay at 
the root of the problem. National income data were not used 
in forecasting before 1941. ( 64 ) The Inland Revenue (and 
other economic departments) had the expertise to compile 
national income accounts, indeed they did so in 1929, ( 6S) 
but the exercise was not repeated. Whether the potential 
applicability to taxation forecasting of national income 
accounts was perceived, remains unknown. 
More generally, the necessity for a strictly balanced 
budget placed impossible burdens upon the forecasters to 
produce accurate estimates. This made them extremely 
cautious and disposed towards risk aversion, the result being 
an in-built tendency to understate (~ ~) revenue;* a 
tendency which in turn led to countervailLng Treasury 
pressures for the estimates to be stretched. 
* It also resulted in secrecy on the part of the revenue 
departments, particularly Customs and Excise. For example, 
in early March 1931, Webb privately advised his Chairman: 
"I should be glad if, in giving any figL1res to the 
Treasury, we can avoid being finally tied down at this 
stage, not only because of the forestalments position, but 
also because some of the estimates are otherwise quite 
conjectural ... & the late(r] I can wait before being 
definitely committed, the better it will be" (W.V./230, 
Webb to Floud, 6 March 1931); while in 1934 figures were 
actually withheld from the Treasury: 'This is another 
revised edition [of the tax forecast]. I think you had 
better keep this for yourself & the Deputy Chairman, & 
not send anything more to the Treasury unless they ask 
for it (& in no case send them the Table!)" (W. V ./270, 
Webb to H. J.B. Lintott [Private Secretary to Chairman"), 
27 March 1934). 
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4. Taxation and economic activity 
It remains to look briefly at the relation between 
taxation and economic activity, a subject that will be 
explored further in later chapters. The subject is of 
particular importance, for there were frequent complaints 
by the business community that excessive taxation was a 
primary cause of Britain's interwar economic difficulties. 
Whether taxation levels were 'excessive', in any 
absolute sense, is impossible to determine. While the war 
resulted in a permanent upward shift in taxation levels, 
there are considerable difficulties involved in assessing 
the implications of this for economic activity. In particular, 
there is a dearth of objective yardsticks with which to make 
such an assessment and reliance usually has to be placed 
upon impressionistic evidence. 
Sufficient data, however, are available with which to 
make international comparisons:(GG) from this it seems, 
firstly, that the receipts ratio was high in Britain; and, 
secondly, that there was a long lineage to the relative 
unimportance of indirect taxes in Britain.(67 ) The high 
level of taxation, vis-a-vis Britain's industrial 
competitors, was officially recognised, but the implications 
of this remained a subject of dispute. For example, the 
Colwyn Report,* which might be expected to have considered 
this question in some detail, limited itself to the state-
ment that the heavy tax burden had "to some extent affected 
our industry ... although we regard it as of minor importance 
* Chaired by Lord Colwyn, previously chairman of the 1919-20 
Royal Commission on the Income Tax, this committee had 
been established in March 1924 "to consider and report on 
the National Debt and on the incidence of existing 
taxation, with special reference to their effect on trade, 
industry, employment and national credit" (Committee on 
National Debt and Taxation, Report, Cmd.2800 (1927), 
p.viii). · 
compared with more general difficulties affecting our 
foreign trade."( 6S) 
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The disincentive effects resulting from the high levels 
of taxation required to finance an enlarged public sector 
have, since the early 1970s, been increasingly commented 
(69) . d upon. This was also true of the 1nterwar perio : the 
issues were fully investigated by the Colwyn Committee, 
which reported in 1927, and in lesser detail by the Balfour 
Committee on Industry and Trade which issued reports between 
1927 and 1929. ( 70) 
According to the Colwyn Committee, the central issue 
was that of the burden of the income tax: whether, as 
business representatives maintained,(7 l) the incidence of 
the tax was being shifted from producers to consumers, for 
if this was the case the tax was '~esponsible for raising 
prices, and (was) therefore a potent factor in depressing 
trade. "( 72 ) Following the evidence of economists such as 
Pigou, <73 ) the committee rejected this view, and concluded 
that "prices [are 1 determined by considerations into which 
the Income Tax does not directly enter", a conclusion that 
was "true over practically the whole field and for 
practically the whole of the time, any exception being local 
or temporary and insufficient to invalidate it. "< 74 ) 
Later commentators have not taken this view; ( 75 ) 
indeed, the report has been criticised for its unthinking 
acceptance of the classical economists' analysis that, in 
the short -run, an ineo-nl8- tax could not be shifted ei tlier 
by an individual or corporate body.< 76 ) Furthermore, the 
analysis was unsatisfactory because it was based upon 
conditions of perfect competition,<77 ) conditions which 
quite patently did not hold by the interwar period.(7 S) 
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The committee had summarised its views as follows: 
We conclude, with regard to enterprise, that the 
effects of high income taxation have been almost 
negligible in the field of employments and professions; 
over a great part of the industrial field, while 
appreciable, they have not been of serious moment, but 
it is clear that they must often have put a check on 
the more speculative class of business ... Wider 
causes than taxation, however, and particularly the 
dislocation of our old export markets, must be held 
mainly responsible for the lack of buoyancy in recent 
years. Relatively, income taxation has not been a 
factor of high importance. (79) 
The business community neither concurred with this view, or 
the assumptions underlying it, and throughout the interwar 
period organised business pressed the contrary view: that 
high rates of taxation depressed business confidence and, 
whilst other market forces contributed to the difficulties 
of British industries (particularly in export markets), a 
reduction of the income tax was the primary means whereby 
government could assist economic recovery. 
The opinions of organised business on taxation questions 
can be illustrated further by reference to the papers of the 
Federation of British Industries (F.B.I.), the largest and 
most influential of the employers' organisations.(SO) 
Throughout this period the F.B.I. pressed, both publicly and 
in representations to the Treasury, for a reduction of income 
tax; this to be financed by further economies in expenditure.(Sl) 
The F.B.I.'s attitude on this question was well expressed by 
Lithgow* in a meeting of its Taxation Committee in March 1931. 
Lithgow '~mphasised the fact that, in the past, increases in 
public expenditure had gone hand in hand with increased 
industrial prosperity, which alone l.~endered the country able 
to bear the burdens", but that, since the war, public 
*Sir James Lithgow, President of the F.B.I. (1930-2). 
expenditure and national income had not grown in line, 
"directly depriv(.ing] industrialists both of the capital 
and of the psychological incentive which was essential to 
real development. "( 82 ) 
In part, the F.B.I.'s views on taxation followed from 
their conception of the r~le of government in economic 
affairs, so that the question of high taxation was not a 
purely economic one. For example, shortly after the 1931 
crisis, the following policy statement was approved for 
publication: 
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Heavy expenditure on social services and on general 
administration and the crushing load of direct taxation 
has undoubtedly seriously accentuated the difficulties 
inevitably imposed upon the country by the world crisis. 
In the opinion of the Federation the country has been 
attempting to work an economic system based on private 
enterprise under circumstances which made the success-
ful conduct of such a system impossible. Private 
enterprise can only function efficiently and afford 
good employment and a good standard of living for the 
people if it is allowed to operate with reasonable 
freedom from Governmental restraints and is given the 
essential conditions for success. The most essential 
of these conditions is a plentiful and cheap supply of 
capital. Great Britain must therefore again become a 
country in which it is easy to accumulate capital and 
attractive to invest it. Heavy direct taxation, 
especially of the present type, e.g. Income Tax, Super 
Tax [sic), and Death Duties, all at high rates, is 
peculiarly inimical to the accumulation of capital and 
a serious deterrent to its investment. It is also 
psychologically a serious discouragement to the enter-
prise and initiative which is essential to the wellbeing 
of an industrial and trading nation. (83) 
Rarely did the F.B.I. voice its opinions so strongly; never-
theless, the passage clearly illustrates the strength of 
feeling against prevailing tax rates. 
Within the business community, and in its discussions 
with government, debate focused not only on the rate of 
income tax but also on the question of allowances for 
business undertakings . A linli ted measure of financial 
relief had been granted in 1929 with the derating scheme, 
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whereby rates were reduced on property used for productive 
industry or freight transport, the central government 
reimbursing to local authorities a sum equal to the 
estimated loss of revenue from these sources.* 
Following the report of the Royal Commission on Income 
Tax (1920), (S4 ) depreciation allowances had been granted in 
respect of wear and tear on plant and machinery,** a further 
(obsolescence) allowance also being paid if a capital asset 
was replaced before exhausted. The Royal Commission had 
further recommended that the obsolescence allowance be 
granted irrespective of whether the capital asset was 
replaced or not. This proposal had not been accepted,*** 
but was seen by the business community as an important means 
whereby the income tax could be used to aid industrial 
rationalization. 
The question was considered in some detail by Inland 
Revenue and the Treasury in 1930; firstly, as a response 
to representations from the F.B.I. and the British Chambers 
of Commerce;(85 ) and later, after an amendment -proposing 
full relief against tax for the whole capital cost of new 
plant and machinery - had been put down on the Finance 
Bill. ( 86 ) The objections raised by the two departments to 
these schemes have a wider applicability, to the general 
question of using taxation to stimulate economic activity. 
Firstly, Inland Revenue maintained that since the real 
difficulty was in obtaining capital to finance rational-
ization schemes, rather than in entrepreneurs being 
* The cost was approximately £22m per annum for local 
authorities in England and Wales (Burns 1941: 120). 
** The allowances were increased in 1931 and 1938, on both 
occasions as a partial offset to the increased standard 
rate of tax. 
*** It had also been rejected by the Colwyn Committee. 
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"deterred from [so doing) because they (did J not get 
obsolescence allowances", such allowances would do little 
to generate additional investment. Therefore, "as a subsidy 
given from the Revenue to industry for the purpose of 
fostering rationalisation ... the price would prove to be 
altogether out of proportion to the results."(S7 ) While 
such an argument was far from decisive, it was overshadowed 
by other, more weighty, objections: the schemes' cost was 
difficult to estimate - both departments were always 
reluctant to enter into open-ended commitments; and it 
threatened certain basic canons of the income tax code -
therefore carrying with it the risk that it would be used 
as a precedent by other groups and would eventually result 
in a marked diminution of the tax base.(SS) 
Capital allowances were firmly opposed throughout the 
rest of the 1930s. Indeed, all but very limited financial 
concessions to industry remained an anathema within Whitehall. 
Nowhere is this more clearly evident than in the very strong 
reaction of the authorities to the third report of the 
Special Areas Commissioner for England and Wales.(Sg) 
The Commissioner, Sir P. M. Stewart, had not only made the 
radical suggestion that the further growth of industry in 
London should be controlled, but had also suggested a 
pacltage of financial measures to induce new firms to locate 
in the Special Areas. Of these, the most controversial was 
the proposal to relieve from income tax profits not 
distributed but put to reserve, and exempt from income tax 
f . t t d . . £ ~ 00 ( 9 0 ) pro 1-s no excee 1ng .~ . 
Inland Revenue, believing "that the trouble of the 
depressed areas [was} high cost[s] of production and [that) 
the taxation of the profit margin cannot lower the cost(sJ 
of production", (gl) dismissed the proposal as of little 
financial significance to firms in these areas.<92 ) More-
over, there were grave dangers associated with such a 
proposal: it was quite indefensible to give preferential 
treatment to new industry over existing industry in the 
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Special Areas and, in the case of large companies, impossible 
to differentiate which of their factories made what profit; 
in the case of factory extensions it would be impossible to 
tell the extra profits due to the extension; concentration 
on profits gave no help to firms making losses; the Special 
Areas were not the only areas having depressed industries; 
and finally, tax reliefs could never be temporary. Accordingly, 
the memorandum concluded: 
that if the State is to embark upon the policy of 
holding out financial inducement for the development 
of enterprise in the Special Areas the true course is 
to determine the subsidy in a form that is available 
irrespective of the proiits that may result from the 
enterprise and is directed to reducing any handicap 
that these areas suffer from. To attempt it through 
the Income Tax queers the Income Tax pitch and 
produces a capricious form of relief that does nothing 
effective to assist the Special Areas. (93) 
The Treasury shared these objections to the proposal; 
more generally, they placed special emphasis upon the fact 
that subsidies (either as negative or positive expenditures), 
by virtue of the fact that they were not selective, were 
financially expensive in terms of the results achieved, and 
raised administrative and political questions much wider 
than the specific issue of financial assistance to the 
Special Areas.< 94 ) 
Financial assistance on any substantial scale to the 
business sector was seen as the first step in an 
irreversible process which would steadily erode the 
revenue base, and therefore threaten budgetary stability; 
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it would also open up a Pandora's box of administrative 
difficulties with profound political implications for the 
" role of the state in the economic-political life ot the 
country. Experience since 1945 lends support to the 
existence of these difficulties, the legitimacy of which is 
largely a matter of political choice rather than economic 
debate. There was a definite reluctance to use the taxation 
system as a vehicle to aid industrial recovery; in addition, 
as is well established, interwar governmen• generally 
avoided intervention wherever possible. Where intervention 
proved unavoidable, as increasingly became the case in the 
1930s (e.g. shipping)., intervention was ad hoc, was directed 
to the industry as a whole, and most importantly did not 
operate through the taxation system. 
Finally, a few preliminary conclusions may be drawn. 
Whilst there was a reluctance to use the tax system in a 
discriminatory manner, it was firmly accepted within the 
financial departments that taxation was a potentially 
important instrument of economic management, and that in 
particular a cut in income tax (which would affect both 
corporate and personal incomes) could have beneficial effects 
in promoting recovery. It was also recognised that in a 
depression increased taxation could exacerbate deflationary 
forces. Thus the foundations for modern economic management 
were already in existence; but it was the continued 
adherence to the balanced budget rule which prevented the 
effective translation of these attitudes into practical 
demand management. The reasons for the maintenance of 
budgetary orthodoxy must now be examined. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE BUDGET AND BUDGETARY POLICY: INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal policy in the years following the abandonment of 
the gold standard, indeed throughout the whole interwar 
period, has been judged by a number of writers to have been 
limited in its scope and objectives, and seriously 
destabilizing in its operation.(!) These questions 
explored in this and the two following chapters:(2 ) 
are 
first, 
a satisfactory definition of the budget is obtained, and 
then the main issues involved in evaluating interwar budgetary 
policy are introduced; in chapter 5 the budgetary history 
of the period 1929-39 is chronicled; and, finally, in 
chapter 6 constant employment budget balance estimates are 
employed as a measure of changes in fiscal stance. 
1. The budget: conventional and adjusted definitiop~ 
A necessary starting point in any discussion of budgetary 
policy during the interwar years is the budget definition 
employed by the authorities. The figures used in this study 
relate to central government plus the social insurance funds, 
not to the public sector as a whole, the concept now 
currently in use.* For the interwar years, when there were 
no nationalized industries and only a few public corporations, 
the principal omission is local government. Since it was, 
to a large extent, independent of central government, (3 ) its 
omission is not inappropriate: our objective is to embrace 
within our definition of the budget that sector of the 
*This does not, however, preclude consideration of the 
expenditures of local authorities and public corporations 
where appropriate; for example, when assessing the total 
effects of fiscal operations in chapter 6. 
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economy over which the Treasury had effective control and 
through which it therefore exercised its fiscal policies. 
The interwar financial statistics for central 
government present a number of difficulties: 
(1) The budget, as conventionally defined at the time (see 
identity (1) below), was not based on a coherent concept, 
nor did its definition remain constant. The exact components 
of the two sides of the account in any year were "to some 
extent at least a matter of chance and partly even of 
choice."(4 ) 
(2) The accounts were not only an amalgam of current and 
capital receipts and outlays, the composition of which 
varied from year to year, but in addition the budget did 
not cover the whole of central government activities; in 
particular, it excluded the social insurance funds (although 
the central government contribution to these funds was 
included in 'Ordinary Expenditure'). 
(3) Expenditure as conventionally defined (G in identity 
c 
(1) below) also omitted expenditure financed by borrowing 
under specific Acts of Parliament, while debt redemption 
was incorporated in general expenditure. Revenue (T in 
c 
identity (1) below), on the other hand, covered not only 
current tax and non-tax revenue but also included non-
recurrent transfers as devices to aid the balancing bf 
the budget. 
Account of these factors was taken when redefining the 
budget on an unchanging and unambiguous basis. The starting 
point was the conventionally defined budget: 
( 1) 
where Be was the budget balance; Tc 'Ordinary and Self-
Balancing Revenue' which included the major tax receipts, 
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the proceeds of sales of state property, repayment of loans 
granted to foreign governments, interest payments, shares 
in profits, receipts from special funds and the revenue 
from the Post Office; and G 'Ordinary and Self-Balancing 
c 
Expenditure' which covered debt interest and sinking fund 
payments, expenditure on the Armed Forces and Civil 
Departments, capital expenditure (except certain capital 
items voted outside the budget by specific Acts relating 
mainly to outlay by the Post Office and, in the later 
1930s, to defence expenditure), and the (current account) 
expenditure of the Post Office. 
Thus defined, B was the balance used by the 
c 
authorities and economic commentators in presenting and 
assessing policy. A balanced budget therefore meant that 
Gc should not exceed Tc. 
The definition of the budget used in this study is: 
B = T - G (2) 
where B is the budget balance and 
T - Tc - NRT + SIFPC (3) 
G- Gc + (CE + OB + DB- SF) + (SIFB - SIFGC)(4) 
where T and G are as before, and 
c c 
NRT Non-recurrent revenue included in T 
c 
SIFPC Private sector contributions to the social 
insurance funds 
CE Capital expenditure financed by borrowing 
OB other expenditure financed by borrowing 
DB Defence expenditure financed by borrowing 
SF Sinking fund payments included in Gc 
SIFB 
SIFGC 
Total benefits paid by the social insurance 
funds 
Central government contributions to the 
social insurance funds included in G 
c 
These adjustments serve two purposes: firstly, they 
revise the coverage of the central government accounts so 
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that they conform more closely to those now currently in 
use;(S) secondly, they remove the effects of fiscal window-
dressing; that is, the exclusion of non-recurrent receipts 
and the inclusion of various items of expenditure financed 
by borrowing nullifies the accounting devices employed by 
the Treasury to aid the achievement of a target balance 
B _(6) 
c 
2. [!_seal window~dressigg_ 
Table 4.1 records the conventionally defined budget 
balance (B ) and the adjustments made to expenditure and 
c 
revenue as part of the procedure for obtaining an unchanging, 
and economically more significant, definition of the budget 
(B). As above, these adjustments can be consider~d in two 
stages. 
The exclusion of sinking fund payments and extension 
of the budget definition to incorporate fully the social 
insurance funds requires little comment. Its effects are 
clear: the budget balance is improved in the case of the 
former; whereas, in the case of the latter, the balance 
on the social insurance funds could, at certain times 
(e.g. 1929-31) have important consequences for budgetary 
stability. A discussion of this is deferred until a later 
chapter. ('i) 
Table 4.1 
Budget balance, revenue and expenditure 
adjustments, 1929730-1939/40 (£m) 
Budget fiscal window-dressing Sinking Budget Social Budget balance f d balance ins. balance 
(Be) expenditure revenue un (B )* funds (B) A 
1929/30 -14.5 -15.3 -3.5 +47.7 +14 .4 +3.0 +17.4 
1930/1 -23.2 -11.0 -23.2 +66.8 +9 .4 -33.6 -24.2 
1931/2 +0.4 -18.1 -20.9 +32.5 -6.1 -39.6 -45.7 
1932/3 -32.3 -33.4 -11.9 +26.3 -51.3 +l.l -50.2 
1933/4 +31.2 -6.5 -10.0 +7.7 +22 .4 +10.9 +33.3 
1934/5 +7.5 -7.5 +12.3 +12.3 +13.5 +25.8 
1935/6 +3.0 -10.5 -8.0 +12.5 -3 .o +19.0 +16.0 
1936/7 -5.6 -13.5 -11.8 +13 .1 -17.8 +32.5 ~~~:;1/ m937/8 +28.8 -81.9 -5.1 +10.5 -47.7 +32.0 1938/9 -12.7 -150.7 -1.5 +13 .2 -151.7 +14 .5 -137.2 
1939/40 -276.0 -513.8 -1.4 +7.2 -784 .o +34.8 -749.2 
Sources: See App. I for both sources and methods of adjustment. 
Notes: * BA = TA - GA' where TA s Tc - NRT, and 
GAs Gc + CE + 00+ DB - SF. 
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Prior to 1937 fiscal window-dressing on both sides of 
the budget accounts was small in magnitude at less than 1% 
of GDP. Thereafter the difference between the conventionally 
defined and adjusted budget balances, respect ive_l:Y: _Be_ a~d _I3A, 
widened appreciably as fiscal window-dressing altered in 
form - the expenditure element increased markedly as defence 
-expenditure (only part of which was included in G ) came to 
c 
dominate the course of budgetary policy, while on the revenue 
side fiscal window-dressing became insignificant, the scope 
for such transactions being greatly reduced as potential 
sources of revenue were exhausted. Whilst for the greater 
part of the period the total magnitude of fiscal window-
dressing was not large, such practices were central to 
budgetary planning; consequently, an appreciation of them 
is crucial in understanding budgetary policy during this 
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period, for fiscal window-dressing acted to conceal 
deficits and thus provided, within certain limits, a means 
of avoiding discretionary action and its consequent adverse 
effect on demand, if a target balance (Be) was to be 
attained. 
Fiscal window-dressing on the expenditure side took 
the form of excluding various categories of expenditure 
financed by borrowing - for capital purposes, defence, and 
miscellaneous items - which more correctly should have been 
assigned to the budget. Although in one sense these items 
were visible, even if only to a few financial experts, and 
the veil over the authorities' activities was transparent, in 
general the authorities were successful in obscuring the true 
expenditure position and conveying the impression of adherence 
to orthodox financial principles. Similarly, on the revenue 
side, non-recurrent items were brought in which should have 
been excluded according to the accounting practices ostensibly 
in use. These receipts were varied from year to year, 
according to the exigencies of the budgetary situation, as 
the Treasury sought to maintain the illusion of a balanced 
budget throughout the greater part of the 1930s. While the 
sums involved in this sphere of fiscal window-dressing were 
generally smaller than on the expenditure side, the operations 
were more intricate, largely invisible and involved a more 
complicated subterfuge. 
The ability to indulge in this type of fiscal window-
{
dressing or cosmetic action primarily stemmed from the 
absence of a rigorous statutory definition of the budget. 
By the interwar years, as Chancellors were forced to try 
and accommodate demands for greater social expenditure 
within the dictates of budgetary orthodoxy, the budget 
identity had become an amorphous hybrid, an amalgam of 
current and capital accounts, devoid of any internal 
consistency or tangible economic significance. There is 
no evidence in the Treasury papers that budgetary reform 
was seriously considered.(S) Primarily because few were 
really aware of the extent to which such devices were 
employed in budgetary policy,* there was no real pressure 
for reform. As Phillips argued: 
there is no great technical difficulty in producing 
for a series of years budgets which are balanced at 
the end of the year to the nearest penny ... Perhaps 
half a dozen financial writers in the country would 
understand from published accounts what was 
happening, but I doubt if any one of the half dozen 
is capable of making the position clear to the 
public. (9) 
There were, however, limits to the Treasury's 
activities in this field. Under Churchill's stewardship 
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of the national finances (1924-9) '~evices of unprecedented 
ingenuity for balancing the budget" had been employed 
which deeply offended conservative financial interests.** 
In the 1930s the Treasury was eareful not to run the risk 
of having its activities exposed. Hence the use of such 
expedients in any one year was limited; for example, in 
April 1933 (when the Treasury had already decided to 
appropriate £10m from the War Loan Depreciation Fund), 
Phillips suggested that in addition £3.8m could be 
obtained by taking two years' surplus from the Savings 
* 
** 
For example, Hicks (1938: 279-89), Clark (1933: 434; 
1937: 136-7), the Liberal Industrial Inquiry (1928: 
418-25), and The Economist (e.g. Budget Supplement, 
10 April 1937, p.l), were all aware of such practices, 
though not the full extent of them since they had to 
rely on published accounts, and pressed for budgetary 
reform. The majority of contemporary writers, however, 
seemed unaware of this dimension of policy. 
Hicks (1938: 7, 11). During the period 1926/7 to 1.928/9 
an estimated £52m was taken into revenue as a result of 
Churchill's activities in this field (T172/1684, Note by 
Phillips, 23 Oct. 1929). 
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Banks in one year. Hopkins, however, firmly opposed such a 
course: "in my view one big sin like the Depreciation Fund 
is all right, but one big one and one little one side by 
side sounds too unorthodox and I shouldn't do it."(lO) 
While non-recurrent receipts paid into revenue (T ) 
c 
were postponed or accelerated according to 'necessity',* 
in addition, during discussions preceding the presentation 
of the budget, the Treasury would manipulate the revenue 
and expenditure estimates so that a potential deficit 
"would then be covered on paper."(ll) As was shown in the 
previous chapter, the Inland Revenue would occasionally 
relax pressure for the collection of income and surtax in 
the final quarter of the financial year if it was antici-
pated that the estimate would be exceeded and the financial 
position was likely to be more serious the following year. 
The sums not collected would then be taken as arrears the 
following year.(l 2 ) In normal circumstances the Treasury 
avoided recourse to the device of under-estimating 
expenditure and inflating the revenue estimates, for in 
the first case they ran the risk of having to introduce a 
Supplementary later in the year, while the second course 
entailed the danger that their activities would be exposed.(l3 ) 
Moreover, a budget that was so tightly planned would not 
contain a 'hidden reserve' which was seen as necessary to 
meet unforeseen contingencies.< 14 ) Nevertheless, the serious 
* Using the Treasury's internal receipts book (T239/25-7) 
the exact date of a receipt can be pin-pointed. These 
registers show that, in general, the Treasury paid items 
into Miscellaneous Revenue in the first three quarters of 
the financial year, thus reducing the central government 
deficit during the period when expenditure, irrespective 
of whether the final budget outturn was in balance, greatly 
exceeded revenue. If the budget forecast, however, was a 
deficit, although of an uncertain magnitude, receipts from 
items such as the profits of the Bank of England note issue, 
the National Debt Commissioners, and the Enemy Debt Clearing 
Office were ta~en in the last week of the financial year, 
their magnitude being varied (roughly) according to the 
sum necessarv to balance the bud~et. 
budgetary difficulties of the early 1930s meant that such 
devices were employed; in particular, the estimates for 
expenditure on unemployment were reduced in 1932 and 1933 
below the figures recommended by the Ministry of Labour as 
part of the Treasury's attempts to avoid raising taxation 
further and thus retarding the nascent recovery.(lS) 
In the circumstances of the 1930s where the existence 
of mass unemployment made it politically difficult to 
achieve the tightening required to balance the budget in 
the face of autonomous fluctuations in activity, fiscal 
window-dressing and related practices served the essential 
function of allowing the Treasury apparently to adhere to 
orthodox financial principles whilst simultaneously 
limiting the extent of fiscal tightening required in a 
depression to maintain a balanced budget (B ) . 
c 
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The existence of such budgetary practices would support 
the rather cynical view, expressed in a more recent budget 
debate, that "all Budgets are to some extent mythical 
creatures comprising a considerable admixture of illusions."(l6 ) 
It also suggests some scope for revision of the traditional 
interpretation of the authorities' belief in balanced 
budgets, in that adherence to budgetary orthodoxy would 
appear to owe something to political expediency as well as 
'sound' economic principles. 
3. BudKet~ry orthodox~ 
We consider first the principles underlying nineteenth 
t bl . f · ( l 7 ) I l t h cen ury pu 1c 1nance. n genera erm~ t ese can be 
summarised in a set of propositions which hinged on the 
balanced budget convention (or rule) that the minimum 
objective of government in the financial sphere was to 
cover its expenditure with its receipts. Two exceptions, 
or relaxations of this rule, were permitted: (1) in war-
time the exigencies of the situation allowed limited 
recourse to borrowing; and (2) capital projects shown to 
be remunerative in an accepted accounting sense could be 
financed by borrowing. A number of related propositions 
followed from the balanced budget convention and the view 
of the limited functions of the state from which it, in 
turn, derived : 
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(1) Since taxes were a burden on productive enterprise, and 
expenditure should be limited to those functions of 
government considered absolutely necessary, the size of the 
budget (in relation to GDP) should be kept small, and the 
aim of budgetary policy should be an ~ post surplus to 
permit debt redemption and/or remission of taxation. 
(2) The balanced budget convention was further reinforced 
by the antipathy towards deficit finance, a process which 
was viewed as withdrawing funds from productive employment. 
An appreciation, however, is essential of the 
historical setting in which these principles of public 
finance evolved: firstly, in understanding their strength 
and diuturnity; and secondly, why they ceased to be 
appropriate in the changed economic and political conditions 
of the twentieth century. 
When Adam Smith propounded the maxim in The Wealth of 
~tio~ (1776), which underlay the balanced budget 
convention, that "What is prudence in the conduct of every 
private family, can scarce be folly in that of a great 
Kingdom", the target for attack was the then prevailing 
mercantilist doctrines. It was not intended as an absolute 
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rule, immutable, and applicable to all historical 
situations. Rather, it derived from Smith's conviction 
(which was shared by the later 'classical' economists) that 
the state was an inefficient form of organization for wealth 
creation, because it rested on a pattern of special trading 
privileges, grants of monopoly and tariffs; and that 
governments, unless constrained by a balanced budget rule, 
would retard capital formation if they were permitted to 
borrow funds since these would otherwise be productively 
invested. Thus the classical case for balanced budgets 
rested on a series of interrelated propositions, of both 
an economic and political nature, which reflected attitudes 
towards the r~le of the state, the responsibilities of 
government, and the belief that the unconstrained operation 
of market forces would ensure full employment equilibrium.(lS) 
Similarly, the preoccupation of contemporary economists 
and financiers with redeeming the national debt reflected 
prevailing conditions, notably that control over the rate 
of interest or the domestic price level was not within the 
power of the authorities, and thus the debt could become an 
important restrictive element in the economy whilst, in 
addition, frustrating operations calculated to reduce the 
burden of the debt.(lg) 
A number of other factors were also important. In the 
conditions of primitive accounting control which held prior 
to Gladstone's reforms of the 1860s, a balanced budget was 
used as a means of assessing the efficiency of financial 
management. More generally, the budget was a political 
event, a means of discussing and criticising the economic 
. (20) policy of a government. As has recently been shown, 
the balanced budget convention, the cornerstone of the 
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nineteenth century 'fiscal constitution', was not "some 
unthinking Victorian moral code which had nothing whatso-
ever to do with the rational conduct of government affairs"; 
on the contrary, it "played a crucial role in 
constraining the otherwise inherent biases of that system 
to over-expenditure and deficit finance."( 2 l) These biases 
or weaknesses in the fiscal constitution centred on fears 
of profligacy of politicians in a democratic political 
setting, the weak position of Parliament in the financial 
control it exercised over the executive, and the leverage 
exerted by the service departments, with their incessant 
demands for increased expenditure, within the executive.<22 ) 
As Hicks has argued, adherence to balanced budgets in 
the nineteenth century was ·~ sound economic instinct'' 
given the backcloth of rapidly expanding population and 
growing prosperity. Moreover, the evidence suggests that 
towards the close of the century there occurred '~ not 
insignificant change of heart, at least in the sense of 
reluctance to increase tax rates substantially in bad 
times", while the bal.anced budget convention: 
became increasingly embarrassing, and indeed 
economically inappropriate, as the strong 
expansionary phase of the British economy died 
away. It seems that a sort of horse-sense prevented 
the later Victorians from following too faithfully 
an inappropriate fiscal policy. The attempt to 
return to the pure milk of Gladstonian finance in 
the next Great Depression (particularly in the 
second budget of 1931 ... ) finally demonstrated 
that the old medicine was no longer safe, 
unadulterated, for internal use. (23) 
Returning now to the interwar years, we may summarise 
as follows the traditional interpretation of the allegiance 
to budgetary orthodoxy: 
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(1) Many have argued that the Treasury, consciously or 
unconsciously, adhered to some sort of belief, stemming 
from classical economics, "that all factors of production 
are normally and inevitably utilized by private business, 
(and that] it follows that the State can obtain the use of 
such factors only by preventing private business from using 
them From this it follows that the first principle of 
'sound' Public Finance is that the budget should be 
balanced."(24 ) Furthermore, unbalanced budgets were 
counter-productive because they would have an adverse effect 
on business confidence, especially if they resulted from 
unremunerative public works. As one contemporary put it, 
"What was gained on the swings of public investment was, 
therefore, liable to be lost in part on the roundabouts 
of private investment."( 25 ) 
(2) Within this schema it was further contended that 
unbalanced budgets were inflationary. 
(3) An increase in the size of the deadweight national 
debt was seen as highly undesirable for the increased debt 
charge (interest payments and sinking fund) would place 
additional burdens on productive enterprise. 
Against these supposed tenets of orthodox thought 
Keynes and other perfervid advocates of a more active and 
interventionist policy argued that in the circumstances of 
the 1930s it was absurd to hold that a budget deficit would 
'crowd-out' private sector demand or that an increase in the 
money stock would be inflationary. The fact that the 
financing of the deficit would have monetary consequences, 
in the sense that the government's debt operations acted on 
the credit base, was not a matter of contention; the area 
of dispute was whether inflation was automatic and not 
instead dependent on the pressure of demand in the labour 
market. Since this was a central theme of the interwar 
policy debate, the various aspects of this question are 
considered in greater detail in the following section. 
The automatic association of budget deficits with 
inflation stemmed principally from a misinterpretation of 
the causes of inflation and resulted from the fact that 
classical economic theory drew an artificial distinction 
between real and monetary forces.< 26 ) In addition, there 
had developed a strong and apparently irrational fear of 
inflation, which was to influence many of the policy 
decisions of the period - in particular, the return to 
the gold standard in 1925 and the heroic attempts made to 
remain on gold in 1931. 
It is usually argued that the preoccupation with the 
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national debt stemmed from a fundamental confusion between 
the position of a private business or individual and that 
of the state, for it ignored the fact that whereas tbe 
former must default unless able to meet expenditure out of 
income, the latter's debt was not a burden in the same 
sense since the state represents the community as a whole 
and holds its debt with the same body it represents. In 
fact, the authorities' fears were not as irrational as one 
would suppose. As has been shown, the interwar years were 
characterized by a falling price level, fears about future 
population trends, and a greatly enlarged debt charge 
caused by the First World War.< 27 ) The latter was to 
reinforce the already existing deflationary bias in 
budgetary policy, while the greatly increased transfer 
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payments within the economy acted, given the generally 
regressive nature of the tax system, to depress the over-
all propensity to consume and thus aggregate demand. 
The question whether the direct demand effects of an 
unbalanced budget would be counteracted by an adverse 
effect on business confidence and therefore private sector 
demand, either through the effect on the rate of interest 
or more generally on business expectations, was central 
to the economic policy debate of the 1930s and in a sense 
is still pertinent today, for to a large extent the success 
of fiscal operations in a capitalist society depends on 
their being favourably received by financial markets. 
On strictly economic issues the Treasury's position 
has been misunderstood. On the question whether unbalanced 
budgets automatically resulted in inflation, the Treasury, 
in the early 1930s, held the following position: 
There is a strong public instinct which 
associates unbalanced Budgets with inflation, and no 
men have done more than the present Government to 
impress that view on the country. The public 
instinct is right, but it would be an entire mistake 
to suppose that an unbalanced Budget means immediate 
or rapid inflation. In the case of a financially 
strong country the process from Budget deficits to 
inflation is a long drawn out agony which may drag 
on for years. So long as the Government can borrow 
from the public to cover the deficit there is no 
inflation. The cost of borrowing will rise which 
makes the Budget position worse but the crash will 
only come, if it does come, at long last when the 
public is completely discouraged and will lend the 
Government no more money. Till that moment arrives 
there will be no inflation. (28) 
This document suggests that the balanced budget convention 
in addition to having an economic rationale also derived 
from political and psychological origins. 
Maintenance of balanced budgets was publicly expressed 
in terms of adherence to certain economic principles, whereas 
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political considerations were of paramount importance. On 
this point it is worth citing at length a Treasury document 
-a comment on Keynes's Means to Prosperity (1933) -
which articulates these political considerations and puts 
the policy prescriptions of the 'new' economics within a 
political, as well as economic, context: 
If the Budget were unbalanced by £50 millions to 
take a shilling off the Income Tax, the process would 
not stop there. If once expenditure can be incurred 
without the unpleasant necessity of imposing 
taxation to cover it it would become impossible for 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Government or 
the House of Commons to control public expenditure, 
especially if borrowing for current expenditure was 
advocated as the road to prosperity. 
We can see what has been the painful experience of 
other countries, and it will be remembered that 
immediately after the war when we were still meeting 
current expenditure out of borrowings there was an 
orgy of expenditure of all kinds and that after a 
year or two far heavier taxation even than that of 
the war years had to be imposed to pay for it. We 
do not want to repeat that process. Keynes and Co., 
whilst agreeing that normal Budgets must be balanced 
to prevent disaster, say that this is the one 
psychological year when a concatenation of circum-
stances has arisen to justify deliberately unbalancing 
the Budget. But can anyone suppose that, once a 
precedent of this kind was set, people would remember 
the special arguments adduced to justify it? 
Whatever may be thought by people outside, members of 
the House of Commons will realise how impossible it 
would be once we had abandoned the principle of 
paying our way to stop a rising tide of expenditure. 
Within a year or two (i.e. very near the next General 
Election) there would be the sort of situation we had 
in 1931, i.e. the need for new cuts and new taxes. (29) 
From this a very important conclusion followed: remission of 
taxation only had a favourable psychological effect when 
occasioned by a previous budget surplus: 
Would there be the same psychological effect when the 
remission was only given by unbalancing the Budget 
and when it would be followed immediately by clamant 
demands for new expenditure, every demand justified 
on the same grounds as had led to the original 
unbalancing of the Budget and the beginning of 
borrowing. Would not the ordinary taxpayer and the 
business man very soon begin to have a feeling of 
uneasiness and apprehension? After all people will 
realise that the bill must be paid if not this year 
next year or the year after. Uncertainty and 
apprehension as to the future would very quickly 
cancel out any immediate psychological benefit which 
the reduction of taxation by unbalancing the Budget 
would promote. (30) . 
Thus the precept of the balanced budget acted as the 
ultimate constraint on the growth of expenditure, since it 
moderated and tempered the natural demands of politicians 
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and sectional interests for new expenditure, and provided a 
'neutral' framework within which competing demands were 
reconciled. 
This conclusion relates to recent literature in 'public 
choice' economics, (3 l) in particular the new critique of 
Keynesian economics developed by Buchanan and Wagner. <32 ) 
This is concerned less with the fundamental accuracy of 
the Keynesian diagnosis of inherent instability and 
potential for under-employment equilibrium in market 
economies, and more with the realism of the political 
philosophy underlying the 'new' economics. This critique 
rests on two premises: 
(1) The instrument Keynes introduced to ensure full 
employment - budget deficits - removed completely the 
institutional constraint to the growth of expenditure. 
(2) Keynes's assumptions about political behaviour- termed 
by his biographer the "presuppositions of Harvey Road"(33 ) 
whereby Keynes implicitly assumed that the small elite 
responsible for formulating economic policy would, even 
in the face of historical evidence to the contrary, always 
act in accordance with the public interest and not succumb 
to political or other pressures -, although both highly 
idealistic and altruistic, were also naive and had dangerous 
implications for political-economic stability. 
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It is contended that such a view, combined with the 
additional instrument of economic policy provided by the 
'new' economics, was both unrealistic and totally 
unsuitable for the conditions of a representative democracy, 
for the abandonment of the balanced budget constraint 
permitted politicians to engage in operations against the 
long-term public interest by serving their short-term 
political and electoral advantage. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the Treasury 
held a similar position, although it was never articulated 
in such a systematic and precise form, and instead derived 
from an intuitive conviction that, whilst Keynes and other 
advocates of an active fiscal policy essentially desired 
long-term balanced budgets,<34 ) such a policy of 'functional 
finance' was politically unrealistic and even naive, for 
political pressures would vitiate the imperative of raising 
taxation (to create the surplus) as boom developed. 
Even in the 1944 Emeloyment Policy White Paper, (35 ) 
the so-called '~ormal recognition of the principles of the 
Keynesian Revolution in Britain", (3 G) there was a definite 
unwillingness to countenance unbalanced budgets as a long-
term policy. Beveridge accused the Treasury of being ·~till 
far too inhibited in regard to central finance, too fearful 
of increasing the national debt", <37 ) whereas, in fact, the 
Treasury's attitude reflected the fear, which was quite 
widely held in Whitehall, that the complete removal of the 
balanced budget rule (either over one year or the course of 
a trade cycle) would lead to an explosion of expenditure and 
the assumption of greatly increased state powers in the 
postwar'period. 
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It is also interesting to note that in the formative 
period of the monetarist counter-revolution of the 1960s, 
an integral part of the attack on the efficacy of fiscal 
policy centred on an appreciation of the political factors 
involved in formulating budgetary policy and the way in 
which discretionary action could in practice be destabilizing. 
Admittedly, the main thrust of attack centred on theoretical 
issues, in particular whether changes in the money stock had 
an indirect effect on aggregate demand as a result of wealth 
effects, but as Friedman says: 
In the United States the revival of belief in the 
potency of monetary policy was strengthened also by 
increasing disillusionment with fiscal policy, not so 
much with its potential to affect aggregate demand as 
with the practical and political feasibility of so 
usingit. (38) 
In the following chapters it will be shown that while 
on economic grounds alone the Treasury remained sceptical 
throughout the 1930s of the efficacy of the policy 
prescriptions of the 'new' economics, on strictly political 
grounds monetary policy remained a more acceptable ins.trument 
of stabilization policy for in a sense it was politically 
neutral. Thus Phillips in comparing the respective merits 
of fiscal and monetary policy as recovery devices ~oncluded:* 
The truth is that neither Budget deficits nor 
excessive public works can bring about inflation 
unless and until certain special conditions are 
fulfilled. Those conditions are that the Government 
borrows not from the public but from the Central 
Bank; and that the Central Bank uses the new assets 
which it receives in the form of Governmental promises 
to pay as the basis of a fresh creation of credit. It 
is the increase in Central Bank assets which produces 
inflation under certain conditions, and Budget 
deficits operate only through that factor. Everything 
* Inflation in this context meant reflation, rather than 
an increase in the price level for its own sake. Phillips's 
theoretical position was very similar to that of Hawtrey 
(1925) 
that a Budget deficit can do, could be done very much 
more simply by the Central Bank increasing its assets 
on its own account by buying gold or securities. The 
Budget deficit is a useless complication and a very 
dangerous one because it is difficult to reverse and 
~an get] completely out of control. (39) 
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This fear of the continued growth of expenditure was a 
major preoccupation throughout the interwar period. Thus 
the May Committee had lamented the deplorable state of 
affairs where the dice had become so heavily loaded in 
favour of expenditure, (4 0) explaining this development in 
the following terms:* 
After the heavy sacrifices of the war large sections 
of the nation looked to the post-war period with the 
natural expectation of a general improvement in the 
old conditions of life. The disappointment of many 
hopes in the economic sphere seemed to intensify 
demands for improvements from political action and 
all parties have felt the insistent pressure for 
promises of 'reforms' as the price of support, such 
'reforms' being in fact mostly of the nature of 
privileges or benefits for particular classes at 
the cost of the general taxpayer. The resulmof 
this pressure are to be seen not only in the lavish 
promises contained in the election addresses of the 
period since the war but in the undertakings freely 
given by individual Parliamentary candidates to 
sections of the electorate. At election times those 
desiring increased expenditure on particular objects 
are usually far better organized, far more active 
and vocal than those who favo~r the vague and 
uninspiring course of strict economy; and as a 
result candidates not infrequently find themselves 
returned to Parliament committed, on a one-sided 
presentation of a case, to a course which on fuller 
knowledge they see to be opposed to the national 
interests. (41) 
What exactly should be understood by political neutrality, 
in the context of the choice of monetary or fiscal policy? 
Political neutrality may be thought of not only as a belief 
in the laissez-faire ideal that market forces, unencumbered 
* This problem was particularly acute with regard to the 
unemployment insurance system: '~ach successive 
Government has made changes in the scheme, which have 
been determined less by the need for the careful 
balancing of income and expenditure than by a desire to 
attract, or do as little as possible to repel, electoral 
support" (Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance 
(Gregory Commission), Final Report, Cmd .4185 (1932), 
p .164). 
by government interference, would ensure the attainment 
·of full employment equilibrium and the optimal allocation 
of productive resources, but also the fear, in some 
Hayekian sense, (42 ) that since political parties and 
pressure groups always violate general economic rules, 
acceptance of the policy prescripts of the 'new' economics 
would create the opportunity for politicians to interfere 
with the operation of market forces for the benefit of 
particular groups, this development culminating in the 
situation in which politicians, for electoral purposes, 
would be forced to pursue policies against the long-term 
public interest. 
The Keynesian revolution as applied to public finance 
overthrew the balanced budget convention but failed to 
substitute an alternative set of guidelin-es calculated to 
constrain the natural profligacy of politicians in a 
democratic political setting. Thus was created the 
possibility of political-business cycles.<43 ) While such 
cycles were not possible in the interwar period, the 
influence of political factors cannot be completely dis-
counted. Accusations were made against Churchill's 1929 
budget (delivered only some six weeks before a General 
Election), which had remitted taxes across the board, that 
it was a blatant act of electioneering;(44 ) similar 
comments were evoked by the change in the government's 
unemployment policy in 1935, the liberalization in 
attitudes towards public works reflecting the political 
t-hreat posed by Lloyd George's 'New Deal' ; (45 ) and there 
is no doubt that Chamberlain's budgetary strategy of 
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1932-5 was strongly influenced by political considerations. (4 G) 
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The importance of political neutrality as a guideline 
for policy* may be illustrated by reference to two important 
episodes during the interwar period: the adoption of 
tariffs in 1931-2, and the motives for the return to the 
gold standard in 1925. 
At first sight the adoption of tariffs would seem to 
conflict with the view that, in general, the economic 
policies adopted during these years attempted to solve 
economic problems without creating a series of vested 
interests which would endanger long-run economic and 
political stability. But, in the eyes of the authorities, 
such a situation was guarded against by the creation of 
the Import Duties Advisory Committee which,<47 ) rather than 
the Board of Trade, was charged with overseeing the operation 
of the tariff and considering applications from specific 
groups for further tariff protection, thus appearing to take 
tariff questions 'out of politics'. This objective is 
visible from the very earliest stages of planning the 
tariff. Thus the Conservative Research Department's Tariff 
Committee Report of June 1931 (on which the official tariff 
was largely based) stated: 
The tariff can never be 'taken out of politics', 
and the original emergency tariff must be purely the 
work of politicians and the Government ... But the 
right way to carry out the adjustment and trans-
formation of the original tariff ... is in our 
opinion through the macfuinery of a non-politic~! 
impartial Tariff Commission, whose recommendations 
the Government may either accept or reject, but 
shall not go beyond. To nothing connected with the 
tariff do we attach higher importance than to the 
correct functioning of this body ... (48) 
* See Booth (1978) for the way in which the National 
Government, usually with Chamberlain as the motivating 
force, tried repeatedly to divorce policy questions from 
their political context·. This was primarily achieved by 
creating administrative bodies, such as the Unemployment 
Assistance Board, which were quasi-independent of 
executive control. 
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In a rather different sense the idea of political 
neutrality has an applicability to the motives underlying 
the return to gold, for in its most extreme theoretical 
form the gold standard can be viewed as the very embodiment 
of the laissez-faire ideal in that the adjustment mechanism 
would be entirely automatic, thus precluding state inter-
vention or management.< 49 ) For example, at the famous 
dinner party in March 1925 when Churchill assembled 
together Keynes, McKenna, Niemeyer, and Bradbury to discuss 
the merits of return, Grigg (the only source for this 
episode) relates that Bradbury "made a great point of the 
fact that the Gold Standard was knave-proof. It could not 
be rigged for political or even more unworthy reasons."(5 0) 
This raises the interesting question why the economic 
authorities, indeed informed opinion generally, were 
unwilling to trust politicians with economic management. 
Thus Snowden believed that: 
(In] the control of credit and currency, the 
administration of the control must be kept free from 
political interferences. I will tell you why. In 
the first place Parliament is not a competent body 
to deal with the administration of such highly 
delicate and intricate matters. The second argument 
is this, that I have seen and I know something of 
the danger of the control of credit and the means of 
starting an inflation policy, and it might be highly 
dangerous in the hands of a Government that wanted to 
use this means in order to serve some purpose, or to 
gain popular support. (51) 
One possible explanation is that this type of view: 
derived partly from the experience of inflation during 
and after the war, which was put down to political 
chicanery rather than to the war. Out of it arose 
the moral denunciation of the 'managed currency' of 
1914-25, and the dangerous myth that a gold standard 
like the one of 1925-31 was automatic, and not (as it 
in fact was) also 'managed'. (52) 
In the creation of this 'myth' the example of the Continental 
inflatio~ of the early 1920s was undoubtedly instrumental. 
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Whilst we can see ~post facto that this fear of inflation 
stemmed from a misunderstanding of cause and effect in 
inflationary processes, we can also appreciate the profound 
impact on those responsible for formulating economic policy 
in Britain of the impoverishment and destitution of much of 
the German middle class and the subsequent growth of 
extremist politics. Nor should the British inflation of 
1919-20 be forgotten:( 5J) this was to have a lasting 
impression upon policy makers and, very likely, was to 
prejudice the case against deficit finance in the very 
different circumstances of the 1930s. 
The balanced budget convention and belief in the 
automatic operation of the gold standard were thus in a 
sense analogous, in that they were perceived as a means of 
controlling political action which could be disadvantageous 
to the long-term public interest, and had developed as 
responses to the dangers inherent in a democratic, 
pluralistic society. It is within this framework of 
analysis, rather than one which views adherence to balanced 
budgets exclusively in terms of an economic rationale, that 
we can now proceed to survey the budgetary history of the 
1930s. Before doing so, however, the crowding-out issue 
is further considered. 
4. Crowding-out 
In this final section we discuss more fully the 
crowding-out debate, its relevance to the issue whether 
budget deficits and public works programmes can be employed 
as policy instruments to mitigate unemployment and 
stabilize demand, and the reasons why the business community 
might react adversely to particular economic policies. 
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In discussing the crowding-out issue it is necessary 
first to distinguish between real productive resources and 
financial resources, a distinction not always made evident 
in the literature.<54 ) Our concern here is with the 
latter. (55 ) Crowding-out may be described in the following 
manner: with a given money stock, an increase in bond sales 
(to finance a budget deficit and/or public works programme) 
would have little or no impact on aggregate demand because 
the rise in interest rates required to sell the additional 
bonds would crowd-out an equivalent volume of other 
expenditures (private investment and consumption, in so 
far as they are sensitive to interest rates). In its most 
extreme form, therefore, it would be held that fiscal 
operations could not affect the level of aggregate demand, 
their influence being limited to determining the allocation 
of expenditure between different purposes.< 56 ) 
Unfortunately, the use of such arguments during the 
interwar period were characterized by a failure to specify 
clearly what factors were operating to raise interest 
rates and the channels through which they operated. Two 
main al terna ti ves suggest themselves : 
(1) that with a fixed money stock and at a position of 
full employment, the financing of a deficit purely by bond 
sales crowds-out private expenditure because extra trans-
action balances are required for a higher level of incomes 
and these will be released from asset balances only as 
interest rates rise; or 
(2) also with a fixed money stock but at a position of 
less than full employment (or, indeed, irrespective of the 
state of demand in labour markets), a deficit financed by 
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bond sales would crowd-out private expenditure if there was 
sufficient opposition to, and apprehension about, the 
government's policy that there was an increased demand for 
cash balances (a change in liquidity preference) which 
prevented idle balances from taking up the additional bonds 
without raising interest rates. 
The first case represents what is commonly termed 
crowding-out; the second may be viewed as a form of 
psychological crowding-out. It is of especial relevance 
to the interwar policy debate where the attitude of 
financial markets could effectively neutralize fiscal 
operations. In both cases, ceteris paribus, an accommo-
dating monetary policy - financing the deficit or increased 
public works expenditures by new money rather than by bond 
sales- could have prevented crowding-out. But here also, 
there was scope for adverse confidence effects; that is, 
such a monetary policy might be viewed as irresponsible, 
thus reducing private sector investment via an adverse change 
in business confidence.< 57 ) 
The first form of crowding-out also represents the 
supposed position of the Treasury during the interwar period.(SB) 
Thus Stein (in common with other economists) has described the 
'Treasury view', (Sg) as expressed in the Memoranda on Certain 
Proposals Relating to Unemployment (1929), (GO) as: 
the position that the amount of savings available at 
any time was given and in use, so that an increase in 
government borrowing to pay for public works would only 
displace private investment and would not add to total 
employment ... [This view was] a particular application 
of 'Say's Law', an old economic principle which says 
that supply creates its own demand and that there 
cannot be a general deficiency of demand. This is the 
same as saying that all income that is saved is 
automatically invested and constitutes a demand for 
goods. (61) 
But as will be shown in a later chapter, and as suggested 
above, (G2 ) references by the Treasury to a crowding-out 
mechanism were not of this first type, but rather of the 
second. Accordingly, the determinents of confidence 
amongst the business and financial communities require 
consideration. 
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Why were these groups in general opposed to a counter-
cyclical fiscal policy?- opposition, it was believed, 
sufficiently emphatic to ensure that the effectiveness of 
such a policy would be constrained by a rise in interest 
rates resulting from an adverse change in liquidity preference 
when the bonds to finance such a policy were marketed. A 
number of explanations may be suggested: 
(1) the business community had a very low level of trade 
cycle consciousness (i.e. a limited perception of the trade 
cycle) and tended, in times of depression, to attribute 
their difficulties '~o particular factors which affect the 
particular business or at best the particular industry, 
such as the activities of competitors at home and abroad, 
a shift in the direction of demand, and so on", rather than 
to a general deficiency of demand.< 63 ) 
(2) on political grounds the business community might view 
as undesirable an increase in government expenditure because 
it would - especially in the case of public works - be 
accompanied by increased state interference in industry. 
(3) more generally, if it were believed on economic grounds 
that fiscal operations were incapable of permanently raising 
the level of employment -because they did little to improve 
the economy's productive base-, such a policy would flounder 
on the fears that the increased debt charge would eventually 
have to be covered from higher taxation. The prospect of 
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such an increase in taxation might anyway itself ensure the 
failure of such a policy as a result of disincentive effects 
on investment. 
Similar considerations applied to the state of confidence 
in financial markets, although special factors, stemming from 
London's pre-eminent position as an international financial 
centre, should also be taken into account. In particular, 
apprehensiveness (no doubt made legitimate by the 1931 crisis) 
that the government's financial policy would be viewed abroad 
as 'unsound', with the risk of an outflow of sterling (with 
consequences for the domestic credit base) and upward 
pressure on short-term interest rates, imposed an 'external 
constraint' on policy-making. The strict standards required 
to act as a leading financial centre imbued economic policy 
with a moral dimension which, by the interwar years, acted 
to Britain's disadvantage because it made imperative more 
exacting standards of financial conduct than those adhered 
to by other countries. When, as occurred in 1931, Britain 
was deemed to have failed to meet these standards, the 
consequences were severe.< 64 ) Moreover, the reluctance to 
balance the budget strictly, characteristic of other 
countries during periods of depression, was an important 
meanf:i of avoiding the deflationary demand effects of 
adherence to budgetary orthodoxy in the face of severe 
autonomous fluctuations in activity. British policy makers 
considered this course of action to be unavailable, although 
fiscal window-dreSsing was to serve the same objective, 
albeit with a large element of deception. 
It is contended that, in the past, arguments which rely 
on business psychology as an explanation of opposition to 
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the policy prescriptions of the 'new' economics have been 
too easily dismissed by holding that such opposition was 
irrational and/or unascertainable. For example, Winch takes 
the view that: 
The trouble with this type of psychological argument 
is that it can never be proved or disproved. It tends 
to be circular: if things go well, it must be because 
confidence has been restored; if things go badly, it 
must be because there is insufficient confidence. 
However, there is something suspect about arguments 
that can only be used to support the status 9J!2.· It 
is often simply another way of saying 'Be orthodox', 
or 'I dislike what is being done', while at the same 
time evading the uncomfortable business of having to 
say why ... It seems simpler to say that Chamberlain 
and his Treasury advisers concentrated on narrow 
budgetary considerations, and were unaware of the 
deflationary consequences of what they were doing. (65) 
By virtue of its intangibility, confidence cannot be accurately 
specified or measured; that fact, however, hardly questions 
its existence or potency. Moreover, this dismissive view-
point has resulted from an approach which is too narrow in 
its perspective, in that it has focused on what would appear 
to be the purely economic interests of the business and 
financial communities and has ignored the political and 
indirect economic dimensions of the question. Unfortunately, 
the business community rarely expressed the grounds for their 
opposition to unbalanced budgets and large scale public 
works programmes as remedies for unemployment.* Even amongst 
the papers of the F.B.I., the largest and most vocal of the 
employers' organizations, there are but few references to 
the subject. 
* More generally, when op~n1on on a subject is unanimous 
the literature of the time tended not to go deeply into 
the reasons for a particular belief. This problem of 
exegesis is especially true of the reasons underlying 
the return to the gold standard in 1925 (see Morgan 
1961: 1268); it is also equally true of the issues 
considered here. 
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The following, however, is one of the few F.B.I. 
documents that does illustrate business opinion on this 
question. Written in late 1930, at a time when serious 
budgetary disequilibrium was first becoming apparent, it 
shows first that the F.B.I. did not question the desirability 
of restoring budgetary equilibrium, and further that this 
should be achieved by expenditure cuts (no account being 
taken of the consequent adverse effect on demand). Finally, 
there was a medium-term objective of remitting taxation to 
stimulate industrial recovery. 
[We) cannot continue further along the present road 
without disaster. Not only must further additions 
to our unproductive national expenditure be regarded 
as suicidal, but a drastic overhauling of our · 
existing expenditure is imperative if the situation 
is not to become progressively worse. 
The Budget position is extremely grave. British 
industry has been struggling for nearly a decade to 
recover its position in the markets of the world, 
handicapped by a load of taxation which not only far 
exceeds that of any other important commercial 
country, but so far from showing signs of decreasing 
has actually grown cumulatively more burdensome. 
This at a time when many of our competitors are 
making forced cuts in taxation, so that the burden 
of taxation on British industry is being relatively 
intensified. Added to this we are in the midst of 
what is likely to prove the greatest world trade 
slump of the present generation. 
(The] circumstances which have led to the present 
disquieting state of affairs are, in [our] opinion, a 
direct consequence of the policy of successive· 
Chancellors of the Exchequer in framing their Budgets, 
and in particular their estimates for current expenditure, 
with little regard either for the conditions of our 
national production, or the needs of those responsible 
for its efficient operationo In particular, no account 
appears to have been taken during recent years of the 
cumulative effect of the burden of taxation on a decade 
of industrial depression, accompanied by a falling 
price level and credit stringency . 
. . . . . . 
[The1 limits of industry's taxable capacity have been 
exceeded, and ... the present volume of our national 
production is insufficient to provide the sums at 
present being expended - and under contemplation - by 
the State on unproductive objects . . . The paramount 
need ... is for an immediate retrenchment in our 
national expenditure. (66) 
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Admittedly, this document was prepared at a time of rapidly 
deepening depression, but it also reflects industry's 
A general attitudes towards budgetary policy and the role of 
the state in promoting recovery: the preferred remedy for 
high unemployment, low demand, and low profitability was 
remission of taxation, a remedy based on an implicit belief 
in the potency of market forces and, as already noted, the 
view that income tax entered into costs.< 67 ) Given the 
balanced budget constraint, continued 'unproductive' 
expenditure on public works inhibited such a remission of 
taxation, while, insofar as businesses viewed the demand 
for their products in narrow terms (part of the afore-
mentioned low level of trade cycle consciousness), it was 
difficult for them to perceive that expenditure on public 
works was more effective in inducing recovery than a 
reduction in costs and the stimulus to investment afforded 
by a reduction in taxation. In these circumstances, 
opposition to unbalanced budgets and public works 
programmes become rather more cogent. While on strictly 
economic grounds this viewpoint was misfounded, because in 
general the multiplier effects of an increase in 
expenditure exceed those of a cut in taxation, in 
formulating this policy preference attention was not 
exclusively confined to the direct economic issues, other 
considerations intervened. The state of business confidence 
must once again be accorded a significant rSle in any 
explanation of the continuance of financial orthodoxy by 
governments during the interwar period. 
I' 
CHAPTER 5 
BUDGETARY HISTORY 1929-39 
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In this chapter we survey the budgetary history of the 
1930s, attention being focused on the annual budgets, and 
the way in which budgetary policy changed in its nature and 
functions so that by the later 1930s it had assumed a central 
rtle in macroeconomic management. An evaluation of changes 
in fiscal stance, and the manner in which such changes were 
influenced by the characteristics of the fiscal system, is 
deferred until the following chapter. The overall budgetary 
position is summarised in Table 5.1. 
1. Depression 1929-33 
Even before the onset of the world depression the 
Treasury had anticipated that the falling price level would 
lead to the development of an unfavourable budgetary 
\ situation, and had advised Churchill that contingency action 
be taken.(!) The depression in Britain was to have an 
\· 
immediate and marked effect on the budget balance which 
moved into deficit as a result of the automatic response 
of receipts and expenditures to a cyclical downturn, not 
because of discretionary action for stabilization purposes. 
As Table 5.1 shows, between 1929/30 and 1932/3 the budget 
balance (B/Y) deteriorated by 1.7 percentage points of 
GDP (or £G7 .6m); the deterioration of the conventionally 
defined balance (B /Y), however, was smaller (0.6 percentage 
c 
points of GDP, or £17.8m) and followed a somewhat different 
course, reflecting the authorities' attempts to minimise by 
j fiscal window-dressing the published deficit. 
Detailed accounts of budgetary policy during the early 
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depression period, that of the administration of the second 
Labour Government, can be found in the work of Skidelsky 
and others. ( 2 ) Here we are concerned with the main features 
\ 
of the individual budgets of 1929, 1930, and 193~. These 
are summarised in Table 5.2, the analysis for the final year 
being complicated by the existence of two budgets, in April 
I! and September 1931. 
~ 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 record the authorities' attempts to 
restore budgetary equilibrium in the face of deepening 
depression; they indicate that prior to September 1931 
these efforts centred on raising additional taxation. The 
emphasis in the 1930 budget was almost exclusively on direct 
taxation, while in the 1931 budgets direct taxation was 
raised by approximately twice as much as indirect. This 
strategy followed from two factors: (1) on grounds of 
equity, and under the influence of electoral pressures, the 
Labour Government attempted to minimise the increase in 
I 
1 indirect taxes because of their regressive incidence; and 
(2) in the early stages of a depression indirect taxes 
were more sensitive to income changes whereas (because of 
the lag between earnings and assessment) income and surtax 
maintained their yield.(3 ) Nevertheless, in the April 1931 
budget the Treasury decided against a further rise in 
income tax because of the presumed adverse effect on 
confidence and therefore the level of economic activity;(4 ) 
they also hoped that expenditure cuts would later become 
politically possible. In fact, by early 1931, it was the 
----- --- -
expenditure side of the account that, at least for the 
Treasury, dominated discussions about restoring budgetary 
equilibrium. These discussions, the establishment of the 
May Committee, and the subsequent response to its report, 
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Table 5.1 
Central government receipts. expenditure. and budget 
balance: conventional and adjusted definitions.s... 
1929/30-1939/40* 
A. {~of GDP): 
(Tc/Y) (G /Y) c (B /Y) c (T/Y) (G/Y) (B/Y) 
1929/30 19.2 19.5 -0.3 21.1 20.7 +0.4 
1930/1 20.7 21.2 -0.6 22.1 22.7 -0.6 
1931/2 22.0 22.0 0.0 23 .6 24.8 -1.2 
1932/3 21.9 22.7 -0.9 23.9 25.2 -1.3 
1933/4 21.1 20.3 +0.8 23.2 22.3 +0.9 
1934/5 19.8 19.7 +0.2 22.2 21.6 +0.6 
1935/6 19.9 19.9 +0.1 22.1 21.7 +0.4 
1936/7 20.2 20.3 -0.1 22.3 22.0 +0.3 
1937/8 19.9 19.3 +0.6 22.0 22.3 -0.3 
1938/9 19.9 20.1 -0.3 22.0 24.7 -2.7 
1939/40 20.0 24.8 -4.9 21.9 35.1 -13.2 
L_{£m. 2: 
(Tc) (Gc) (Be) (T) (G) (B) 
1929/30 815.0 829.5 -14.5 893.9 876.5 +17 .4 
1930/1 857.8 881.0 -23.2 915.1 939.3 -24.2 
1931/2 851.5 851.1 +0.4 914.5 960.2 -45.7 
1932/3 827.0 859.3 -32.3 903.9 954.1 -50.2 
1933/4 809.4 778.2 +31.2 890.0 856.7 +33.3 
1934/5 804.6 797.1 +7.5 899.3 873.5 +25.8 
1935/6 844.8 841.8 +3.0 935.7 919.7 +16.0 
1936/7 896.6 902.2 -5.6 990.0 975.3 +14.7 
1937/8 948.7 919.9 +28.8 1051.5 1067.2 -15.7 
1938/9 1006.2 1018.9 -12.7 1114.1 1251.3 -137.2 
1939/4-o 1132.2 1408.2 -276.0 1241.0 1990.2 -749.2 
Sources: The actual figures are drawn from Financial 
Accounts and the working notes to Feinstein 
(1972); the GDP figures from Table 6.1. 
Notes: * See above pp .100-02 for the budget definitions . 
reveal much of interest about contemporary attitudes towards 
budgetary policy. The following section consequently 
considers this committee in some depth. 
(i) The Mav Committee 
Towards the close of 1929 Snowden, perturbed that the 
financial situation was ·~ecoming progressively gloomier as 
we add still more to our existing conunitments", warned the 
Table 5.2 
Budget summary 1929L:30-1932L:3 : 
EUblished forecasts and results {£m2 
1929/30 1930/1 1931/2 1932/3 
(April) (Sept.) 
1 . Budget balance 
(B ) of previous 
yeir +18 .4 -14.5 -23.2 +0.4 
2. Budget on 
existing basis (6) Revenue (Tc) 834.7 823.6 847.6 825.8(7) 846.4 
Expenditure (Gc) 822.7 865.9(1) 889.9 (3) 900.5 848.1 
Balance (B ) +12.0 -47.3 -37.4 ~74.7 -:-1.7 
c 
3. Discretionary 
changes 
( i) taxation 
first year 
+10.0(4 ) 
- direct +31.5 +29.0 
- indlrect -7.9 +2.3 +7.5 +11.5 +2.5 
full year 
- direct +43.5 +57.5 
- indirect -8.0 +2 .4 +8.0 +24 .0(8) +3.0 (i i) economies 
+l;.o<2 > +2~.o(5 ) +35.7 (iii) misc. 
4. Budget Estimates 
Revenue <Tc> 826.3 873.3 885.1 866.3 848.9 
Expenditure (Gc) 822.7 871.0 884.9 864.8 848.1 
Balance (Be) +4.1 +2.2 +0.1 +1.5 +0.8 
5. Budget outturn 
Revenue (Tc) 815.0 857o8 851.5 827.0 
Expenditure (Gc) 829.5 881.0 851.1 859.3 
Balance (Be) -14.5 -23.2 +0.4. -32.3 
Sources: Financial Accounts; Financial Statements 
Notes: 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Deficit (estimated) of £42.3m for 1930/1 plus £5m 
as the first instalment towards repayment of the 
1929/30 deficit ( S.48 Finance Act, 1930) . 
Transfer from-Rating Relief Suspense Account. 
Deficit reduced from £42.3m to £37.4m by a transfer 
from the Rating Relief Suspense Account. 
This gain consisted of a rescheduling of income tax 
payments, the benefit to the Exchequer only applying 
for one year. 
Planned transfer from old Exchange Account. 
Change in revenue estimates since April Budget: 
Budget Estimate 885.1 
reduced tax yield 
Inland Revenue 
Customs & Excise 
Hoover moratorium 
-25.0 
-4.0 
-30.3 
825.8 
Change in expenditure estimates since April Budget: 
Budget Estimate 884.9 
Hoover moratorium 
reduced debt interest 
" sinking fund 
Supplementary Estimate 
Cessation of borrowing 
Unemployment Fund 
Road Fund 
for 
Comprising e~onomies of £22m ann 
nlannerl !'=:1nk1no- fnnt'l n!lumAn+c ni' 
-13.6 
-5.6 
+0.8 
+25.0 
+9.0 
900.5 
a renuction in C1~ "1...,. 
Cabinet that the magnitude of inherited expenditure 
obligations, combined with the uncertain revenue prospects 
and the commitment to repeal the McKenna duties, (S) had 
seriously upset budgetary equilibrium. Deficits (Be) of 
£45.3m, £57.7m, and £64.8m were forecast for 1930/1, 
1931/2, and 1932/3 respectively.(G) 
Concern over the expenditure side of the account 
largely centred on the growing cost of unemployment 
insurance and transitional benefits, and in particular the 
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disquieting regularity with which Bondfield* had to approach 
Parliament with requests for further borrowing powers. As 
early as January 1931, Hopkins (operating on Snowden's 
instructions that Parliament and the Cabinet must be made 
aware of the need for economy) told the Royal Commission 
on Unemployment Insurance that: 
continued State borrowing on the present vast scale 
without adequate provision for repayment by the Fund 
would quickly call in question the stability of the 
British financial syste~. (7) 
The deteriorating financial position of the Unemployment Fund 
is shown in Table 5.3. Since the fund was not fully consoli-
dated into the conventionally defined budget accounts,(S) not 
all of the increased outlay on benefits revealed itself in 
the conventionally defined budget balance (B ) . This source 
c 
of relief, however, was to be short-lived as the fund's 
borrowings became the focus for comment and criticism of 
budgetary policy generally. 
The question of economy in the wider sense had been 
mooted occasionally in Parliament; but from early October 
1930, with the publication of the Liberals' How to Tackle 
Unemployment, (g) demands for another 'Geddes axe' to 
expenditure became more insistent. (lO) The Cabinet responded, 
* Margaret Bondfield, Minister of Labour 1929-31 
Table 5.3 
Outlay on unemployment benefits 
1929/30-1931/2 (£m) 
Status 
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Total 
outlay 
Exchequer 
contributions 
to 
unemployment 
insurance 
and 
transitional 
benefits 
Balance of 
income and 
expenditure 
of 
Unemployment 
Fund for the 
period 
of the 
Unemployment 
Fund at the 
end of the 
period 
on 
unemployment 
benefits 
1929/30 
1930/1 
1931/2 
20.4 
36.8 
57.9 
-3 .o 
-36.4 
-39.6 
-39.0 
-75.4 
-115.0 
Sources: Working notes to Feinstein (1972); Royal 
Commission on Unemployment Insurance (1932), 
Minutes of Evidence, pp .157-61. 
59.7 
103.5 
125.1 
firstly, by immediately appointing a Royal Commission to 
review the unemployment insurance issue;(ll) and, secondly, 
some months later, it concurred in the establishment of the 
May Committee to consider the general question of economy.< 12 ) 
The origins of this latter body lay in a two day House 
of Co~nons debate of 11 and 12 February 1931 which had 
censured the government for the rapidly deteriorating 
budgetary·situation. The outturn was that Snowden agreed 
to establish a small independent economy committee, (l3 ) not 
as a concession to an over-zealous House of Commons, but 
rather because it served two important purposes: (1) it 
provided a breathing space for the Treasury and the Cabinet; 
. -
and (2) as Snowden later wrote: 
I welcomed this agitation for a reduction of expenditure 
because I realised that no Government could embark upon 
a drastic reduction unless it were supported by a 
strong public opinion. (14) 
The committee, appointed by a Treasury Minute of 17 
March and chaired by May,* was given the following terms of 
reference: 
* Sir George May, Chairman Prudential Assurance Co. 
To make recommendations to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer for effecting forthwith all possible 
reductions in the National Expenditure on Supply 
Services, having regard especially to the present and 
prospective position of the Revenue. In so far as 
questions of policy are involved in the expenditure 
under discussion, these will remain for the exclusive 
consideration of the Cabinet; but it will be open to 
the Committee to review the expenditure and to 
indicate the economies which might be effected if 
particular policies were either adopted, abandoned 
or modified. (15) 
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Both the terms of reference (identical to the earlier Geddes 
Committee), and the membership (May plus two members from 
each of the three Parties) were, it may be surmised, care-
fully calculated to ensure the attainment of the Treasury's 
objectives. 
Operating from the premise "that the country must face 
the disagreeable fact that its public expenditure - and in 
this we include local as well as national expenditure - is 
too high and that it must be brought down to a lower level"(lG) 
three general principles guided their recommendations: 
(i) that the rise in the value of money in recent years 
provides a strong prima facie case for the revision of 
money obligations fixed under other considerations ... 
(ii) that existing financial difficulties make it 
necessary for the nation like the private individual to 
consider seriously what it can afford and not merely 
what is desirable. Reviewed from this standpoint much 
expenditure is unwarrantable at the present time, which, 
under more favourable conditions, we should deem 
justifiable and even a wise investment of the national 
resources. 
(iii) that only by the strictest regard to economy and 
efficiency over a long period can the trade of the 
country be restored to its pre-war prosperity and any 
substantial number of the unemployed be re-absorbed 
into industry. (17) 
Whilst in general this position has been discredited by 
modern stabilization theory, at the time it was widely held, 
not just within Whitehall but also by other influential 
interest groups. In particular, as was shown in the previous 
chapter, the principles governing the May Committee's 
investigations were also shared by the F.B.I.(lS) Such views 
were put on a number of occasions in representations to the 
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Treasury, particularly in pre-Budget deputations, (lg) 
whilst simultaneously other bodies also pressed for 
economy.* Of these, the most noteworthy was 'The Friends 
of Economy', "a body of prominent men", formed at the 
beginning of 1931, which organized the 'great City Meeting' 
held at the Cannon Street Hotel on 27 January 1931 at which 
a number of leading politicians -E. C. Grenfell, Viscount 
Grey, Sir Robert Horne (an ex-Chancellor), and Sir Ernest 
J. P. Benn -had made economy the central political and 
economic issue of the day. ( 2 0) 
There is no question that, in general, there was a 
complete absence of serious and informed opposition to the 
principle of economy in the months preceding the financial 
crisis which, for Britain at least, commenced in mid-July 
1931. Indeed, acceptance of the eventual need for economy, 
combined with the inevitable delay before the l'vlay Committee 
and the Royal Commission completed their reports, permitted 
Snowden to introduce a far less-deflat_i_Q~a_!'y_E_!_l_dggt than 
would have been the case if full account had been taken of 
the effects of depression on endogenous budget items. 
The problem of budgetary disequilibrium facing Snowden 
in April 1931 was serious: 1930/1 had closed with a deficit 
(B ) of £23.2m and the forecast deficit for the coming year 
c 
was £37.4m, reflecting almost equally the effects of 
depression on the revenue and expenditure sides of the 
account (see Table 5.2). In his budget speech Snowden was, 
* The Association of British Chambers of Commerce in 1931 
also took as their central theme "that only by the most 
stringent retrenchment can this country be saved from 
catastrophe" for without "immediate and determined 
remedial action, the effect upon this country's credit 
must be disastrous; in fact it cannot be long before 
there is a very definite flight-from the pound." 
(Tl72/1516, 'Deputation to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer', 17 Feb. 1931). 
however, careful to stress that: 
The apparent deficit of £23,000,000 is apt to be 
misleading especially to foreign opinion. On the 
basis of some foreign Budgets and commercial practice 
instead of a deficit of £23,000,000, the year would 
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have closed with a surplus of £43,500,000 [because 
£66.8m of sinking fund payments were included in the 
budget] ... It says much for the soundness of our 
national financial position that, in a year of 
unparalleled industrial depression, we have not only 
been able to pay our way but to make such a substantial 
reduction of the Debt. (21) 
The whole budget was dominated by two interrelated objectives: 
on the one hand (as above) to maintain domestic and inter-
national confidence by making the current budgetary position 
appear in the most favourable light; while, on the other 
hand, maintaining the momentum of opinion that severe 
retrenchment would be required later in the year. 
Consequently, as an interim solution, Snowden felt justified 
in temporarily abandoning his life-long adherence to 'sound' 
financial principles; and resort was made to a number of 
expedients.* 
Firstly, under §.48 Finance Act, 1930, the Treasury was 
obliged to repay (in three instalments) the deficit of 
1929/30, and further to cover any subsequent deficit by a 
pro~ increase in the Fixed Debt Charge. Snowden, however, 
* For Snowden the framing of this and the following budget 
must have been an extremely instructive exercise, one 
calculated to test to the full the degree to which political 
necessity could override ingrained economic beliefs/ 
prejudices. In general, Snowden's belief in balanced 
budgets and a 'sound' financial policy was unquestioning-
attitudes probably stemming from his early belief that 
success, in electoral terms, for the I.L.P. would be pre-
cluded if the Party took an unorthodox stance on monetary 
questions (Cross 1966: 66, 246). Thus his reaction to 
Churchill's period as Chancellor had been one of total 
disdain, and on being informed of the widespread use of 
devices to balance the budget (see Tl72/1684, Note by 
Phillips, 23 Oct. 1929), Snowden wrote to Churchill: 
'The difference between us does not lie in a nice 
calculation of figures. It lies in differing conceptions 
of sound finance . . . A well balanced Budget is not a 
luxury which is to be avoided: it is a necessity which 
must be provided for.:" (Tl72/1690, Snowden to Churchill, 
23 Jan. 1930). 
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proposed that the windfall of £9m from the German 
Mobilization Loan should be taken as completing the 
bl . t · f th 1929/30 def1· c1· t. (22 ) S dl th o 1ga 1ons or e econ y, ere 
was the question of the 1930/1 deficit of £23m: 
I do not think the Committee should expect me or 
will expect me to make provision by an addition to the 
fixed Debt charge - that is by an increase of taxation 
- to meet this shortage of £23,000,000 immediately out 
of present resources. Moreover, I am confidently 
expecting that, as the outcome of the recommendations 
of the Economy Committee ... ,considerable reductions 
of expenditure will be made during the year, which will 
automatically go to Debt reduction. It is also 
possible that during the year conditions may be 
favourable for considerable Debt conversion operations 
* 
Finally, the prospective deficit for 1931/2 of £37.4m was 
to be covered by: (1) a £20m raid on the old Exchange 
Account;** (2) an alteration to the payment dates for income 
tax under Schedules B, D, and E which would give a non-
recurrent gain of £10m; and (3) an increase in the oil duty 
calculated to fill the· residual gap of £7.5m.<23 ) 
The clear alternative would have been a sharp increase 
in taxation (a tariff having been explicitly rejected in 
the most scathing terms)( 24 ) which Snowden was loath to 
undertake: 
[It] is only too clear that in many directions 
increased rates of taxation would at this time 
produce a disappointingly low increase in yield 
I regard this Budget ... as one dealing with 
* 251, H.C. Deb. 5s., 27 April 1931, col.l397. Snowden was 
here anticipating that conditions might become favourable 
for the conversion of the 5% War Loan. The operation was, 
in fact, not announced until late June 1932, having been 
delayed by the 19:~1 financial crisis (see p. 150 below). 
** The account had been established during the First World 
War to make purchases of foreign exchange to cover over-
seas, principally dollar, obligations. By the late 
1920s the account had largely fallen into disuse, 
although its funds were used twice yearly in financing 
the U.S. war debt payments (see Tl71/287, Hopkins to 
Snowden, undated (but about 19 March 1931); T188/48, 
Hopkins to Fisher and Chamberlain, 26 Feb. 1932). 
a temporary emergency and justifying temporary 
measures. 
I cannot ignore the psychological effect on trade and 
commerce of any increase in direct taxation at a time 
when they are, I hope, on the point of emerging from 
an unprecedented slump. I haye, therefore, decided 
not to propose any increase in the Income Tax. (25) 
Thus the budget was a stop-gap; although viewed as most 
unsatisfactory by certain Conservatives,<26 ) it did at 
least delay the full imposition of deflationary fiscal 
measures. 
Meanwhile, the May Committee reviewed the financial 
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situation, receiving assistance in its task from the Public 
Accounts Committee which suggested possible areas for 
consideration (as it could not itself deal with them since 
they were matters involving policy).<27 ) The May report 
was first made available on 24 July, and considered by 
Cabinet at its meeting of 30 July, (28 ) where, with "the 
kind of systematic ineptitude that it seemed determined to 
display at this period, it took note of the report simply 
with the casual remark that all departments 'affected by 
the report should send in their observations not later than 
18 August'", ( 29 ) and then dispersed for the summer recess 
believing that detailed consideration of the report could 
safely be left for a few weeks. The report was published 
on 1 August, and, as is well known, marked the real turning-
point in the financial crisis: it changed its nature from 
a largely technical difficulty (a shortage of liquidity in 
Europe) to a crisis of confidence in sterling.<3 o) Such 
an adverse impact might have been avoided with more 
imaginative statesmanship: publishing it alongside a 
declaration of policy.<3 l) In fact, Hopkins had urged in 
the strongest terms permissible for an official: 
I submit for your earnest consideration that the 
publication of the May Report should be accompanied 
by an announcement that a Cabinet Committee including 
the Prime Minister and yourself [Snowden] wi 11 sit in 
the holidays to present to Parliament immediately on 
its re-assembly proposals designed to repair the 
budgetary position and render it sound. They need 
not, of necessity, be exclusively proposals for 
economy: they may include proposals for increased 
taxation. On this I would only say that in my view 
the limits of direct taxation in times of slump are 
nearly reached. 
Unless action on these lines is taken I cannot 
help expressing my fear that the consequences may be 
very grave. 
Furthermore, Hopkins expressed his opinion that: 
The majority report shows no mercy. It assumes that 
we ought, even in the midst of a slump to pay the 
contractual sinking fund and borrow nothing for 
unproductive purposes (e.g. Unemployment and Roads). 
On this basis it shows a gap next year of £m.l20. 
This in my view may exaggerate the position but the 
figure of £m.l20 will be flashed round the world. (32) 
The advice was ignored, and as Hopkins warned, the conse-
q uences were "very grave", although a more sensible policy 
towards the publication of the report would have been 
unlikely to have prevented the eventual collapse of 
sterling. 
The main features of the majority May report were as 
follows: on the basis of a forecast deficit for 1932/3 of 
£120m (assuming a cessation of borrowing for unemployment 
and roads), economies of £96.5m (some £66.5m to come from 
unemployment insurance alone) and new taxation of £23.5m 
were proposed . 
The r8le of this report in exacerbating the financial 
crisis, the failure of the Labour Government to agree on 
the required economies, and the subseqllent formation of 
(33) 
the National Government, are well known. Here we 
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merely survey the main featLJres, attention being concentrated 
on the framing of the September 1931 budget. 
/' 
'It 
I 
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The first point of importance is that the principle of 
a balanced budget, even in time of depression, was not 
questioned, not even by the minority report signed by the 
two Labour members. (34 ) /Dissent was limited to the way in 
which the economies were to be achieved. In the case of 
the minority report, it was decided that the principle of 
'equality of sacrifice' should be adopted, and that this 
could best be attained by imposing a surcharge on rentier 
incomes. Nevertheless, even with these reservations, the 
task of balancing the budget was pursued with doctrinaire 
purposefulntss, as evidenced by the demand that cuts in 
expenditure, rather than increased taxation, must make the 
major contribution towards the restoration of budgetary 
equilibrium. 
The nation can(not] continue as at present borrowing 
to meet current requirements and deluding itself that 
by still showing a sinking fund in the national 
accounts it is not only meeting its liabilities but 
actually paying off debt. This course will lead 
inevitably to an intensification of the financial 
difficulties until the day comes when far greater 
sacrifices than those we suggest are forced upon the 
country. The other method is to endeavour to right 
the position solely by means of additional taxation, 
but to achieve a truly balanced budget next year in 
this way the extra taxation would need to be very 
heavy and we fear the consequences. The margin of 
safety is already narrow. (35) 
Secondly, the major emphasis within the proposed economies 
was on the necessity for cutting outlay on unemployment 
benefits. Whilst this was the most rapidly growing item of 
expenditure - because of its high cyclical sensitivity - <36 ) 
there were, in addition, three 
analytically separate bases for the pressure to 
r_~h radically on the unemployment system: the 
11 view that it itself contributed to unemployment; 
~opposition to the 'anomalies' and 'abuses' with which· 
)/it was alleged to be riddled; and fears of the effects 
of continuous borrowing to maintain it. (37) 
"11 // 
Cuts in unemployment benefits thus assumed a symbolic 
importance. As one contemporary later put it: 
The recent 10 per cent. cut is not important because 
of the relief it gives to our national expenditure. 
The cut is important because the dole is a support 
\.··,· and a symbol of our lack of flexibility and our blind 
\resistance to change. (38) 
\ 
Thirdly, the majority and minority reports' diagnosis 
of the causes of budgetary disequilibrium differed funda-
mentally. The majority report (and later Cabinet 
discussions) justified the cuts in pay and benefits on the 
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grounds that "the rise in the value of money in recent years 
provides a strong prima facie case for the revision of 
monetary obligations fixed under other conditions,"(39 ) 
while the minority report used the same reasoning to press 
for higher taxation on rentier incomes. While the majority 
report saw the budgetary difficulties as stemming from the 
unceasing growth of social expenditure, itself determined 
by the weakness of politicians who succumbed to electoral 
pressures, the minority report maintained that such services 
were "essential to modern large-scale industry", and that 
the real villain of the piece was the increasing real burden 
of the debt ~xge. They contended that it was here that 
remedial action was required.<4 0) 
In fact, such a course would have been untenable, 
indeed counter-productive if the real objective-was not to 
.1 
~ balance the budget per§_£ but to restore confidence. This 
was particularly true of proposals to reduce sinking fund 
payments; as Snowden informed the Labour Cabinet shortly 
before its collapse: 
the Leaders of the Conservative Party, and also the 
Representatives of the Bankers, had stated that any 
attempt of this kind to camouflage the true position 
would be at once detected, and that it was of 
para~ount importance that the Budget should be 
balanced in an honest fashion. (41) 
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Two further questions require consideration: that of the 
British budgetary position vis-a-vis other countries; and 
that of the likely employment effects of balancing the 
budget in the manner recommended by the May Committee. 
Henderson, in his capacity as Secretary to the Economic 
Advisory Council, was asked by MacDonald for his comments 
on the May report. By mid-1931 Henderson had moved some 
way from the policy position he had held with Keynes in 
1929, and had been concerned by the worsening of the 
financial position for a number of months. ( 42 ) Nevertheless, 
Henderson still felt compelled to write that the report had 
"laid on the dark colours very thick indeed" and that: 
the Committee's criterion of a properly balanced 
Budget seems to me to be unreaso er . The 
prospective deficiency of 120 millions is reached by 
adding in the whole of the expected borrowing for the 
Unemployment Fund and the Road Fund, while maintaining 
the Sinking Fund at £52 ~illions ... This is to go 
far beyond what would have been regarded as the 
requirements of prudence in the hey day of orthodox 
finance ... 
On the whole, indeed, the British budgetary system has 
so far stood the test of depression decidedly better 
than those of most other countries; and the suggestion 
conveyed by the May Committee that our position is 
exceptionally unsound and will remain so, unless a gap 
of £120 millions is bridged next year, is thus, from 
'
the standpoint of international comparison, misleading 
in the extreme. (43) 
Henderson's latter comm~nt is substantiated by the evidence 
presented in Table 5.4 which gives the budget accounts, on 
roughly comparable bases, for the four major industrial 
nations at that time. Special circumstances, however, 
necessitated that Britain adhere more strictly to orthodox 
financial principles and thus deflate further than other 
countries - the necessity to restore confidence, prevent a 
~light 
~osts, 
I 
from sterling, permit reductions in manufacturing 
and facilitate a general reduction of interest 
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Table 5.4 
Central government budget accounts: 
Great Britain, France, Germany, and United Statest 
1929/30-1932/3 
Great Britain 1929/30 
(£m) 1930/1 
1931/2 
1932/3 
Debt 
Expend- ·payments 
Receipts iture . Balance included in 
815.0 829.5 
857.8 881.0 
851.5 851.1 
827.0 859.3 
-14.5 
-23.2 
+0.4 
-32.3 
expenditure 
47.7 
66.8 
32.5 
26.3 
France 1929/30 
(Francs m) (15 months) 64268 58849 +5419 
1930/1 53094 53265 -171 
1931/2 50977 53362 -2385 
1932 
(9 months) 38069 42991 -4922 
Germany 1929/30 7509.8 8186.6 -676.8 
(Reichmarks m) 1930/l 7784.2 8391.8 -607.6 
1931/2 6812.4 6994.9 -182.5 
1932/3 5821.6 5964.7 -143.1 
United States 1929/30 4044.6 3854.2 +190 .4 553.9 
440.1 
412.7 
471.6 
($m) 1930/l 3191.6 4127.5 -935.9 
1931/2 2003.9 4865.3 -2861.4 
1932/3 2083.7 3873.4 -1789.7 
Sources: Great Britain: League of Nations (1936: V, Table 
IIa); France: League of Nations (1937: XI, Table 
IIa); Germany: League of Nations (1937: XII, 
Table I I); and United States: League of Nat ions 
(1937: XXXIV, Table II). 
rates. (44 ) ~-us during the discussions preceding the 
Septe~ber 1931 budget, at Treasury and Cabinet level, there 
was firm opposition to any reduction in sinking fund payments 
as a method of easing the pressure. As Hopkins wrote: 
We are endeavouring to overcome a radical lack of 
confidence abroad in our financial position. Half 
measures will not gain this end, and even in the best 
atmosphere an inroad into Sinking Fund is never well 
received. From this point of view any reduction at 
all could only be justified if it were part of a 
scheme which commanded the respect of the world. 
Reduction of sinking fund will pro tanto render 
it more difficult io get back to the possibility of 
a large Conversion operation. (45) 
Why was heed not paid to Henderson's comments?* Howorth's 
* The sinking fund provision was in fact reduced to £32.5m. 
(Deputy Secretary to Cabinet) reaction to Henderson's 
memorandum shows that there was apprehension lest it 
\["produce on the P.M.'s mind an impression that things are 
~not really as bad as they appear to be". In any case, the 
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prospective deficit had now become £170m and not "the lower 
and less devastating figure" of £120m,* while: 
increased taxation of the order required seems out of 
the question if the taxation experts are right in their 
view that we have reached saturation point, at all 
events as regards direct taxation, and that fresh 
burdens of this tremendous volume would not in practice 
produce more cash than the present taxes. 
The problem may be insolvable, but to impose new 
taxation would be bad enough in any case, while to fail 
to collect it would be the beginning of the end. (46) 
The effects on employment, incomes, and output of the 
!:adoption of the proposed measures also received scant attention. At the official level, the question was in one 
sense irrelevant (since the restoration of budgetary 
equilibrium was paramount), but it was of importance with 
regard to forecasting ~ ~ what the ~ post effect of 
the measures would be on endogenous budget items. Keynes, 
however, did give the matter some thought in both his private 
and public pronouncements against the authorities' 
deflationary stance. 
Despite reservations about the May report's recommendations, 
Henderson had been forced to conclude that the report's 
-\/ unfortunate timing, the threat of a collapse of confidence in 
sterling, and the policy objective of maintaining the gold 
standard, made it :imperative to accept its recommendations. 
~,0 Keynes, however, took a completely different line: first, 
~* The prospective deficit for 1932/3 was widened by further 
red L!Ct ions in est :i.mat eel tax yields as the depression 
depeened and the net effect of the Hoover moratorium 
(see Notes 6 and 7 to Table 5.2). 
147 
in a private letter to MacDonald, and later in a New 
Statesman article. In the former Keynes clearly stated his 
general objections: 
The Com[mittee]'s recommendations obviously 
represent, in substance and broad effect, an effort 
V to make the existing deflation effective by b~inging 
i~Qmes down to the level of prices. They are part 
and parcel of the policy of seeking equilibrium by 
2/ general reductions of wages and salaries, and they 
would indeed, if they were taken in isolation, be a 
most gross perversion of social justice ... 
My advice is that we do not attempt to make the 
deflation effective, because, apart from the question 
whether it is intrinsically desirable, I am convinced 
for the following reasons that an attempt made now 
would be both futile and disast~ous:~ 
(i) The first effect of adopting the proposals of the 
Economy Com(mittee) and analogous measures would 
certainly be a further decline in business profits and 
a substantial increase of unemploy_me.nt, becauiie ... 
economies which are not balanced by reduced taxatiQD 
must necessarily reduce demand~!_'_el~~fiv~_!Q_supp_ly, -
the buying power of those-immediately affected would 
be dtminished, whilst no one else's buying power would 
be increased. Thus there would be no initial success 
from adopting the policy ... 
(ii) The cut in money incomes which would be required 
to reach equilibrium by this route would be more than 
those concerned would submit to ... 
(iii) It would be- impossibieto obtain the public 
consent to such measures unless __ bond-holQ.e.rs, etc., 
were treated in the same way~ I know no practical 
means to secure even a modicum of social justice. 
(iv) But above all - and this is the new fact within 
the last two months - it is now nearly certain that 
we shall go off the existing gold parity at no distant 
date. (47) 
Keynes's opposition is interesting in its duality ana 
farsightedness: not only did he oppose the economies as 
such, bllt believed they were unnecessary since the imminent 
departure from the gold standard would remove one of the 
basic constraints on domestic policy, thus permitting the 
eventual pursuit of a reflationary monetary and fiscal 
policy. KeynES'S pllblished note advanced the argument one 
step further by presenting estimates of the macroeconomic 
~ 'effects of balancing the budget, the first time such an 
approach htid been used in the interwar policy debate. 
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Concerned that the May Committee "show[ed) no evidence of 
having given a moment's thought to the possible 
repercussions of their programme, either on the volume of 
unemployment or on the receipts of taxation", Keynes 
pointed to the symmetry of fiscal action: "the immediate 
consequences of the government reducing its deficit are the 
exact inverse of the consequences of its financing 
additional capital works out of loans." A £100m reduction 
in expenditure, Keynes calculated, would only reduce the 
budget deficit by £50m because of the adverse effect on 
employment and incomes of reduced government demand. 
Accordingly, he concluded: 
At the present time, all governments have large 
deficits. For government borrowing of one kind or 
another is nature's remedy, so to speak, for preventing 
business losses from being, in so severe a slump as the 
present one, so great as to bring production altogether 
to a standstill. It is much better in every way that 
the borrowing should be for the purpose of financing 
capital works, if these works are any use at all, 
than for the purpose of paying doles . . . But so long 
as the slump lasts on the present scale this is the 
only effective choice which we possess, and government 
borrowing for the one purpose or the other (or a 
diminished Sinking Furid, which has the same effect) is 
practically inevitable. (48) 
The main details of the subsequent events may be 
summarised as follows:( 49 ) between 12 and 23 August the 
Labour Cabinet and its Economy Committee endlessly discussed 
a variety of budget packages calculated to attain the 
interrelat·ed objectives of b uclgetary eq ui libri urn, the 
restoration of confidence, and the raising of further 
credits to support sterling. Following the inability of 
the labour Cabinet to secure an agreed programme of both 
the required type and amount, MacDonald formed a National 
Government on 24 August. A further Economy Committee was 
appointed on 26 August which was to agree to economies 
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totalling £70m (including a 10% cut in unemployment benefit 
rates) and £80m in increased taxation, the full programme of 
"drastic and disagreeable measures" being presented to 
Parliament on 11 and 12 September. ( 5 0) 
Details of these budget measures are given in outline 
in Table 5.2. The form of the cuts in expenditure are 
particularly interesting since they differ in an important 
-------
respect from those instituted during similar episodes in the 
postwar p~r~od. The major economies comprised expenditure 
on goods and services and transfer payments to the unemployed; 
the only capital item curtailed was road expenditure at 
£7.9m.( 5 l) In contrast, postwar governments, when faced 
with the necessity of cutting expenditure, principally 
during sterling crises, have been able to take the politically 
more palatable and less disadvantageous course of concen-
trating their cuts on capital items_,* for the composition of 
expenditure has changed markedly over the intervening 
period, the proportion of capital expenditure to total 
expenditure having increased significantly. 
(ii) The crisis continued 1932-3 
Chamberlain replaced Snowden as Chancellor in November 
1931, (S 2 ) MacDonald having long wanted to send Snowden to 
the House of Lords in order to permit a freer hand with 
regard to economic policy, and tariffs in particular.<53 ) 
Chamberlain's immediate aim on taking office was to 
secure the introduction of a general protective tariff, an 
objective attained in early February 1932. ( 54 ) Chamberlain 
then felt able to turn his attention to more general budgetary 
* Thus the Labour administrations of the 1960s when facing 
crises in July 1965, 1966, and January 1968, concentrated 
their cuts on public authorities' investment- Price 
(1978a: 113-16). 
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matters, and as he later told the Cabinet: 
[W] hen he took office he had made it his definite aim, 
in dealing with national finance, to build up the 
resources of the nation until they were in an 
unassailable condition. He had also wanted to 
demonstrate the strengthening of the national 
resources by progressive remissions in successive 
Budgets. So far he had been successful in carrying 
out that policy. It had been almost an essential of 
that policy that his first Budget should be an 
unpopular one. His second Budget had been a little 
better, and he hoped that his third would be better 
still. To complete the policy it was important to 
avoid an anti-climax in the case of his fourth 
Budget by making all the concessions and remissions 
in the third Budget. (55) 
Mention should now be made of the War Loan conversion 
operation,<56 ) since the course of budgetary policy in the 
early recovery period was primarily determined by the 
easing of monetary conditions that resulted from the 
successful conversion of the 5% War Loan to a 3i% basis. 
Undertaken between June and December 1932, some 92% of the 
£2,085m (outstanding at 31 March 1932) 5% stock was 
converted, resulting both in lower interest rates and a 
significant easing of the burden of debt payments on the 
budget.< 57 ) Cheap money had long been a Treasury objective, (5 S) 
a means of promoting industrial recovery and of relieving 
budgetary pressures; and once instituted, it was to become 
(with tariffs) the centrepiece of domestic recovery policy. ( 59 ) 
Recent research has reaffirmed the traditional view that cheap 
money underlay the strong recovery of 1932-7;(6 0) the 
positive contribution of cheap money to the budgetary position 
also remains unquestioned; nevertheless, the point should 
also be made that cheap money was to inhibit the adoption of 
other, less orthodox, policy instruments. In particular, the 
authorities' fear that cheap money would be threatened- via 
adverse confidence effects - by a policy of deficit finance 
and/or resumption of large-scale public works programmes 
acted ·i;o reinforce the commitment to an orthodox budgetary 
policy. Thus a trade-off existed, that between an active 
monetary policy and an expansionist fiscal policy. ( 61 ) 
Shortly after assuming office Chamberlain instructed 
Hopkins to prepare, in conjunction with the revenue 
departments, estimates of "the amount of scope ... over a 
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period of three or four years for remitting tax burdens or 
permitting increased expenditure."(62 ) In undertaking this 
exercise, known as 'Old Moore's A1manack', Hopkins advised 
Forber and Grigg that they were "on present indications to 
take a middle course between optimisti~ and pessimistic 
prophecies", (63 ) ~· that by 1935: prices and earnings 
would have recovered to near 1929 levels; the "home trade 
[would have] regained activity and vigour", while the U.K.'s 
share of international trade would have risen from 11 to 13%; 
there would have occurred a substantial improvement in 
unemployment (to approximately 1.2m), but depression would 
continue in the staple industries; gilt-edged rates would 
be approximately 4%, equity values and stock exchange 
activity would be at normal levels; on balance there would 
be an ending of the burden of war debts, while the savings 
from the War Loan conver~ion would be counterbalanced by 
future larger sinking fund payments; a planned 10% increase 
in defence expenditure; and that "progress towards the 
assumed 1935 level will be at a uniform rate year by year from 
the outset of 1932."(64 ) 
As Howson says the '~ssumptions afford an insight into 
what the Treasury thought a policy of cheap money could 
achieve", (65 ) whilst at the same time 'Old Moore's Almanack' 
also marked a completely new departure in forward budgetary 
1 . ( 66) p_annlng. 
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On the basis of the working assumptions outlined above, 
Hopkins was able to inform Chamberlain that there might be 
a surplus of £80m available by 1935, a '~ournfully small'' 
sum in the light of the increased taxation of the previous 
two years. Such a disappointing result stemmed from two 
factors which were to dominate budgetary planning during 
the recovery phase: (1) "it illustrate[d] painfully the time 
lag before the Exchequer participates in increasing 
prosperity when the country is on the upgrade''; and (2) it 
reflected the "onward march (even under a strict economy 
policy)" of social expenditure, the likely high future cost 
of transitional benefits, the necessity of increasing 
defence expenditure, and the inevitable reduction in 
Miscellaneous Revenue "through the exhaustion of war 
remanets." Hopkins did however add the caveat that the 
estimates had been "hurriedly prepared" and were ''based 
on assumptions which, though defined, are merely an exercise 
of the imagination. When 1935 comes the picture will be 
different (for better or worse) 11(67) 
The "fiscal revolution" in tariffs( 6B) execLlted between 
November 1931 and February 1932 was not to be repeated in 
the wider sphere of budgetary policy. As Tables 5.1 and 
5.2 show 1931/2 closed with a small surplus (B , not B 
c 
where the deficit in fact widened), but the final result 
was in fact somewhat more complicated. For almost the 
whole of the final six months of 1931/2 the Treasury 
anticipated a deficit which might approach £8m, largely 
as a consequence of the anticipated failure of the Inland 
Revenue duties to meet the estimates.< 69 ) That a surplus 
prevailed resulted from two factors: (1) in the previous 
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September, when framing the estimates of expenditure for 
the remainder of 1931/2, the Treasury had exercised extreme 
caution in order to minimise the risk of having to introduce 
a further Supplementary which would have not only prejudiced 
the policy objective of a balanced budget but might also 
have had an adverse effect on confidence at a critical time; 
fortunately, unemployment failed to rise to its expected 
level and there was consequently a moderate saving on the 
expenditure side of the budget; ( 70) (2) the "magnificent 
response" of income and surtax payers during March 1932 
ensured that together these were £19.4m above the estimate. (7!) 
Towards the end of February 1932, Hopkins was able to 
inform Chamberlain that he was "fairly confident" of a surplus 
and thus there arose the question whether the whole of the 
£2Qn transfer, authorized under the Finance (No. I) Act, 
1931, from the old Exchange Account should be taken into 
revenue. ( 72 ) To Hopkins: 
The essence of the matter is that things are going to 
be terribly tight next year and we cannot reasonably 
afford to allow a surplus this year to be applied to 
a reduction of debt in addition to the £32 million 
of Sinking Fund. (73) 
Hence it was decided that only an amount necessary to balance 
the budget should be taken, the balance being assigned to 
the following year's revenue.< 74 ) 
Whilst 1931/2 did in fact close with a surplus, the 
framing of the budget for the following year presented 
innumerable difficulties and was a source of considerable 
disquiet for the Treasury. As 1931/2 drew to a close a 
deficit in the region of £6-Brn was expected for the coming 
year, although, as was noted in a previous chapter,<7S) such 
estimates were crucially dependent on the level of income 
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and surtax receipts in the final quarter of 1931/2. To 
ensure budgetary equilibrium, the Treasury officials, 
acknowledging the considered opinion of the revenue 
departments that it was impossible to raise tax rates 
further, while the yield of taxes already in force was more 
uncertain than usual, ( 7G) decided on a number of courses. 
Before the decision to proceed with the establishment of 
the Exchange Equalization Account there existed the 
possibility of taking part of the remaining balance of the 
old Exchange Account into Miscellaneous Revenue. This 
avenue was closed in the final week of March when 
Chamberlain approved Phillip's plan for the account.< 77 ) 
It then fell to the Ministry of Labour to bear the costs 
of the necessary readjustment. They had originally 
submitted an estimate for unemployment benefits of £72.5m 
which was calculated on the basis of an average Live Register 
of 2.6m unemployed. ( 7S) Whilst this was £6.5m lower than 
the forecast made in the previous September, Hopkins still 
believed it to be unduly pessimistic, and agreed with 
Phillips that: 
It would certainly be disappointing if the tariff and 
the depreciation of the pound had no effect whatever 
in reducing unemployment below its present high level. 
The general world distress and the restrictions 
imposed by foreign countries on our exports cannot 
be ignored, but on the whole it is perhaps not too 
optimistic to expect that the general level of 
unemployment might be 10 per cent. lower between 1st 
April 1932 and 31st March 1933 than it is at the 
present time. (79) 
The Treasury (with Chamberlain's approval)(SO) pressed for 
a figure of £65m. The Ministry of Labour was forced to 
acquiesce: 
We had no option but to defer to the views of the 
Treasury on the subject, but we made it clear that we 
could accept no responsibility for the lower figure, 
and Hopkins said that he recognised that they were 
running the risk of possibly having to provide a 
Supplementary Vote during the course of the year 
which might amount to as much as £8,000,000 or more. 
[Such) information as we have obtained [since the 
discussions with the Treasury of mid-February) from 
our Local Offices confirms the view we held that 
there is no such sign of better conditions in trade 
and industry .as would justify the more optimistic 
view which is reflected in the Estimates. (81) 
Whilst on the basis of the reduction in unemployment since 
the abandonment of gold there was a natural expectation of 
some further improvement in trade and employment, the 
primary motive was budgetary. Hopkins later justified the 
decision as follows: 
A year ago the Ministry of Labour suggested that 
the Live Register for the year 1932/3 ought to be 
taken at 2,600,000. The Treasury, with one eye on 
what they believed to be the probabilities·and the 
other eye on the financial stringency and the need 
to take risks in ordei to keep the Budget balanced, 
advised the Chancellor to adopt the figure of 
2,400,000 and this figure was adopted. (82) 
[Emphasis Adqed) 
Such an expedient was to occur the following year, despite 
the fact that a Supplementary did have to be presented for 
unemployment towards the close of 1932/3. Treasury 
instructions to the revenue departments for the framing of 
their estimates also illustrate the extent to which the 
Treasury sailed close to the wind during this period, 
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deliberately over-estimating revenue to avoid the necessity 
for further tightening. Both departments were asked to 
review their figures "in the light of [the Treasury's] 
representations that the estimates should allow for a 
substantial improvement in general conditions in 1932. ,( 83 ) 
In early April 1932 Chamberlain was informed that the 
prospective deficit for 1932/3 had now fallen to £4.3m 
and: 
should it be decided that a balance must be obtained 
on the existing basis without new taxation it could 
be done without extravagant stretching of the figures 
But it would be hard to say that the Budget in 
this form [would] contain anything of a hidden 
reserve. (84) 
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Accordingly, in order to lessen the already serious risks 
they were facing, the Treasury "consider[ed) how to clothe" 
certain non-recurrent revenue items "in a sufficiently 
respectable garb", ( 85 ) and, in the budget, filled the 
remaining gap by the reintroduction of the tea duty and 
a number of miscellaneous duty increases.C86 ) 
With such a small margin for manoeuvre, given the policy 
constraint of a balanced budget, remission of taxation or 
restoration of the expenditure cuts were unachievable. Thus 
the crisis measures were maintained during fiscal 1932-3, 
the clear expectation being that there would be a limited 
recovery in the following year which would permit a loosening 
of fiscal stance. The budget was thus clearly based on an 
'act of faith', although as we shall now see certain contingency 
measures were receiving active consideration. 
(iii) 'Economy' 1931-3 
The presentation of the economy programme to Parliament 
in September 1931 was accompanied by the issue of a number 
of circulars to local authorities and central departments 
stressing the urgency of a ·~tringent pruning of expenditure.''(87 
The way in which the economies were instituted, by the 
National Economy Act, 1931, is particularly interesting. The 
Act gave powers to the government to enforce the economies by 
Order in Council, but, as Fergusson later explained to 
Chamberlain, it: 
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designedly refrained from g1v1ng power to restore those 
cuts by Order in Council or any other means except of 
course fresh legislation. This was done so that, if 
the Labour Party won the impending General Election, 
they would not be able to restore (the] cuts except by 
a Bill passed by both Houses of Parliament. (88) 
The first moves in reconsidering the economy policy came 
in early December 1931, but such moves remained tentative 
throughout 1932 as the budgetary position remained unfavourable. ( 89 
Indeed, despite the severity of the economy cuts already 
instituted, shortly after the completion of the 1932 budget the 
Treasury was to face a worsening of the budget estimates. The 
central problem was that : 
Chamberlain, like his predecessor a year ago, has produced 
a budget which depends for its fulfilment upon business 
recovery. His estimates of revenue are frankly based in 
a number of important respects upon a revival of trading 
and financial activity which the burden of taxation itself 
goes far to nullify. (90) 
Whilst there existed an influential group that believed 
that the budget strategy was doomed to failure because of the 
absence of active measures to induce recovery, ( 9 l) politically 
there was also strong pressure for further moves in the 
direction of economy.< 92 ) Waterfield* summarised the budget 
position in early May 1932 as follows: 
(1) This year's Budget has been balanced with great 
difficulty, and only by the retention of taxation at a 
level which the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself has 
admitted is excessive, and both Parliament and the tax-
payer regard as well-nigh impossible. 
(2) In a number of respects the Budget takes an 
optimistic view of the future, e.g. (a) in the estimates 
of the level of unemployment during the year, (b) and 
of the yield of the Import Duties .. . , and (c) in its 
deliberate exclusion of any provision for the interest 
on the U.S.A. debt in December ... 
(3) The chance of a deficit by the end of March 
cannot therefore be overlooked. But that will make it 
all the more incumbent on us to balance the 1933 Budget. 
Yet what are the prospects? Even assuming a revival of 
trade in the course of 1932, the Inland Revenue estimates 
of revenue from existing taxation in 1933, as forecast 
for the purposes of 'Old Moore's', is only about equal 
to this year's figures. And with every week of 1932 
*A. P. Waterfield, Assistant Secretary, Treasury 1927-31, 
Principal Assistant Secretary 1932-8. 
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that passes with further dreary evidence of reduced 
profits and dividends passed, the prospect of a 
revival of trade coming in time to benefit the 1933 
figures grows more remote. (If the revival does not 
come at all this year, the prospect for 1933 is pretty 
desperate; the figures might well be as much as 
£20/25 millions below 1932). Nor are the figures for 
Customs and Excise likely to be much more satisfactory, 
judging by the forecast made for 1935 ('Old Moore'), 
which showed an increase of only £24 millions between 
1931 and 1935. 
(4) On the other hand, the latest forecast of 
Expenditure in 1933 suggested a~ 'automatic' increase 
of some £7i millions including £6 millions on defence 
(which, though alarming, will be very difficult to 
resist ... ) 
(5) Further, it is impossible to exclude altogether 
the possibility that in 1933 we may have to provide 
something at least towards interest in the U.S.A. debt 
... [which, though) impossible to guess ... might quite 
possibly be a net payment of between £5 and £10 millions. 
(6) Miscellaneous Revenue is likely to be some 
£3i millions down in 1933. 
(7) It may well happen therefore that next March we 
shall be faced with the prospect of revenue, based on 
existing taxation, of about the same as this year 
(perhaps further additional [import) duties may produce 
a little more, but it would not be safe to rely too much 
on these for revenue purposes), and with a 'potential' 
expenditure some £10 to £20 millions greater. 
(8) Yet it is certain that both Parliament and the 
taxpayer expect a substantial remission of taxation in 
one form or another next year, and will make their 
dissatisfaction felt plainly enough if they don't get 
it. 
(9) There are only 2 ways in which such remission 
can be made possible, either by an early revival of 
trade or by a reduction of expenditure. However much 
we may hope for the first, we have no right to assume 
it as a certainty. We must be prepared for the second 
contingency ... (93) 
A detailed inquiry into the potential for further economy 
cuts was therefore proposed; it was accepted and carried out 
during May-June 1932. (94 ) Economy was considered at both a 
national and local level; the latter, apart from being 
"urgently needed in the interests of industry", would also: 
in some cases directly and in all cases indirectly, 
benefit the national expenditure. So far as grant 
aided services are concerned any reduction of 
expenditure would affect the Exchequer twice; first 
by a reduction in the direct grant in aid of the 
service, and secondly by a reduction ultimately of 
the general block grant, which is dependent on the 
total expenditure of Local Authorities generally. (95) 
But as Strohmenger informed Fisher:* 
I am not too hopeful of very much being done and 
am clear that little indeed would be done without a 
very grave effort. But if for political or budgetary 
reasons it is essential that further steps towards 
economy should be taken, an intensive attack on local 
expenditure might be considered. (96) 
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An additional problem was that on technical grounds economy 
in local expenditure was a medium-term policy option, since 
an essential prerequisite was for a body to investigate the 
scope for such economi(;)s. Thus the appointment of the Ray 
Committee in early July 1932 essentially served a short-
term political purpose,** and it is likely that a major 
factor in the genesis of the committee was the pressure 
being exerted by the House of Commons Private Members 
Committee.< 97 ) Before turning to consider the recommendations 
of the Ray Committee, reference should be made to the issue 
of national economy. 
In this sphere there were also certain difficulties. 
The only real scope for further economies lay with social 
expenditures, but since the cuts of the previous September 
were "linked together in the public mind in a way which 
makes them appear part of a comprehensive all round economy 
scheme" it would "be extremely difficult to revise the 
(previous cuts] with a view to increased economy except as 
part of a further all round scheme of equal sacrifice." 
Acceptance of these political judgements inevitably meant 
that "the field of economy is very substantially restricted", (gs) 
a conclusion communicated to Parliament in early June 1932. 
* Sir E. J. Strohmenger (Under Secretary, Treasury; 
Controller, Supply Divisions). 
** Chaired by Sir William Ray, the Committee on Local 
Expenditure was instructed "to consider the whole field 
of expenditure and make recommendations ... for ensuring 
reductions in such expenditure, whether defrayed from 
Exchequer Grants, Rates or other sources ... "(Report, 
Cmd.4200 (1932), p.8). 
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Chamberlain, stressing that he "decline[d] altogether to 
accept the view ... that we have come to the end of the 
possibilities of reduction in national expenditure", told 
the House of Commons: 
(If] you are to obtain substantial reductions in 
national expenditure you have to contemplate something 
more than a mere paring down ... It has been suggested 
that all I had to do was to take my pen and write 
quickly how much I wanted the bill reduced, and that 
there was no reason why that should not be done at 
once. I have seen attempts at national economy made 
before now. I have seen economy undertaken in haste 
and repented of at leisure. One has to be careful, 
in the first place, that substantial changes ... can 
be permanent, [that is) not be reversed within a 
short time because they had been insufficiently 
thought out. 
[Secondly], if you look at the main items in our 
national expenditure which are of such a size that 
they would warrant the belief that substantial 
reductions can be made, they arise in matters of very 
vital importance either to the safety of the country 
or to the standard of living of its people ... I do 
not say that in no circumstances should any of these 
things be touched, but I do say that we want to be 
very sure that changes are necessary before we under-
take them. 
[Finally], while I believe it is necessary to 
watch carefully the situation, and that we must 
certainly lose no opportunity of reducing national 
expenditure where it can properly and wisely be done, 
yet I say that we have already taken measures which 
should prepare the way for a rapid advance as soon as 
general conditions become favourable. (99) 
Further difficulties arose from the continued increase in 
unemployment. On 6 June Betterton* circulated a memorandum 
informing the Cabinet that unemployment had risen by a further 
O.l7m between March and May, that '~eports ... received in 
the last few days [from] Departmental Controllers are gloomy 
in the extreme and indicate an increasing loss of public 
confidence in an early revival of trade", so that ''there can 
be no prospect now of our realising" an average Live Register 
of 2.4m during 1932/3 and a Supplementary -as the Ministry 
* Sir Ho Betterton, Minister of Labour 1931-4. 
of Labour had warned when the Estimate was fixed - would 
be required. (lOO) 
Phillips accepted that "the legitimate expectations 
entertained last March of a substantial improvement in 
employment due to our better competitive position look 
like being defeated or at least postponed for a time", 
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but argued that an attempt should be made to try and dispel 
this pessimism which he considered was retarding recovery.(lOl) 
The magnitude of the Supplementary required was dependent on 
the course of world trade, which was considered to be highly 
unpredictable. (l02 ) 
Simultaneously, revenue (especially income and surtax) 
was failing to meet the estimates. By late October, the 
time when "forecasts [were] usually at their gloomiest", a 
deficit of approximately £32m was anticipated, or £38m if 
unemployment averaged 3m rather than 2.75m.(l03) For 
economic and political reasons a further tightening of 
fiscal stance was considered to be impracticable; thus the 
natural course was to make the budget accounts appear in as 
favourable a light as possible: 
Supposing the deficit to be as bad as it looks at 
present, viz. of the order of £32,000,000, the 
Chancellor will be able to claim that there have been 
definite savings on the interest charge of £13,000,000 
[due to the War Loan conversion]. These are genuine 
cash savings which apart from book keeping would be 
set off against the deficit. It can also be pointed 
out that we shall have provided out of revenue some 
£13,000,000 for the Unemployment Fund which under the 
system in force before the National Government took 
office would have been borrowed. 
This is not too bad a showing and if presented 
in the proper way ought not to produce an unduly 
depressing effect on financial circles. (104) 
Of importance at this juncture was the change in the 
public mood concerning the emergency measures of September 
1931: by late 1932 further economies would have been 
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problematical while there also arose more insistent demands 
for an active recovery policy. This changed atmosphere 
is important in understanding the Cabinet's reaction to the 
Ray report which had recommended wide-ranging and con-
troversial economies totalling £35-40m.(l05 ) As was to be 
expected, the committee had treated the effects of these 
measures as outside their terms of reference.(lOG) 
The question of the Ray report was first raised in 
Cabinet on 8 March 1933 when a draft circular to local 
authorities was discussed.(l07 ) MacDonald was concerned 
that the circular would '~ppear in a hostile and critical 
atmosphere" and therefore desired the preparation of an 
accompanying note for the press which would: 
bring out the expansive points in the circular, making 
clear that the Ray Report is not supported and that 
the economies are in administration and not on services 
themselves. If the Government were thought to be 
imposing further cuts manx of their supporters would be 
anta onised and the · 6litical conse uenceS would be 
serious. (108) Emphasis Added 
In accordance with these political objectives the Cabinet 
approved a revised circular drawn up by a Cabinet Committee.<109 ) 
Following Cabinet discussions about the change in public 
opinion, (1 lO) MacDonald informed Parliament that the "present 
financial situation offer[ed] no hope that it (would] be 
possible to restore the (expenditure] cuts", but that no 
further cuts were being considered. (1 ll) Nor were false 
hopes encouraged that a reduction of taxation would be 
possible until after the recovery of receipts to a satis-
factory level, (ll2 ) although Chamberlain did try to reassure 
the business community by stating that while a deficit was 
likely in 1932/3 taxation would not be increased further 
to cover it.(ll3 ) Thus prior to the debates on recovery 
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policy generated by the April 1933 budget, Chamberlain was 
unsympathetic towards the expansionist case: 
There is nobody more anxious to reduce taxation 
than I am, both on personal grounds and out of 
sympathy with the taxpayer. But I should conceive 
I was failing in my duty if I were to undermine the 
feelings of confidence that have been inspired 
throughout the world in the stability of this 
country's finances ... 
If'I were to deliberately unbalance the Budget 
in order to reduce the income-tax ... , well, the 
consequences would very soon be felt in a way far 
more disagreeable to the taxpayer than even the 
continuance for a little longer of the burdens which 
press upon us so hardly. (114) 
2. Recovery 1933-7 
The main details of the budgets over the recovery phase 
are summarised in Table 5.5 which should also be examined in 
conjunction with Table 5.1 above. 
(i) 1933 budget(ll5 ) 
As predicted 1932/3 closed with a deficit. Its magnitude 
- £32.3m as measured by B -was determined by a number of 
c 
factors: the payment of £28.9m for U.S. war debt obligations 
(unplanned in April 1932); a total shortfall in revenue of 
£22m resulting from the disappointing yield of the tariff as 
imports were checked more than anticipated, and failures to 
reach the estimates on beer, income and surtax. There were, 
however, savings amounting to £10.5m on the expenditure side 
of the account. The deficit would have been larger still 
(over 1931/2 to 1932/3 the deficit as measured by B widened 
from £45.7m to £50.2m) had it not been for borrowing to 
cover the cost of the War Loan conversion operation and 
savings' certificates encashments(£25.9m) and a transfer of 
£8.9m to revenue from the profits of the Bank of England 
Note Issue. (ll6 ) 
Table 5.5 
Budget summary 1933/4-1936/7: 
published forecasts and results.(£m) 
1. Budget balance (Be) of 
previous year 
2. Budget on existing basis 
Revenue (Tc) 
Expenditure (Gc) 
Balance(l) 
3. Discretionary changes 
(i) taxation 
first year - direct 
- indirect 
full year - direct 
- indirect 
(ii) economies 
(iii) miscellaneous 
4. Budget Estimates 
Revenue (T c ) 
Expenditure (Gc) 
Balance(l) 
5. Budget outturn 
Revenue (Tc) 
Expenditure (Gc) 
Balance (Be) 
1933/4 
-32.3 
795.2 
781.0 
+14.3 
-11.5(2 ) 
-11.5 
+0.9 
-13.4 
782.3 
781.0 
+1.3 
809.4 
778.2 
+31.2 
1934/5 
+31.2 
814.0 
784.9 
+29.1 
-20.5 
-0.2 
-24 .o(4) 
-7.6 
791.2 
790.4 
+0.8 
804.6 
797.1 
+7.5 
1935/6 
+7 .5 
826.1 
820.5 
+5.6 
-4.5 
-1.1 
-10.0 
-1.3 
-4 .o 
+4.5(5 ) 
824.8 
824.3 
+0.5 
844.8 
841.8 
+3.0 
Sources: Financial Accounts; Financial Statements. 
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1936/7 
+3.0 
872.4 
893.7 
-21.3 
+12.0 
+4.5 
+16.5 
+4.7 
894.2 
893.7 
+0.5 
896.6 
902.2 
-5.6 
Notes: 1 In contrast to previous years no sum was specifically 
allocated for debt redemption, nor was provision 
made for US war debt payments. 
2 Includes a one year only transaction of £12m 
remitted when restoring payment dates for income 
tax to their original basis. 
3 Transfer from War Loan Depreciation Fund. 
4 Assumed effect of discretionary changes. Reduction 
of motor vehicle duties (first year effect -
£2.2m, full year- £4.0m) but cost almost wholly 
b9rne by the Road Fund. 
5 Transfer from Road Fund. 
That 1932/3 closed with a deficit effectively limited 
action for the following year; in particular, if financial 
confidence were to be maintained, the following year's budget 
would have to be framed on a conservative basis. The dominant 
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Table 5.6 
Expenditure on debt service, 1929/30-1939/40 (£m) 
Management u.s. War Sinking Interest and debt fund Total* 
expenses 
£m. as % 
of GDP 
1929/30 277.5 2.3 27.5 47.7 355.0 8.4 
1930/1 264.6 1.3 27.3 66.8 360.0 8.7 
1931/2 274.0 1.9 13.6 32.5 322.0 8.3 
1932/3 260.2 2~1 19.9 26.3 308.5 8.2 
1933/4 211.9 1.1 3.3 7.7 224.0 5.8 
1934/5 210.7 1.0 12.3 224.0 5.5 
1935/6 210.5 1.0 12.5 224.0 5.3 
1936/7 209.8 1.1 13.1 224.0 5.0 
1937/8 215.3 1.0 10.5 226.8 4.7 
1938/9 215.7 1.1 13.2 230.0 4.5 
1939/40 221.8 1.0 7.2 230.0 4.1 
Sources: Financial Accounts; GDP data from Table 6.1 below 
Notes: * Total payments equals 'Fixed Debt Charge'. 
feature of the 1933 budget was the reduction in the debt 
charge resulting from the War Loan conversion and low Treasury 
Bill rates (Table 5.6). This created a number of technical 
difficulties, first considered by the Treasury in October 
1932. 
The Finance Act, 1928, had established the Fixed Debt 
Charge (F.D.C.) with an initial figure of £355m. Special 
powers, however, had to be taken to reduce this to £322m in 
1931/2 and £308.5m in 1932/3, but it was due to revert to 
the original figure in 1933/4. With interest and management 
charges estimated at £226m for 1933/4, this would give 
sinking fund payments of £129m. As Phillips commented: 
This would be absurd in present circumstances and 
legislation will be required both for this reason 
and because the total charge will in any case need 
permanent revision if we can exclude the United 
States Debt and also allot the saving on the War 
Loan conversion to the taxpayer, asctearly we must. 
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Phillips therefore suggested an F.D.C. of £258.5m which 
would cover interest and management charges and also provide 
£32.5m for debt redemption, while in subsequent years a 
£50m sinking fund should be adopted. This would be: 
not altogether inconsistent with a balanced Budget 
and ... at the same time not so low as to rule out 
the hope of a return to a more vigorous policy of 
debt redemption in more favourable circumstances 
later. (117) 
By the time of the presentation of the budget, however, a 
radical shift in policy had occurred; for Chamberlain 
announced that the F.D.C. was to be set at £224m which 
omitted allowance for sinking fund payments altogether, 
powers instead being taken to borrow for the statutory 
sinking funds (amounting to £7.5m): 
I do not think that even the strictest financial purist 
will quarrel with me for borrowing that small sum to 
meet my purposes in the present year. In times like 
these, of unemployment and stress on all sides, and 
of trade depression, we can, in my opinion, use our 
money more wisely and more profitably than in the 
redemption of Debt, provided, of course, that we make 
generous provision for it when good times come. (118) 
This practice was continued throughout the remainder of the 
1930s, powers being taken annually in the Finance Act, whilst 
in addition, where interest paid on savings certificates 
exceeded the margin available in the F.D.C. the Treasury 
borrowed the requisite funds.* By such practices, the burden 
of budgetary difficulties was eased, and the deflationary 
impact of fiscal operations lessened. 
* For much of the 1930s interest continued to accrue without 
being claimed, whilst the F.D.C. had been so reduced that 
there was no margin available to cover it. Thus by 31 
March 1937 interest amounting to £124m had accrued and 
the Treasury were deeply disturbed by the consequences if 
a substantial volume of certificates were cashed because 
this would have necessitated large-scale borrowing to meet 
their liabilities (T171/340, Phillips, 'Note on the Annual 
Debt Charge', 3 Feb. 1938). The possibility of such an 
occurrence, although unlikely, undoubtedly strengthened 
opinion in the Treasury against 'rash economic experiments' 
such as a deliberately unbalanced budget which might have 
an adverse effect on government. credit. 
In the final quarter of 1932/3 the revenue forecasts 
continued to show the effects of depression, while 
unemployment was to peak in January 1933. Nevertheless, 
the Treasury would only agree to a Ministry of Labour 
Estimate at the previous year's figure (the Ministry had 
applied for an additional £4m). (ll9 ) Thus, as in 1932, 
the Treasury enforced their will against departmental 
opposition. While the Live Register for 1932/3 was 
expected to average 2.785m, and "if we follow the 
inferences from 1932 the proper figure for 1933/4 would be 
about 2,950,000", Hopkins nevertheless believed: 
that would be to assume that we shall continue to run 
down hill. The right assumption at this stage not 
merely for unemployment but for everything seems to 
be that conditions will at least remain stable, if 
they do not get a little better ... (120) 
Similar assumptions guided the framing of the revenue 
estimates for 1933/4, which showed a reduction (Tc) of 
£53.7m on 1932/3, primarily because the current yield of 
income and surtax was based on the depressed years of 1931 
and 1932, (l2 l) while beer and spirits were also performing 
badly. (122 ) 
To permit a limited remission of taxation - which was 
viewed as politically necessary, if insignificant 
economically - potential raids were investigated and it 
was decided to appropriate £10m from the War Loan 
Depreciation Fund.<123 ) This gave a prospective surplus 
of £24.3m and permitted a reduction in beer duty (because 
the previous rate was apparently seriously affecting 
consumption and thus the duty's yield) and the restoration 
of payments of income tax under Schedules B, D, and E to 
their oTiginal dates. <124 ) 
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Such remissions, however, failed to satisfy those who 
had campaigned for a relaxation of budgetary policy 
sufficient to stimulate recovery - a campaign opened by 
The Times in late January 1933,<125 ) and later developed 
by M.P.'s of all parties, (126 ) and a number of leading 
. t (127) econom1s s; a campaign greatly strengthened by Keynes's 
articles in The Times of mid-Marc~ 1933, 'The Means to 
Prosperity', which sought to advance the theoretical basis 
of the expansionist case. <128 ) 
Despite these pressures, Chamberlain was not prepared 
to unbalance the budget to permit further remissions of 
taxation. His adherence to balanced budgets may be said to 
derive from two interconnected influences, firstly that 
economic policy was a quasi-moral issue, secondly that 
unbalanced budgets were ineffective in inducing recovery. 
With regard to the f·ormer, Chamberlain expressed his 
views in one of the weekly letters to his sisters: 
(T]he Times has an article almost every day demanding 
reduction of taxation and the Mail & Express are adding 
their shriller notes now - I receive deputations from 
M.P.'s who urge 'imaginative finance' plus a wide 
var·iety of specific interest groups, e.g. brewers, 
film companies, etc. 
And every one of them represents that his particular 
interest is in a moribund condition entirely owing to 
taxation. I foresee that I shall soon be the most 
unpopular man in the country, while at the same time I 
receive rather grudging & very belated praise for a 
'sound' Budget last year and for the Conversion which it 
made possible. I should think few Chancellor's have had 
a more difficult task than I and I add (between our-
selves) my conviction that few men in my position would 
resist the temptation to bid for popularity. (129) 
Towards the end of the 1933 budget speech Chamberlain took 
the opportunity to reply to the "agitation - I might almost 
call it a drive - in favour of deliberately unbalancing the 
Budget in order to take a substantial slice off the Income 
Tax". Chamberlain summarised the protagonists' case as 
follows: 
That the time has now come when trade recovery is on 
the point of materialising, and that a reduction of 
direct taxation would give such a psychological 
fillip to the country that the wheels of industry 
would start running again at such a rate that in a 
comparatively short time, say in three years, we 
might expect to find ourselves in possession of a 
substantial surplus of revenue. That programme is 
to be combined with a programme of [capital] 
expenditure, and the combined programme is to be 
announced beforehand so that the public may be 
directed to pay attention only to what is to happen 
at the end of the period, and to disregard the 
question of whether at any intermediate stage there 
is a surplus or deficit. 
169 
In reply, Chamberlain advanced the following counter-argument: 
(1) Suppose that I were to take a shilling off the 
Income Tax this year. That would cost £50,000,000. 
Then, according to the plan, I am to expect in 1934 
that I shall draw somewhere about level, and that in 
1935 I shall have a surplus of not less than 
£50,000,000, so that over the whole three years the 
Budget is to balance. That means that an extra 
£50,000,000 has to materialise in 1934, and an extra 
£100,000,000 in 1935. If those results are to be 
produced out of Income Tax alone, as some people 
suppose, it would mean that the profits of 1933, this 
present year, would have to be increased by 
£250,000,000 and the profits of next year would have 
to be increased by £500,000,000. Of course, these 
vast figures are purely academic. We all know that 
any general increase of prosperity would affect the 
Budget in many ways. I dare say that most of them 
would be favourable. But I put it to the Committee 
that, at least, these figures show the necessity of 
caution in accepting too readily the anticipations 
which are so hopefully attached to the idea of a 
three years' Budget. 
As a matter of fact, however, everyone knows 
that you cannot possibly, in these times, forecast 
what is to happen over three years. Even one year 
may produce quite unexpected results, as the Committee 
has seen in the review I have given of the year that 
is past. If I were to pretend that I could lay out 
a programme under which what I borrowed this year 
would be met by a surplus at the end of three years, 
everyone would very soon perceive that I was only 
resorting to the rather transparent device of making 
an unbalanced Budget look respectable. 
(2) No Finance Minister, as far as I know, has ever 
deliberately unbalanced his Budget when he possessed 
the means of balancing it ... No Finance Minister 
would willingly abandon the primary bulwark against 
extravagance or forget that an unbalanced Budget may 
presently have to be balanced again. But although no 
Finance Minister voluntarily unbalances his Budget, 
sometimes external circumstances perform that task 
for him. 
[3) Look round the world to-day and you see that 
badly unbalanced budgets are the rule rather than 
the exception. Everywhere there appear budget 
deficits piling up, yet they do not produce those 
favourable results which it is claimed would happen 
to us. On the contrary, I find that budget deficits 
repeated year after year may be accompanied by 
deepening depression and by a constantly falling price 
level. Before we embark upon so dangerous a course as 
that, let us reflect upon this indisputable fact. Of 
all countries passing through these difficult times 
the one that has stood the test with the greatest 
measure of success is the United Kingdom. Without 
underrating the hardships of our situation - the long 
tragedy of the unemployed, the grievous burden of 
taxation, the arduous and painful struggle of those 
engaged in trade and industry - at any rate we are 
free from that fear, which besets so many less 
fortunately placed, the fear that things are going to 
get worse. We owe our freedom from that fear largely 
to the fact that we have balanced our Budget. By 
following a sound financial policy we have been 
enabled to secure low interest rates for industry and 
it would be the height of folly to throw away that 
advantage. If we were to reverse our policy, just at 
the very moment when other Governments are striving 
to follow our example and to balance their Budgets, 
after experience of the policy which we are now asked 
to adopt, we would stultify ourselves in the eyes of 
the world and forfeit in a moment the respect with 
which we are regarded to-day. (130) 
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The existing domestic recovery policy, and the continued 
commitment to budgetary orthodoxy, were thus reaffirmed in 
the budget speech. Nevertheless, the expansionist case had 
not gone unheard. The sinking fund had largely been 
suspended, and a limited remission of taxation made possible 
by fiscal window-dressing. Furthermore, whilst, within the 
Treasury, the view prevailed that it was ·~ssential that the 
Government should not be deflected from the main lines of 
(its] present policy", it was also recognized that,. on 
political grounds, "there would ... have to be some 
alteration in the attitude towards public works adopted 
in the King's speech". (l3 l) 
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(ii) 1934 budget 
In one sense, Chamberlain's optimism or carefully 
calculated risk of April 1933 was justified: 1933/4 closed 
with a surplus (B ) of £31.2m. Careful inspection of the 
c 
revenue and expenditure data shows, however, that the surplus 
did not r~sult from a revival of economic activity as such 
- revenue (Tc) in fact fell by 2.1%, but expenditure (Gc) 
fell by as much as 9.4%, the whole of this change being 
explained by a reduction in the F.D.C. 
With the publication of the budget accounts for the 
first six months of 1933/4 the view began to gain ground 
that the year would finish with a substantial surplus.<132 ) 
Such a possibility was first mentioned in Cabinet on 18 
October, <133 ) but was not actively discussed until 6 
December 1933, (134 ) when it was "unanimously decided that 
the benefit should be spread over those who have been cut 
(135) 
as well as those who have been·burdened". 
However, the first complete budget forecast drawn up 
was "very disappointing", (136 ) because of unfavourable 
developments on both the revenue and expenditure sides of 
the account. With regard to the former, Inland Revenue 
duties were estimated to yield £390m in 1933/4 but only 
£380m in the following year, largely because of the continued 
fall in profits in 1933 and the fact that the former year 
had contained £13m of duties on the Ellerman Estate. But 
this estimate was made before the Budget samples of profits 
were prepared (during February), (137 ) and Phillips commented 
that "having regard to the improvement in unemployment and 
other signs of trade recovery I find it myself difficult to 
believe that Inland Revenue in 1934/5 will be so poor."(l3 S) 
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Similarly, the Customs and Excise forecast was considered 
questionable, leading Phillips to comment that it was "low, 
but quite clearly it is not excessively low." (139 ) Finally, 
there was the £10m from the War Loan Depreciation Fund 
included in Miscellaneous Revenue in 1933/4 which would not 
be available in the following year while receipts from the 
Enemy Debt Clearing Office were also falling off. 
The picture is too g~oomy to be faced. I think in 
view of the size of this year's surplus we must try to 
carry over some of the Miscellaneous Receipts to next 
year. It is not altogether a desirable proceeding (and 
it could not of course be repeated in 1935 when the( 140) bump down in miscellaneous receipts must be faced). 
To remedy this situation Phillips proposed to transfer 
£6.5m of miscellaneous receipts from 1933/4 to 1934/5, and 
to raise the Inland Revenue estimate by a maximum of £10m 
and Customs and Excise by £4m. 
On the expendl.ture side, the continuance of the low 
figure for the F.D.C. was no longer certain and was likely 
to increase as recovery led to a hardening of Treasury Bill 
rates (a question that remained a preoccupation for much of 
the rest of the 1930s); the Ministry of Labour estimate for 
unemployment of £66m (based on an average Live Register of 
2.2m) was "probably unduly pessimistic"; while Supply 
Services in general were "disappointing". 
Without some contingency action the surpluses for 
1933/4 and 1934/5 were likely to be £31.8m and £2.lm 
respectively; with such action they would be £25.3m and 
(approximately) £22.6m.< 141 ) 
By the end of February 1934 conditions had changed 
somewhat: receipts, especially for income tax, were more 
buoyant than expected, and the likely surplus for 1933/4 
was in the range £26.5-30m.( 142 ) Hopkins advised: 
I am sure (that] we ought not to press I[nland) 
R(evenueJ unduly to limit their intake. It is easy 
enough to worsen a standard of collection and very 
difficult to get it back to its former level. 
Indeed all that can readily be done on this subject 
has been done already. (143) 
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Accordingly, Inland Revenue were asked to make only moderate 
efforts to limit their rate of collection of income tax in 
1933/4, (144 ) but Customs and Excise were asked to inflate 
their estimates. 
The budget forecast drawn up in mid-March 1934 shows 
clearly the Treasury's difficulties; on the basis of 
existing taxation and assuming the transfer of £6.5m of 
miscellaneous receipts to 1934/5, budget surpluses in 1933/4 
and 1934/5 of £32m and £20.8m respectively were forecast. 
With the cost of a 6d. cut in the standard rate of income 
tax at £20.5m, restoration of the unemployment cuts at 
£3.6m, and half the remaining cuts at £3.9m, revision of the 
revenue estimates would be required. 
The position of the two Revenue Departments is not quite 
identical. For many reasons the yield of direct 
taxation lags behind changes in the state of trade and 
business. It does not decline so rapidly as might be 
anticipated at the beginning of a slump and its recovery 
tends to be delayed when conditions improve. On the 
other hand Customs and Excise ought to respond almost 
at once to better conditions. 
Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise were asked to stretch 
their estimates by £3m and £5m respectively.C 145 ) 
Preliminary consideration was also given to the prospects 
for 1935/6. It was feared that this would see a deterioration 
over 1934/5 of approximately £38m, as a result of: 
(1) full year effects of 1934 budget changes; 
(2) long-term decline in Miscellaneous Receipts; 
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(3) rising cost of defence; 
(4) the likely increase in the F.D.C. due to rising interest 
rates and the fact that it would be '~ifficult not to provide 
at least for the contractual sinking funds. ,(146 ) 
Outside of the Treasury few were probably aware of these 
difficulties, and as Chamberlain noted shortly before the 
1934 budget : 
There is no doubt that events are justifying my 
prophecy that my difficulties would begin when there 
was any sign of anything to distribute. The uproar 
from the would be recipients is terrific and the papers 
keep whipping them on by new and more fantastic 
estimates of what the surplus will be. I fear there 
will be a good deal of disappointment on April 17 and 
I shall once more come in for a good deal of abuse. 
But I can very honestly say that I care little for 
that. My time will come 20 years hence and though I 
shall probably not be there I am satisfied to leave 
my reputation to posterity. (147) 
The central problems in framing the 1934 budget may be 
summarised as follows: 
(I) the revenue departments had been extremely cautious in 
their forecasting and the Treasury anticipated that there 
would be complaints about the low revenue estimates. Such 
complaints did in fact arise during the budget debates,< 148 ) 
and despite Chamberlain's careful explanation in the budget 
speech of the reasons why the yield of income tax lagged 
(149)' behind recovery, the Treasury were probably correct in 
their judgement that, in general, Parliament was uninformed 
about the basic characteristics of the fiscal system. 
(2) concern was beginning to be shown about the future cost 
of the F.D.C. and the fact that it did not cover the full 
cost of savings' certificates interest. This was a medium-
term problem: "the end of at least relatively cheap money 
is not yet in sight", (lSO) while the problem concerning the 
savings certificates might never be realised. 
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As stated earlier 1933/4 closed with a surplus (Be) of 
£31.2m, but by law this had to be allocated to debt 
redemption and was not available to aid budgetary relaxation. 
By the time of the presentation of the budget the Treasury 
had been able to modify the revenue and expenditure estimates 
so that, on the existing basis, there was a forecast surplus 
for 1934/5 of £29.lm (see Table 5.5). This was '~ufficient 
to enable [Chamberlain] to begin the long awaited process of 
relief from the burdens and sacrifices of the last few 
(151) years." 
In announcing the budget changes explicit reference was 
made to Snowden's advice that a '~urplus now must in justice 
be devoted, as far as it will allow, to relieving those 
classes who suffered when the crisis was acute."<152 ) Thus 
not only was the standard rate of income tax cut by 6d. but 
the cuts in unemployment benefits were fully restored and 
the salary cuts partially restored. On the expenditure 
side, these measures served a social and political purpose; 
with regard to the tax side: 
[O]ut of £81,500,000 of extra taxation which was 
imposed [in 1931], the Income Tax payers found no less 
than £57,500,000, or 70 per cent. of the extra 
taxation. Although their burdens were already heavy, 
they shouldered an extra 6d. on the standard rate; 
there were general reductions in the Income Tax 
allowances; and there was an addition of 10 per cent. 
to the Surtax charge upon the larger incomes. Moreover, 
all these increases of taxation took effect from April, 
whereas the cut only became operative in the autumn. 
I think, too, one must not forget that since 1931 many 
of these Income Tax payers have also suffered a further 
serious reduction in their incomes owing to the 
operation of the Conversion Loan. Therefore, the case 
for some remission is overwhelming, and the only 
question is what form it should take. In deciding 
upon the form, I thought I ought to consider the effect 
of any remission not merely upon the individual taxpayer, 
but upon the country as a whole. Looking at it from 
that point of view, I had no hesitation in coming to 
the conclusion that the relief which would confer most 
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direct benefit upon the country, which would have the 
greatest psychological effect, and which would impart 
the most immediate and vigoro-us stimulus to the 
expansion of trade and employment, would be a reduction 
in the standard rate of Income Tax. (153) 
Thus, whilst in general a remission in taxation was desirable 
on political grounds, the form was determined by economic 
considerations.<154 ) 
(iii) 1935 budget 
When making the 1934 budget changes there had been the 
clear intention that the following year should see a further 
relaxation so as to restore the pre-1931 position. However, 
as early as July 1934 definite fears existed within the 
Treasury that this objective would be frustrated, and that 
even 'The prospects of a surplus in the current year's 
Budget have become somewhat clouded by recent decisions", (155 ) 
namely Supplementaries of £7-lOm already being contemplated 
and the possibility of a rise in defence expenditure. Moreover: 
The revenue appears to be doing well and it would 
be rather early yet to anticipate an actual Budget 
deficit this year. A merely balanced Budget is 
altogether insufficient however since there is uni-
versal expectation of further concessions to be made 
in 1935/36. The actual outlook for 1935/36 and the 
succeeding year 1936/37 is becoming most threatening. 
The 1934 budget changes had full year costs of an extra 
£6.7m; the full costs of completing the restoration of the 
pre-1931 position were far greater. Restoration of the 
second half of the pay cuts and the income tax allowances 
was estimated at £19m in 1935/6 and £35.5m in a full year; 
the reduction in surtax at £4m; while if the public demanded 
a further 6d. off the standard rate of income tax a further 
£20m would be lost in revenue in 1935/6. In addition, as 
had been anticipated, substantial declines in Miscellaneous 
Revenue had to be faced, by £9.5m and £11.5m in the following 
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two years. Finally, "there is no hope that the debt charge 
can be maintained indefinitely at its present extremely low 
figure", although there was no prospect of affording a 
"ret urn to normality in respect of our debt policy [which] 
would involve the provision of say a total of £50 millions 
a year for debt redemption." 
In total, there was the gr1m prospect of a worsening 
of the financial situation by £65m and £90m in 1935/6 and 
1936/7, or £85m and £115m respectively if it were also 
desired to cut further the standard rate of income tax. 
The plain reading of these figures is this. The 
financial prospects for 1935/6 and 1936/7 have become 
bad. Some help may be forthcoming from growth of 
the main heads of ordinary revenue and from a reduction 
in unemployment - though this latter process has come 
to a stop for the moment. But no reasonable man could 
anticipate such a degree of help from these sources as 
to cancel out all the above liabilities. 
The possibility of a further reduction in income 
tax next year has disappeared. 
The possibility of restoring the income tax 
allowances next year has been gravely imperilled, and 
in the event of further expenditure being incurred 
will disappear likewise. (156) 
Meanwhile, the revenue reports for the current year 
continued to be reasonably favourable;< 157 ) concern centred 
over the likely growth of revenue in 1935/6, the prospects 
of which, Hopkins warned in November 1934, had become "more 
black than I had guessed." (1 58 ) Hopkins was instructed to 
prepare a note on the budget prospects for a Cabinet meeting 
which was to be called because it was felt "that the Cabinet 
does not appreciate the gravity of the situation".<159 ) From 
the new budget forecast, Hopkins concluded that "the position 
(was] a little worse", the deficits for 1935/6 and 1936/7 
(on the same basis as the July forecast) having risen to 
. (160) £70.7m and £93.2m respectively. A month later, having 
received the draft Estimates, the situation had deteriorated 
still further, the increase in expenditure commitments 
being "prima facie utterly beyond anything that can be 
covered by increased produce of taxes." Hopkins suggested: 
(1) that the revenue estimates for 1935/6 might be too 
cautious and thus capable of being stretched;(161 ) 
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(2) investigating possible raids, transfers between years, 
and other devices, '~hough it would be dangerous to suppose 
that we can do more that way than find the £7! million to 
replace the automatic fall in Miscellaneous Revenue"; 
(3) reduce the Estimates, care being taken not to force 
Supplementaries upon the departments. 
I conclude therefore that all we can do at present 
is to create an atmosphere of parsimony and financial . 
difficulty and to ask all Departments alike to give us 
all they can and that any actual decision as to the use 
of the axe should be postponed till the end of next 
month: the axe, if then used, (as I fear it must be), 
will need to be accompanied by assurances that 
supplementaries will be allowed if they prove 
unavoidable. (162) 
The proposal to modify the Estimates raised important 
questions of policy. In sending Hopkins' note ~P to 
Chamberlain, Fergusson commented: 
How far it is worthwhile to pursue this course depends 
to a large extent, like the question of budgeting for 
a deficit, on when a General Election is likely to 
occur and, so far as the estimates of expenditure are 
concerned, we shall have to decide what to do by about 
the middle of February at the latest. 
It is much safer and easier to exercise discretion 
on revenue estimates than on expenditure est.imates, and 
I have hitherto hoped that it might be possible to 
bridge the gap by the former method alone; but it is 
beginning to appear that this will not be possible. 
However, we ought to have some further indication of 
the revenue outlook before final decisions have to be 
reached on the main expenditure estimates. (163) 
As the time for the presentation of the Estimates to 
Parliament approached Hopkins further reviewed the situation: 
I cannot point to any Estimate which I believe will 
actually bear a cut of £! million, or anything like 
it, without new legislation or changed policy. I 
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do not myself feel that the £2 million or so which 
could be wiped off the book figures (though not off 
the intrinsic situation) is a sufficiently large 
advantage to set against the disadvantage of the 
probable very unusual Supplementaries later in the 
year. I would prefer to write up the revenue slightly 
above £700 millions, remembering that the Inland 
Revenue and Customs figures are not added together in 
the actual budget statement, so that the passing of 
the £700,000,000 mark will not be strikingly brought 
out. 
An over estimate of revenue [is more satisfactory, and] 
taking all the circumstances into account I think I 
can reconcile it to my conscience. (164) 
It was thus decided that the gap (now estimated at £26.6m) 
should be met by firstly writing up the revenue estimates, 
and secondly, manipulating the figures for Miscellaneous 
Revenue so that "With some trifling changes in minor heads 
of revenue, the deficit would then be covered on paper."<165 ) 
A month later, however, Phillips was writing that while 
it was possible to raise the revenue estimates "I should not 
rank very highly our chance of actually collecting such 
additional sums". ( 166 ) But a new factor had intervened at 
this point: the possibility of a raid on the Road Fund. 
A day after the preparation of the February budget 
forecast Hore-Belisha (an ex-Financial Secretary, and now 
Minister of Transport) had informed Chamberlain that revenue 
was running ahead of expenditure on roads so that he antici-
pated that there would be a balance of £5m by the end of the 
financial year. 
This is a much more favourable position than either 
of us expected, and I hope that you will see you way 
both to increasing the amount of the road programme 
and to agreeing to rates of grant which will enable the 
local authorities to resume work on some of the 
important suspended schemes which they were only 
induced to undertake originally by a promise of grants 
of 75 per cent. or more. (167) 
Hopkins, however, was: 
much more interested in the very tempting amount of 
money which it is now found that the Road Fund will 
contain at the 31st March, and the large growing 
balances of the immediately succeeding years. 
The buoyancy of the motor vehicle duties meant that even if 
authorisation were given to the 5 year road programme being 
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contemplated at that time, the balance of £5m could be taken 
into Exchequer receipts while further sums would probably be. 
available in the future.(lGS) Hore-Belisha, however, was 
furious, and according to Chamberlain, "sent in a written 
protest accompanied by requests for assurances to which I 
shall pay no attention."(lG9 ) 
The question arises why the 1935 budget was so difficult 
to frame. The first point of note is the political context, 
for from December 1934 onwards Lloyd George had been 
campaigning for a change in the government's economic policy. 
The necessity for a popular budget was in any case strengthened 
by the legitimate expectation that from 1934 onwards the 
government was committed to further remissions of taxation. 
Furthermore, attention was already being given to the timing 
of the next General Election(170) and a popular pre-election 
budget was imperative in order to counter a successful attack 
by the Opposition parties on the government's recovery policy. 
On economic grounds, it had also been noticed that there had 
occurred a slackening in the pace of recovery in the second 
half of 1934,<171 ) and a further fiscal stimulus was 
obviously desirable. 
The problem was that expenditure, which was beginning to 
become influenced by rearmament, was outstripping the growth 
of revenue, itself slow to respond to recovery. Further 
remission of taxation and the completion of the last stage 
of restoring the 1931 economy cuts cost a total of £9.6m. 
This was only secured in 1935 by transferring miscellaneous 
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receipts from 1934/5 to 1935/6, raiding the Road Fund, and, 
to a limited extent, stretching the revenue estimates. 
The actual Financial Staternent(172 ) contained little 
of interest, except for the final paragraph: 
We are framing our requirements to-day at a time 
of fresh anxiety in Europe. We must recognise that 
our further progress may be powerfully affected by 
events over which we have little control. Moreover, we 
have ever before our eyes those districts, once the 
seat of our most prosperous industries, which to-day 
still lie under the shadow of world depression. We 
must not, we shall not, relax our efforts by any or 
every measure which offers a reasonable prospect of 
success to restore them to a position in which they 
can play their part in the normal life of the nation. 
But, taking the country as a whole, looking back over 
these 3! years, we can see the improvement has been 
solid, continuous and steady. To that result many 
things have made their contribution - tariffs, 
conversion operations, cheap money, balanced Budgets, 
remissions of taxation. They have done it largely by 
creating a spirit of confidence. Confidence is the 
mother of enterprise, and, when it operates upon many 
individuals and through many channels, it is far and 
away the most effective form of promoting a general 
and rapid expansion of economic activities. Broadly 
speaking,we may say that we have recovered in this 
country 80 per cent. of our prosperity. Our task is 
now to win back the remaining 20 per cent. without 
jeopardising the confidence that we have already 
established. Given peace abroad and a fair measure 
of unity at horne, I see no reason why we should not 
during this current year make a further substantial 
advance towards prosperity, and it is in that 
conviction that I have framed my Budget estimates. 
(173) 
Thus stated, this in essence represented Chamberlain's 
philosophy of economic management, and of budgetary policy 
in Jmrticular. Whilst the Treasury. cannot be accused of 
financial orthodoxy in any strict nineteenth-century sense, 
for the period 1932-6 saw a number of major departures from 
orthodoxy - the virtual abandonment of sinking fund payments 
and the use of fiscal window-dressing to conceal deficits. 
In a wider sense, however, the influence of the nineteenth-
century fiscal constitution on policy formulation is clearly 
discernible, in the refusal to countenance deliberately 
unbalanced budgets and in the reliance on 'normal' channels 
182 
to promote trade recovery. Nor were the characteristics 
of the fiscal system particularly suited to the maintenance 
of balanced budgets in the face of autonomous fluctuations 
in activity, a theme we explore in the next chapter. In 
1935 Chamberlain was convinced of the correctness of the 
financial policy being pursued: 
Though the financial policy of this Government has 
frequently been criticised on the ground that it is 
wanting in boldness or imagination, I think we may say 
that the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and 
that the results which have been accomplished have 
justified us in sticking to sound principles of 
finance. I have sometimes been criticised on the 
opposite ground, in that I have not in recent Budgets 
provided for a. regular sinking fund. As a matter of 
fact the outcome of the four Budgets for which I have 
been responsible have resulted, either in a fixed debt 
charge or in Budget savings, in the provision of 
£87,500,000 towards the redemption of debt. In view 
of that fact I do not think I need fear any prickings 
of conscience on the score of my unorthodoxy. (174) 
(iv) Rearmament -a preview 
The cryptic reference to "fresh anxiety in Europe" made 
at the close of Chamberlain's 1935 budget statement reflected 
the increasing burden of defence expenditure on the budget. 
Following the Cabinet's decision of 1919- known as the 'Ten 
-
Year Rule' - '~hat the Britisb E~pire will not be engaged in 
~-- ~---
\ 
any great war during the next ten years, and that no 
(175) Expeditionary Force is required for this purpose", the 
\defence Estimates were progressively reduced during the 1920s, 
\reaching a minimum o~/ £1 03IJi' in 1932[_~ . (1 76 ) By that date, it 
is generally agreed that "retrenchment had reduced Britain's 
defence services and armaments industry to a dangerously low 
level."(l7 '7) Consequently, the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria in September 1931, which dramatically brought home 
British military vulnerability in the Far East, provided the 
opportunity for a revision of the rule. Its cancellation 
I 
was recommended by the Committee of Imperial Defence in 
March 1932, <178 ) and approved by the Cabinet after much 
d . . (179) 1SC\.l.§_Sl.On. Nevertheless, since the Treasury's view 
- "that to-day financial and economic risks are by far the 
most serious and urgent that the country has to face and 
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that other risks must be run until the country has had time 
and opportunity to recuperate and our financial situation to 
improve"(l 8 0) - remained unchallenged, the cancellation of 
the rule meant in effect that: "The services had won the 
)!
right to plan, but not to spend. The story of rearmament 
in the thirties revolves around this second batt1e."(l8l) 
The importance of this constraint on the growth of 
defence expenditure is clearly visible in the figures for 
the defence Estimates up to 1934/5 and in the modest 
programmes drawn up to rectify the worst deficiencies of 
the defence services. Defence expenditure only began to 
increase substantially from 1934/5 and by 1936/7 had reached 
£136.9m, some 32.9% above the low point of 1932/3. 
Similarly, it was not until February 1934 that the Cabinet 
-
was presented with a detailed rearmament programme, and 
this only proposed additional expenditure of £77m over 
1934/5 - 1938/9 with a further £16m in subsequent years.< 182 ) 
The worsening of the international situation in 1935 
compelled the Cabinet to review the situation, and following 
recommendations by the Cabinet Conunittee on defence issues -
the Defence fuquirements Committee (D .R .C.) - in November 
1935 for a substantial enlargement of the rearmament 
programme, a revised scheme totalling approximately £1015m 
(compared with a total of £634m under the original 
) d · Feb1·uar·y 1936.<183 ) m·th th programme was approve 1n n1 e 
decision to permit part of the rearmament programme to be 
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financed by borrowing, the size of the programme was to 
be further enlarged in subsequent years. This was not 
possible until 1937, but the question of borrowing was 
discussed much earlier. 
(v) Discussions over borrowing 1935-6 
A defence loan was viewed from two different, although 
interrelated, perspectives: (l) that it would permit the 
execution of a larger rearmament programme than that possible 
under the constraint of a balanced budget; and (2) by 
reducing the additional taxation required to finance a 
programme of a given size, it would minimise the electoral 
disadvantages of such a programme, an important consideration 
in its initial stages when the Cabinet were by no means 
convinced that a full scale rearmament programme would be 
politically acceptable. (lS4 ) 
A defence loan had been suggested in June 1934, but had 
found little favour and was easily dismissed by Chamberlain.(lSS) 
As a policy option, it was first seriously raised by the 
D.R.C. interim report of the autumn of 1935 which, as Shay 
, Jsays, had been framed "without reference to financial ;1 
)fJlimitations".(lS6 ) Subsequently, the committee were t~ 
press home the point "that we could not compete on a 
taxation basis against nations who were acting on a loan 
ba c•-'ts". (187) 
.;::,. .... ' and this was to lead to widespread discussion 
of the question. Naturally the focal point for such 
discussions 
support for 
was the Treasury, debate centring on Fisher's 
the D.R.C. proposal of a defence loan. 
-----Both Phillips and Hopkins believed that defence 
borrowing could not be justified on the grounds that it was 
capital or non-recurrent expenditure: 
\: 
, .. 
I 
,_. 
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It was held thirty years ago that there was a 
special case for borrowing to meet the expense of 
military and naval works of some permanence, such as 
barracks and fortifications. There is however no real 
economic ground for distinguishing such expenditure 
from expenditure on the upkeep of the forces. Neither 
type of expenditure is productive and both types 
involve simply an economic loss. The only valid reason 
which would ever be given for borrowing for armaments 
is a budgetary reason. It must be supposed to be clear 
beyond doubt that the level of expenditure contemplated!' 
is abnormal and non-recurrent and beyond the ability of 
the country to discharge immediately out of revenue. 
But, if so, it is the total expenditure that matters 
and the attempt to distinguish between different kinds 
of armament expenditure according as they are supposed 
to be of a 'capital' or revenue character is a useless 
complication. Moreover, the procedure adopted [thirty 
years ago) under the Military and Naval Works Acts 
resulted in a large part of the armaments programme 
being withdrawn from detailed Parliamentary control, 
a fact which contributed largely to the discredit into 
which tLe system fell. 
<, ) 
',1 .'' 
"' I / 
"\ ' 
The great danger of admitting too readily an 
argument based on the supposed non-recurrent character 
L'of the expenditure is that men always over-estimate 
' / 
}
their present suffering and are incurable optimists as 
to the future when it pays them to hold that view. 
r' (Emphasis Added]* 
The desire to avoid justifying rearmament in terms of its 
(supposed) capital value stemmed from concern over the 
effectiveness of the traditional constraints to the growth 
-- -----......_.__ 
of civil expenditure if such a course were adopted: 
It would be unfortunate if the country began to think 
of a Defence Loan as a comfortable Lloyd-Georgian 
device for securing not only larger forces but also 
lower estimates, Budget surpluses and diminishing 
taxation. (188) 
I think ... it would be best to avoid the term 'extra-
ordinary Budget' like poison, even in Cabinet discussions. 
Continental practice has made this phrase synonymous in 
the minds of informed financial circles with all that is 
unsound and dangerous in national finance; and the 
cininstructed public in this country might easily see a 
way out of all their troubles in 'extra-ordinary' budgets 
for Depressed Areas, etc., etc. (189) 
* Tl60/688/F .14996/1 and Tl7l/324, Phillips, 'General Note on 
methods of financing the Defence Programme', 29 Nov. 1935, 
pp.3-4. This accorded with Hopkins's advice that "the only 
ground for borrowing ~ though it may be a sufficient one - is 
that the expenditure places the Exchequer seriously in deficit 
when the country is taxed to full capacity, and the measure 
of the reasonable borrowing is provided by the amount of the 
deficit ... " (Tl60/688/F.l4996/l and Tl72/1832, Hopkins to 
Fisher and Chancellor, 7 Oct. 1935, p.l). 
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Out of these early discussions arose agreement that the 
~ ~ ~ of rearmament finance was that before borrowing 
could commence, two conditions had to be fulfilled: 
I a) the amount of defence expenditure to be borne out revenue should be largely increased over its current amount, as an earnest of the country's endeavour; 
\b) it should be convincingly shown that taxation 
Kalready extremely onerous) has been carried to the 
highest point that the country can bear without grave 
J 
detriment to its economy. (190) 
of 
Borrowing was agreed in principle in December 1935, but not 
undertaken until 1B37/8 because, in accordance with the 
- ------- --· 
princip_les es_t~bl;i_~hed above, it was first necessary to reach 
a posit ion where at least £170m -~of defence expenditure was 
financed from revenue, this figure being the estimated annual 
defencE)_ c_harge once the rearmament programme was completed. 
The decision to limit borrowing, both in amount and in 
its timing, stemmed from a number of factors. Firstly, 
this put Britain at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Germany which 
was rearming via borrowing: 
it may be argued that it is pedantic to pursue 
principles of this kind at a time when the world as 
a whole is_i!jsregarding them. It is quite true that 
principles of sound finance are little honoured today 
outside the British Empire. It is quite true that 
numbers of countries great and small - countries 
recently bankrupt, countries now bankrupt and 
countries still hovering on the edge of bankruptcy -
are adding to their national debt with no regard to 
the consequences. This argument, however, would not 
give soundness to any unsound measures we adopted; 
it would merely aver that we drop back into un§_9und 
fina-rrce in a large, if rather distraught and dis-
reputable, company. Nor have we the wide margin of 
safety which some of our formidable rivals enjoy; 
after several years of ruinous finance the debt 
burdens of the United States and of Germany are still 
far less in proportion to the size and wealth of those 
~ountries than the burden of our own debt. Sound 
finance has been the foundation upon which the spirit 
pf confidence has been revived at home and trust in 
~his country has been re-established abroad, and 
jpresumably the Gove~nment would be slow to depart 
'\from it. (191) 
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Accordingly, borrowing was delayed until 1937/8, and the 
1936/7 budget was framed on the assumption that revenue 
should be sufficient to cover expenditure. 
(vi) 1936 budget 
From 1935 onwards expenditure commitments (both for 
civil and military purposes) were clearly beginning to 
outstrip the automatic growth of revenue, and, having decided 
r· to defer borrowing to 1937/8, were to cause serious difficulties 
i. 
in the framing of the 1936 budget, the last budget of the 
1930s to be balanced according to the conventional budget 
definition. 
The process of preparing public opinion for the 
difficulties ahead began in the autum1 of 1935 when 
phamberlain publicly warned that the growth of defence 
expenditure had substantially reduced the possibilities for 
further remission of taxation. (192 ) The publication of the 
Estimates in February-IVIarch 1936 reinforced the desired 
impression, leading one commentator to note that they were 
'k large enough sum to test any Chancellor's revenue-finding 
b 'l't ,,(193) a 1 1· y. 
As 1935/6 drew to a close it became clear that there 
would be a substantial surplus (which, as in 1933/4, had to 
be alloted to debt redemption), a consequence of revenue 
exceeding the estimates . ( 194 ) It was suggested that, as in 
previous years, the position for the forthcoming year -
estimated in February 1936 as a minimum deficit of £20m -
could be improved by postponing the collection of various 
revenue items, notably the resources of the National Debt 
Com~issioners Death Duty Account, to 1936/7.<195 ) But by 
late February the Treasury were anticipating a deficit (B ) 
c 
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of £27.5m for 1936/7, a deficit calculated on the existing 
basis of taxation and on the assumption of a transfer of 
approximately £10m of non-recurrent receipts. One device 
adopted to minimise the readjustment necessary to ensure 
budgetary equilibrium was the inflating of the revenue 
stimates - Customs and Excise were instructed to increase 
their estimate by £4m, (196 ) and Inland Revenue by £5m, (l9 'l) 
the former department being extremely apprehensive about 
this device.* That such devices had been employed did not 
go unnoticed by the financial press: The Economist commented 
that the revenue estimates were far less cautious than usual, 
1/
Jalthough '~ot excessive, ~~;:~ the major presumption of a 
· continuance of recovery." 
Further taxation, however, was still required to fill 
the gap. Income tax first came under scrutiny, despite 
Fisher's firm belief, expressed in the previous December, 
that nothing should be permitted to constrain as rapid 
rearmament as possible: 
//
The pressing problem is rapid and effective insurance 
in the form of rearmament; this may, with luck, prove 
a reliable deterrent; but if we ourselves jeopardise 
it'Oy antagon1sing our own people at the outset, 
insistence in 1936 on 's.o..und finance..!-ma.;r-cos..:.t_JJ.~L,our 
independence and_.in.u;r;:.e-sa±e-1-y----t·e- the bene·fi t· of Germany 
in the form of sav~ge im.P.o§:i, tions by her. 
Naturally fhe existence of goveTnment indebtedness 
to the tune of £7,000 million is a grave handicap and 
should inculcate prudence; but the supreme interest of 
the stockholders is the !.Etegri ty of the State - not 
merely meaning ther€bj 'sound finance' -but also, and 
much more, in the sense of preservation from 
destruction by external force. 
In all the circumstances, therefore, and particularly 
because of the dangerous ignorance and illusions still 
prevalent in this country, I think it would be most 
unwise to increase taxation next year. (199 V 
* As Webb noted privately, ''This [the revised estimate] 
includes so much 'water' that I think some of the items 
have become silly. But I suppose it is no use protesting." 
(W.V./287, Webb to G. E. P. Murray [Chairman, Board of 
Customs and Excise 1934-40], 3 April 1936. 
Phillips discussed the question in purely economic terms: 
Against an increase of 6d. in income tax 
(i) that the income tax payer who has clearly been 
dAprived already of a 6d. reduction in tax by the 
growth of defence expenditure ought not in pursuit 
of a fetish to have his burden actually increased, 
(ii) that the effect on trade and industry will be 
severe and economic recovery now so promising will 
be finally checked. 
The effect of a high income tax on industrial 
development is in the long run deleterious for the 
reason mainly that new industrial processes and new 
inventions tend to seek out countries where taxation 
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of profits is relatively low. In the short run as 
income tax is charged on profits, there is no economic 
reason why a change of rate should change prices or 
influence markedly the course of trade. The adverse 
result of increasing the tax is a matter of psychology. 
My guess is that in this case the psychological 
reaction might be pretty sharp, but not long lived. 
There might be a pause in industrial recovery for say 
three months, but progress should be resumed there-
after. (2 00) 
Phillips was thus fairly optimistic about trade prospects, 
a view widely held in Whitehall at that time, as seen in 
the Committee on Economic Information's (C.E.I.) 'Economic 
Surveys' and the monthly Board of Trade reports on 'The 
State of Trade'. (2 0l) 
Fisher, however, disagreed and believed that '~he 
psychological effect of an increase of taxation, (and] in 
particular of the Income Tax, might be little short of 
disastrous". (202 ) Even in late March, as the shape of the 
approaching budget began to take form, he felt ·~s strongly 
as ever that an increase of taxation in 1936-7 w[oul)d be 
(203) 
madness". As Permanent Secretary to the Treasury 
Fisher's views obviously carried weight, but on this 
occasion (to be repeated in 1938 and 1939) it was overruled, 
indicating "how l:i.mi ted Fisher's inf J yence Wfl_S, op. the _Eurely 
----- --~--~- ':!""- ----------t £~seal of policy. ,.(2041 
Nor did the Inland Revenue particularly approve of an 
increase in income tax. Thus Forber wrote: 
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Any increase in the standard rate would of course 
not be welcome by industry (and] everything which the 
Chancellor said in 1934, in defending the reduction of 
6d. then given, as something carrying beneficient 
psychological effects not to be found in other taxation 
reliefs, will be used in evidence against any increase. 
It seems to me that if there is a small gap to be 
bridged it would be desirable to do it without recourse 
to a small (and] irritable addition to the Income Tax 
if that is at all possible. (205) 
Unfortunately, the gap was not small, and in late March was 
estimated at approximately £35m.(2 0B) With the writing-up 
of the revenue estimates and the transfer of £4.5m of 
MiscellaneoLlS Revenue to 1936/7 the forecast deficit was 
reduced to £16m,<207 ) but by the time the budget was presented, 
certain rearrangements of the figures had resulted in the 
prospective gap widening to £21.3m. Equilibrium was brought 
about by an increase of 3d. on the standard rate of income 
fax (£12m), an increase in tea duty (£3.5m), a raid on the 
\.. Road Fund (£5 .3m), and minor adjustments totalling £1m (see t\/ (208) ~ Table 5.5 above). No doubt Hopkins provided the final 
justification for the tax increases when he wrote the following, 
a co~nent on the fact that current defence expenditure was 
running at £180m per annum compared with less than £125m in 
the previous year: 
Plainly it would be inadmissible to provide from 
Revenue merely the sums provided in the past: a much 
1 bigger effort must be made. Nor is it sufficient 
that taxpayers should forgo the reliefs which would 
otherwise be available to them: they must consent to 
such further sacrifices as can be borne without 
detriment to our general economy. (209) 
/
The budget thus set the scene 
year. 
for borrowing in the following 
The budget was not well received by the financial press,(2 lO) 
the frustration of those who had anticipated further remission 
of taxation being outweighed by those who feared the adverse 
effects of the budget on the continuance of recovery. In fact, 
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the (apparent) tightening of fiscal stance does not seem to 
have had such adverse effects, for the pace of recovery 
accelerated during 1936-7 as the economy mov~d towards a 
position of 'cyclical' full employment.( 2 ll) 
Expenditure grew faster than planned. Over 1934/5-
1936/7 expenditure (GA) grew by 13.9% while revenue (TA)' 
excluding fiscal window-dressing, also rose but at the lower 
rate of 10.0%. By July 1936 the widening gap between 
expenditure and revenue had grown more visible and 
Chamberlain announced that a deficit in 1936/7 must be 
anticipated(2 l 2 ) since it was expected that defence 
expenditure would exceed planned levels of £178.3m.* The 
budget outturn (B ) for 1936/7 was a deficit of £5.6m and, 
c 
although the Treasury papers are not clear on this point, 
it seems that the expenditure and revenue figures were 
rearranged so that the deficit would be less than sinking 
fund payments.<213 ) 
3. Rearmament and recession 1937-9 
The final phase of budgetary policy was dominated by 
the needs of rearmament: total military outlays rose from 
£265.2m in 1937/8 to £!142m in 1939/40, an increase of 
330.6%, while total central government expenditure (G) only 
increased by 86.5% over the same period (the increase in 
G , which excluded defence borrowing, was much smaller at 
c 
53.1%). Table 5.7 records this increase in expenditure and 
the way in which it was financed, while Table 5.8 summarises 
the main details of the budgets over this period. 
*Ex post defence expenditure in 1936/7 was £186.2m (see 
Table 5. 7). 
Table 5.7 
The financing of defence expenditure 1935/6-1939/40 (£m) 
Defence expenditure Revenue 
Change Change in Total Total Resulting Financed from change 
Defence in all other in central from 
Loans defence items of expend- govern- Change 
Acts, expend- expend- iture ment in 13 ) Disct. iture iture since expend- total 
!"'""' 
1937 Total . financed previous since iture Auto. changes 
and revenue grth. in from prev. (Gc) since 1939 year taxt. 
revn. 
year prev. 
since year 
prev. 
vear 
1935/6 
I 
136.9 I - 136.9 +23.0 +21. 7 +44.7 841.8 +40.2 +45.8 -5.6 
1936/7 186.2 - 186.2 +49.3 +11.1 +60.4 902.2 +51.8 +35.3 +16.5 
1937/8 200.3 64.9 265.2 +14 .1 +3.6 +17.7 919.9 +52.1 +36.9 +15.2 
1938/9 272.1 128.1 400.2 +71.8 +27.2 +99.0 1018.9 +57.5 +27.1 +30.4 
1939/40 (2) (Apri 1 )( 1) 247.8 380.0(2) 628.8 -24.3 +18.0 +6.9 1025.8 +19.8 -4.5 +24.3 (Sept.)l1l . . 502.4 1249(2) . . .. +488.5 1514.3 +52.7 -54.3 +107 .o 
(outturn) 242 491.7{4) 1142(2) -30.1 .. -106.1 1408.2 +126.0 . . . . 
'--
.Sources: Financial Accounts; Financial Statements; Tl71/ 349, 'Review of 1939-40', undated. 
Notes: 1. Budget Estimates. 
Z. Approximate figure. 
3.Automatic growth in revenue plus fiscal window-dressing (which more correctly is a 
discretionary iteml 
4. In addition, £408.5m of the September 1939 Vote of Credit was taken. 
Total 
cent. 
govt. 
revn. 
(Tc) 
844.8 
896.6 
948.7 
1006.2 
1026.0 
1078.7 
1132.2 
Budget 
balance 
(Be) 
+3 .0 
-5.6 
+28.8 
-12.7 
+0.2 
-435 .6 
-276 .o 
~ 
c..o 
~ 
Table 5.8 
Budget summary 1937/8-1939/40: 
p_ublished forecasts and results (£m) 
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1937/8 1938/9 1939/40 
(April) (Sept 
1. Budget balance (Be) 
of previous year 
2. Budget on existing 
basis 
Revenue (Tc) 
Expenditure (Gc) 
Balance(l) 
3. Discretionary changes 
(i) taxation 
first year -
direct 
indirect 
full year -
direct 
indirect 
(ii) economies 
(iii) miscellaneous 
4. Budget Estimates 
Revenue (Tc) 
Expenditure ( Gc) 
Balance (1) 
5. Budget outturn 
Revenue (T c ) . 
Expenditure (Gc) 
Balance (Be) 
6. Planned defence 
borrowing 
-5.6 
923.1 
938.0 
-14.9 
+15.2 
+36. o-41. o<2 > 
938.3 
938.0 
+0.3 
948.7 
919.9 
+28.8 
80.0 
+28.8 -12.7 
994 . 8 1001 . 7 
1024.8 1025.8 
-30.0 -24.1 
+22.3 
+8.1 
+26.5 
+9.0 
+13.3 
+11.0 
+21.5 
+12 .4 
1025 ~2 1026 .o 
102 4 . 8 1 02 5 . 8 
+0.4 +0.2 
1006.2 
1018.9 
-12.7 
90.0 380.0(3) 
SoL~: Financial Accounts; Financial Statements. 
1 As for the period 1933/4-1936/7 no specific 
sum was allocated for debt redemption. 
971. 
1514. 
-542. 
+76 .. 
+30. 
+160. 
+66 .: 
1078 .· 
1514.: 
-435 -~ 
1132.: 
1408.: 
-276 .l 
500.1 
2 Full year yield of National Defence Contribution 
uncertain, but estimated at £2 0-25m. 
3 The Estimates in February 1939 had provided for 
borrowing of £342.5m, but in the Budget it was 
announced that owing to defence acceleration and 
expansion the figure might be expected to rise 
to £380m. 
\ 
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(i) 1937 budget 
Chamberlain had announced in the 1936 budget speech 
that borrowing for defence would be undertaken from 1937/8.< 214 ) 
This departure from strict budgetary orthodoxy had 
implications for the timing and framing of the budget. When 
a balanced budget had been the policy objective, the 
expenditure Estimates had been settled in February and early 
March, while the revenue estimates had not been finally agreed 
until early April, the time remaining before the presentation 
of the budget (usually about 2-3 weeks) being sufficient for 
the Chancellor to decide on any necessary changes in 
taxation. But with unbalanced budgets the situation altered 
somewhat: since the defence Estimates published in early 
March had to show the amount to be borrowed,* the revenue 
estimates also had to be completed by this time, and decisions 
made about new taxation before the close of the old financial 
(215) year. This change undoubtedly made budgetary fore-
casting more hazardous. 
:J~'(c::•: \) 
to borrow £80m in 1937/8, the Treasury felt that taxation 
In the light of the 1936/7 deficit, and the decision 
mus-t--n_Qt on)y be raised but be raised sufficiently to ensure 
an ~ J20St budget surplus (Be). As Hopkins put it: 
/
we want above all to have a Budget surplus to make the 
Defence borrowing look a little more respectable in 
retrospect, and heavy autumn supplementaries to be 
\ met out of Revenue ... if they are not provided for in 
the original Budget. (216) 
The revenue estimates were framed on the general 
assnrnpt:i.on that during 1937/8 "the trade and employment 
curve will continue to rise; that the Coronation will bring 
grist to the Customs and Excise mill; and that the summer 
*As required by the Defence Loans Act, 1937. Changes in 
planned borrowing required Parliamentary approval. 
and winter will be more 'seasonable' than has been the case 
with 1936/7."(217 ) In the circumstances, the assumption 
that recovery would continue was a legitimate expectation, 
although it was not, in fact, to be completely realised 
since recession set in from late 1937.(218 ) 
By mid-February 1937 it had been decided to raise the 
hydrocarbon oil duty and the standard rate of income tax, 
the latter by a further 3d. toSs.* This would reduce the 
expected deficit of £16.6m to a surplus of £0.3m (on the 
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assumption that £80m of defence expenditure was coveared by 
borrowing).( 219 ) At the same time, Chamberlain and Hopkins 
were working on a proposal, originating from the former, (220) 
for reviving the Excess Profits Duty in a revised form. 
This took shape in the form of the National Defence 
(221) Contribution announced in the budget speech. 
Whilst the automatic growth of revenue was insufficient 
to cover the growth of expenditure (even with planned 
borrowing of £80m) and taxes were raised t-G,bring in an 
additirnlal £15.2m, Chamberlain obviously did not announce 
in the budget speech that he expected a substantial surplus 
at the end of the year. The surplus subsequently realised 
- £28.8m with only £64.9m borrowed for defence -was to 
exceed their expectations. How then was the hidden reserve 
created? The surplus resulted from developments on both 
sides of the budget accounts: receipts were £9.5m above 
-----~--
* The Treasury papers throw no light on the reasons for the 
increase in income tax, although there is evidence that 
the Inland Revenue informed the Treasury that the increase 
in standard rate might adversely affect the rate of 
collection of income tax in 1937/8 and thus its ~post 
yield. No accoLmt, however, seems to have been taken of 
this factor when drawing up the estimates (I.R.63/l43, 
Gregg to Hopkins, 19 March 1937). 
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estimates,* largely as a result of the performance of income 
tax; expenditure also gave savings totalling £19m, most 
notably £8.5m on the Vote of the Unemployment Assistance 
Boardo But as Simon stated:** 
The other savings make up a substantial total, but 
they are not individually very large; in some cases 
indeed they represent underspending which will have 
to be made good this year. (222) 
In particular the problem of underspending on rearmament 
was beginning to emerge, reflecting shortages of industrial 
capacity, skilled labour etc. and the government's decision 
(not modified until March 1938) that rearmament orders 
should not impede ordinary trade.< 223 ) Concurrently, the 
Treasury were also deeply perturbed at the rate of growth 
of rearmament (and, to a lesser extent, civil) expenditure, 
and their inability to control it. 
(ii) Rearmament as a budgetary problem 
Economists may assume 'perfect knowledge', and 
historians have hindsight, but Treasury officials 
advising on the balance of risk between military and 
economic weakness had to do so in face of an 
uncertain and unpredictable future. The Treasury's 
attempts to limit defence expenditure are only 
explicable if seen in their historical context. 
Apart from uncertainty as to where the balance of 
risk lay, estimates of the money available for 
defence varied with the fortunes of the economy, 
public opinion (and therefore the willingness of 
the taxpayer to contribute to his own defence) and 
with the ability of the Government to raise loans. 
The balance between military and economic priorities 
-------------
* In 1936/7 all three main direct taxes had fallen short of 
the estimates, which seemed to support the view that they 
had been framed on a far less conservative basis than was 
usual (The Economist, Budget Supplement, 10 April 1937, 
p .1). The Treas,ury must have been anxious to avoid a 
repetition of this, and the conservative framing of the 
estimates in 1937/8 was thus able to serve a dual purpose. 
**Baldwin retired on 28 May 1937; Chamberlain became 
Prime Minister; and Sir John Simon, Chancellor. 
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moved from a position in 1932, when defence expenditure 
was entirely subordinated to the economic situation, 
to the summer of 1939, when priority for defence was 
such that the Treasury had to advise the Government 
that quasi-wartime controls over the economy would be 
required to maintain current defence expenditure after 
the autumn of that year. (224) 
In this section we briefly discuss some of the factors which 
determined this 'balance of risks'. 
The financial and economic limits to rearmament received 
detailed consideration in Inskip's* December 1937 interim 
report to the Cabinet on the status of the defence 
(225) programmes. It was first stressed that: 
the fact that the problem is considered in terms of 
money, must not be allowed to obscure the fact that 
our real resources consist not of money ... but of 
our manpower, and productive capacity, our power to 
maintain our credit, and the general balance of our 
trade. 
The latter, in particular, was seen as of central importance, 
as being "closely connected with our credit": 
The amount of money which we can borrow without 
inflation is mainly dependent upon two factors: the 
savings of the country as a whole which are available 
for investment, and the maintenance of confidence in 
our financial stability. But these savings would be 
reduced and confidence would at once be weakened by 
any substantial disturbance of the general balance of 
trade. 
Finally, the report closed with a classic statement of 
finance as the 'fourth arm in defence': 
his country cannot hope to win a war against a major 
Power by a sudden knock-out blow: on the contrary, 
for success we must contemplate a long war, in the 
course of which we should have to mobilise all our 
resources and those of the Dominions and other 
countries overseas ... We must therefore confront 
our potential enemies with the risks of a long war, 
which they cannot face. If we are to emerge victorious 
,from such a war, it is essential that we should enter 
1\it with sufficient economic strength to enable us to 
make the fullest use of resources overseas, and to 
~ithstand the strain. 
* Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister for Co-ordination of Defence 
(March 1936- January 1939). 
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While, therefore, it is true that the extent of 
our resources imposes limitations upon the size of the 
defence programmes which we are able to undertake, this 
is only one aspect of the matter. Seen in its true 
perspective, the maintenance of our economic stability 
would more accurately be described as an essential 
element in our defensive strength: one which can 
properly be regarded as a fourth arm in defence, 
alongside the three Defence services, without which 
purely military effort would be of no avail. 
This document clearly expresses the essential reasons under-
lying the financial constraints impos~~ upo~ th~~!~~~th of 
rEt:~}·m~me_!l_t ___ expendi t ure; it puts into perspective the 
Treasury's refusal to accommodate the insistent demands by 
the defence departments for greater expenditure; and shows 
as misfounded the accusation, made at the beginning of the 
war and repeatedly thereafter, that Treasury control of 
expenditure had dangerously prejudiced military preparations 
for war. 
·~~---- ---
For analytical purposes we may separate the motives 
J:
or con trolling rear~ament expenditure into three classes : 
'/ ?/ v 
conomic, political, and strategic: 
(1) economic: rearmament was constrained by the availability 
of financial and real resources; throughout the period 
1937-9 the authorities attempted to strike a balance between 
increased taxation and borrowing, the former being increased 
to that level which was considered just compatible with a 
\continuance of trade recovery, the latter being determined 
fl 
~Y the twin objectives of preventing inflation or a hardening 
\of interest rates. The constraints imposed by the availability 
: 
tof real resources were considered to be of equal importance: 
( 
agg:Jtega te government exp~ndi-;~~~:- .a-~~. it: ~:~~o~ents, was 
planned with the specific intention of preventing an 
exacerbation of the already existing supply constraints, 
in particular the shortages of skilled labour and productive 
\ 
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capacity in the capital goods industries. A connected 
problem was the deteriorating current account of the balance 
of payments,* a problem first brought to the Cabinet's 
attention in late 1936;(226 ) and one which was a partial 
reflection of the adverse effects of rearmament: either 
directly, by the redirection of exports to the home market 
and the high import content of rearmament expenditures,<227 ) 
or indirectly, by the increase in export prices. 
(2) political: in essence the question here was to make 
decisions about the relative magnitudes of the military and 
civil components of total government expenditure, a decision 
to increase military outlays meaning that either total 
expenditure had to be raised or civil outlays constrained. 
Such a choice had a political dimension. _ h~lff,-L 
---(3) ;?trat~: the control of expenditure assumed a 
strategic dimension by virtue of the fact that with limited 
total resources available, the object of control was to 
ensure that essential programmes "received due priority, 
and . . . less important proposals were not allowed to clog 
the programme."(228 ) 
The problem facing the.Treasury was its: 
increasing inability to challenge the programs of the 
services on te@~~~ds, because of the 
escalating techno · c~pertise required to 
evaluate those programs, and the services' monopoly 
of that expertise. (229) 
Br:i.dges** put the problem in the following terms: 
* Between 1935-7 the current balance deteriorated from a 
surplus of £23m to a deficit of £47m, a change of 1.4 
percentage points of GDP; a deterioration which 
primarily reflected the slow growth of exports (2%) as 
compared with imports (6.2%) (calculated from Feinstein 
1972: Tables 3, 5, 15). 
** E. E. Bridges, Principal Assistant Secretary, Treasury 
1936-8; Secretary to Cabinet 1938-46; Permanent 
Secretary, Treasury 1946-56. 
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Our only effective weapon [against the rapidly 
increasing defence Estimates] is to take the line 
that there is not more than a certain amount of money 
available. 
(U]nless we act firmly on these lines ... we shall find 
that Defence expenditure will overwhelm us. Every day 
I find further evidence of the continuing growth of 
defence expenditure on objects we cannot possibly 
prove to be unnecessary. There is only one answer: 
to say that there is a given sum of money available 
and no more. (23 0) 
Accordingly, various schemes of rationing were employed to 
ensure that rearmament expenditure did not grow more than 
was compatible with the achievement of the government's 
other objectives. 
A major of the 1938 
budget was the amount that could be borrowed in 1938/9. 
Whilst borrowing had been agreed in principle in late 1935, 
it was not until 11 February 1937, when the Defence Loans 
Bill was introduced, that firm proposals were communicated 
to the public. (231 ) The Bill was passed on 19 Ma*' and 
an issue of £100m 2~% National Defence Bonds 1944/48 was 
made shortly after the budget. The issue was badly planned, 
"a flop of the first magnitude!'( 232 ) It has been estimated 
that the Public Departments were forced to take up at least 
£90m of the loan; and its failure was "the result of 
attempting to borrow such a large sum from general investors 
at the time when the boom was nearing its peak, security 
markets were jittery, and the banks were heavy sellers of 
' b d " (233) on s . The failure of this loan must have done much 
to reinforce the view held within the Treasury that it wa.s 
extremely diff:!:~Y.l.t~~t.o-~r-a4-s·e----.J..ne~w-'~fY!!<!S, as opposed to 
'---~-__......~ -----i.--"- ,..~-"~~ .. ..__~~~~--:-' 
the issue of securiJJ~s .. -£e":r-~eonversj.on operations. More-
over, it was to lead to some revision of the -attitude 
--~------------------....... 201 
towards borrowing for rearmament. As Inskip's interim 
report of December 1937 stated: 
~he present position in regard to borrowing is now ore difficult than in the Spring. If it were decided hat it was necessary to spend substantially more han £1,500 millions on defence over this period of years, it would probably be found necessary that the 
excess should be found by an increase in the level of 
taxation, rather than by increasing the total sum 
made available for defence from borrowed money above 
£400 millions. (234) 
Despite the review of the whole defence programme 
undertaken in the autumn of 1937 the rate of growth of 
defence expenditure was to accelerate significantly. Even 
when the Estimates for 1938 had been pared,* the anticipated 
rise between 1937/8 and 1938/9 was 23:4% (the actual rise was 
to be much greater, some 50.9%, as rearmament was accelerated 
following the Anschluss and Munich crisis).** 
One response to this situation was to call for a halt 
to the onward march of civil expenditure. Thus the Treasury 
applied pressure to the Civil Departments while,*** on the 
wider political front, Chamberlain made speeches stressing 
(23 ')) the need for economy. ' This marked an important change 
in policy, for in 1934 Chatfield's suggestion that civil 
expenditure should be curtailed,**** to enable a greater 
defence effort, had been dismissed out of hand as politically 
----------------
* Draft Estimates of £357.6m were reduced to an agreed 
£343.3m (Tl71/340, Bridges, 'Draft Note for the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to send to the Prime 
Minister', 14 Jan. 1938. 
** Calculated from the following figures of defence 
expenditure (£m): 
*** 
~L~stimate 
1937/8 278.3 
1938/9 343.3 
(Source: Financial Statements; 
The proposal to curtail public 
expenditure was also receiving 
Budget outturn 
265.2 
400.2 
Financial Accounts). 
authorities' capital 
active consideration. 
**** Sir Ernie (later Lord) Chatfield, First Sea Lord 
(January 1933- August 1938); Minister for Co-ordination 
of Defence (January 1939- April 1940). 
I 
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unrealistic.<236 ) Nevertheless, there was (even in late 
1937) still no real attempt to come to terms with the 
essential problem: 
we are attempting to combine an unprecedented effort 
in defence with the maintenance and increase of the 
standard of life and of contentment of the people, 
\and while that is so we have just to be carried along 
'with the current, and heroic measures of economy 
involving reversals of policy appear to be impossible.* 
The budgetary problem, however, as viewed by the Treasury, 
had also begun to change in late 1937. As Hopkins expressed 
it when commenting on the draft 1938 Estimates: 
I do not think that these figures afford ground 
for special apprehension in connection with the forth-
coming Budget. It is true that apart from this 
increase in civil expenditure there will be an enormous 
increase in the cost of defence. But next year we shall 
have the yield of the N.D.C. and the very materially 
higher level of revenue arising inter·aiia from the 
income tax on the high profits of this --yei"r, and we 
have a considerable elasticity of choice as to the 
portion of the total borrowable sum of £400 millions 
which we borrow next year. Moreover, the current year 
will probably show a substantial surplus. 
My concern is really different. So long as 
revenue is rising and unemployment is sinking and we 
can borrow what in reason we please, the real Budget 
problem is pushed to the background. But in four 
1 ears borrowing powers will have lapsed, and one day 
\ 1(whether before or after that time) revenue will be 
;I ailing, not rising, and unemployment will be rising, 
ot falling. Then will come the day of reckoning. (237) 
Increasingly during 1937-8 the Treasury referred to the 
danger of a severe slump after 1941/2 (the ending of the 
rearmament programme) which would make it difficult to bear I' 
the maintenance costs, assuming an end to borrowing, of the 
(238) greatly enlarged defence forces. These forecasts may 
* Tl71/340, Hopkins, 'Civil Estimates, 1938/9', 15 Dec. 
1937. Phillips commented on the rise in civil expenditure 
as follows: "The 1930-37 rise took place despite (a) May 
C(ommittee] and such like, (b) a falling cost of living -
it was 171 in 1930 and went down heavily for a long time 
though rising a bit towards the end, (c) a reduction of 
unemployment at the end to 1! millions, which is probably 
a normal figure (some 800,000 being the absolute minimum 
in the wildest boom). The next five years will show a 
rising cost of living and no drastic economies: a very 
small advance all round for cost of living on salaries and 
social services means a great deal of money." (Tl61/783/ 
8.48431/3, Note by Phillips, 29 Oct. 1937). 
\ 
' 
not have been unduly pessimistic, given the severity of 
the 1937-8 recession and the fact that the subsequent 
recovery was largely a result of expansionary fiscal 
operations;(239 ) in addition, however, these forecasts 
were also a political tactic employed to limit the growth 
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of current expenditure by stressing that future funds would 
be extremely limited. 
The second major factor influencing the 1938 budget was 
the expected level of economic activity. The upper turning-
point had been reached in 1937 III; there then occurred a 
short period of marking time followed by a downturn more 
severe than that of 1929-30. The revenue returns throughout 
the final two quarters of 1937/8 remained favourable - even 
Customs and Excise duties which would respond first to 
recession; indeed, the main duties were to exceed their 
estimates.<240) Nevertheless, as Webb informed the Treasury 
early in the final quarter of the year: 
It is, of course, extremely difficult to estimate 
for next year in the midst of conflicting opinions 
about the general trade position. We are told in 
public speeches that there is no ground for any 
'recession' -while the American situation and our 
own unemployment figures seem to belie them! (241) 
Webb met Phillips shortly afterwards and recorded that: 
The Treasury view about the outlook in trade and 
industry ... is that 1938 might be 'about level with' 
1937; the same may be said for 1939; and by 1941 or 
1942 there may be a slump ... 
This represents a rather drastic check on the 
curve of prosperity, but in face of the unemployment 
figures, the hesitation in many industries about the 
future, the fall in prices, and the setback in 
America which, if prolonged, must react on us, this 
view would seem to be no more than caution would 
dictate. (242) 
The buoyancy of revenue and the low level of unemploy-
ment (at least for the greater part of the year) led to a 
surplus in 1937/8 much greater than anticipated. In early 
January 1938 a surplus of approximately £20m was being 
forecast, a source of some disquiet for the Treasury since 
it would "be a good deal criticised as bad estimating" 
whilst it would also create corresponding problems for 
1938/9 when budgetary stability was problematical.<243 ) 
In mid-February it was estimated that £231.3m would 
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be available out of revenue for defence in 1938/9 compared 
~ with £198.3m in 1937/8, an increase of some £33m. Phillips 
believed this to be a very disappointing result: 
(i) we have not kept pace with the growth in the 
Defence charge, the gross expenditure on Defence is 
estimated at £343 mill.ions, an increase of not £33 
millions but nearly £65 millions over last year's 
estimate, and (ii) while the revenue estimates are 
up by £54 millions the amount available for defence 
is only £33 millions up. 
The latter result is even worse than it looks 
for in fact the 1937/8 estimate with which comparison 
is made proved to be too high:• 
Non Defence Expenditure 
Budget estimates 1937/8 
Budget actual result 1937/8 
Budget estimate 1938/9 
664,580,000 
646,000,000 
685 '857 ,000 
The present estimates are inspired by mild optimism. 
Things may easily turn out worse in fact, for it has 
not been assumed in the figures that there will be 
any serious spread or aggravation of the present set-
back to industry. The Inland Revenue estimates seem 
to be optimistic . . . There is nothing to be done by 
juggling with the figures. (244) 
Once again, therefore, the growth of civil expenditure was 
becoming incompatible with the successful execution of the 
rearmament programme. The problem for the Government was I 
to reconcile the demands for economy, to enable rearmament 
to proceed at a faster rate, ( 245 ) with the natural demands 
for increased expenditure on unemployment as recession 
deepened . (246 ) 
A month later increased taxation was again in prospect. 
With the defence Estimates at £343m and (on the existing 
basis) only £231m available out of revenue, a gap of £112m 
had to be filled from borrowing and additional taxation. 
In expounding the case for increased taxation Simon drew 
upon three arguments. Firstly, since 'The year before a 
General Election (was] the worst year to choose for 
beginning increased taxation", an increase in the current 
year meant that it was "more likely that (they) could 
escape yet further taxation in 1939-40", with consequent 
political advantages. Secondly, 
Further taxation imposed now might possibly drive 
into the heads of the spending Departments the idea 
that bigger and better ships and guns, lavishly 
estimated and impetuously demanded, are not an unmixed 
blessing, and that we really are at our wits' end to 
pay for them. On the other hand, after all our 
Treasury protests, a comparatively 'popular' Budget 
may only encourage the spending Departments to believe 
that there is plenty of money left. 
Finally, a decision to finance the .de.fJ..cLts __ af ___ l~3.~/~ __ an_d. 
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1939/ 4<? who-1-1-y---hy.-.....bg;rq--ewi.O.Jt. 'Yo Lll~,, apart from technical 
difficulties, leave only £69m of the original £400m of 
borrowings available for 1940/1 and 1941/2, a wholly 
inadequate provision. 
~-~ 
I /-~ 
Against an~c~in taxation: 
1. [one case would run]- Y~ ~:ve a surplus of £25 
millions; only £70 millions of the loan money has 
been expended; you recognise that you must use 
borrowed money to the tune of £80 millions; is your 
objection to using £112 millions of borrowed money 
sufficient to justify this most unpleasant and 
unexpected shock? 
2 .... further taxation is not generally expected. 
3. It no doubt is possible, and indeed comparatively 
easy, to get through this year without further 
taxation and taken by itself the course would be 
justified; it is because we have such anxieties over 
the necessarily uncertain future that we hesitate to 
take the easier course. But it is possible that the 
future will not be guite so difficult as we fear. 
[Increased taxation might) administer such a shock 
o business confidence, which is always based on short 
iews, that the recession which may be on its way will 
e magnified. 
5. how is one to evaluate and put into the scale 
t e prospect of political improvement and an easing of 
the tension? I think, however, that if this blessing 
did arrive, it would not make increased taxation at 
present look foolish and might indeed be the occasion 
for a very welcome reduction. (247) 
/ 
~ The decision to raise the income tax was taken around 
~ 16-17 March. Hopkins believed that: 
-----It would ... be entirely premature to increase the 
borrowing powers, and this prematurity would in my 
·udgement greatly increase the impairment of 
Government credit which any great increase in the 
orrowing powers must entail. (248) 
Concern was also voiced about the effects of accelerating 
the rearmament programme because it would inevitably 
require the withdrawal of skilled labour from private 
industry, thus constraining 'ordinary trade', although 
~ 
Hopkins believed that it would not have an adverse effect 
on the 1938/9 revenue receipts.<249 ) Furthermore: 
There is now an opportunity of uniting the nation in 
support of any effort the Government may decide to be 
necessary. Opportunities should occur, if they are 
waited for and rightly used, to raise money both by 
taxation and maybe by borrowing in quantities greater 
than until recently seemed possible without grave 
impairment of our economic resources ... As I see 
it the Budget as now settled is on the whole adequate 
for present needs and sufficiently forthright for the 
temper of the people. I doubt if Government credit 
would at the present time stand up against severer 
proposals. We should, I suggest, stand upon the 
programme as settled and give financial circles time 
to recover their breath after the political and 
general alarms to which they are now givi~g way 
rather than think of a more rigorous programme. Any 
less rigorous one is clearly unthinkable. (250) 
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Having settled the budget in outline, two factors then 
intervened to complicate the situation: (1) the inadequacy 
of current Fixed Debt Charge (F.D.C.) payments; and (2) 
a Customs agreement with Eire which adversely affected the 
revenue~ 
The F.D.C. had been set at £224m in 1933/4, it being 
considered that this was adequate not only to provide for 
all interest and management charges but also for the 
statutory sinking funds and a small margin for debt 
redemption. As 1937/8 drew to a close, however, it became 
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clear that there would be insufficient funds to cover the 
statutory sinking funds. Since the surplus for 1937/8 on 
the budget was likely to be "uncomfortably large" there 
would be no necessity to cover that deficiency; the real 
problem was 1938/9 and thereafter.<251 ) It was agreed that 
provision for the F .D.C. should be increased to £230m, for 
otherwise they would not be "providing honestly from the 
Budget for debt interest and management, leaving debt 
redemption out of account altogether." It was also justified 
on other, more important, grounds: 
Parliament, the Cabinet and the spending 
Departments have been warned time and time again of the 
ominous threat to future Budgets which has been con-
cealed for so long by the fixing of the debt charge at 
a total of £224 millions, a figure only possible under 
quite temporary and abnormal circumstances. No one will 
pay any attention to these warnings until the figure is 
visibly moved up. (252) 
The completion of negotiations with Eire over tariff 
levels,* and the signing of an agreement on 25 April 1938, 
entailed a loss of current revenue amounting to £4m in 
1938/9 but also a non-recurrent capital gain of £10m. 
Unfortunately the latter could not be used to offset the 
former: "the indecency of treating any part of this sum as 
revenue would be so great as to rule that course right 
t "(253) ou . 
Furthermore, while it had been agreed to raise the 
standard rate of income tax (first year yield £28m, full 
year £32m), Simon was anxious that some concessions should 
'~e devised in order to mitigate, for some class[es] of 
taxpayer, the full rigors of the increase", although they 
should "be more of a gesture than anything else. "( 254 ) 
Accordingly, it was agreed to raise wear and tear allowances, 
*Trade agreements were also being negotiated with the U~S., 
Switzerland, and India, which would cost a further £2.5m 
(W.V./307, 'Budget Brief, 1938. Second and Final Edition', 
26 April 1938, p.4). 
208 
and maintain the existing level of earned income reliefs for 
(255) 
smaller taxpayers. With increases in tea and petrol 
duty, the budget was forecast to balance with a small 
surplus, that is excluding the planned defence borrowing 
of £90m.* 
What policy underlay the budget? Since Chamberlain 
had introduced the Defence Loans Bill there had been 
criticism that no statement had been made outlining the 
criteria used for deciding on the balance between additional 
taxation and borrowing.< 256 ) When framing the 1938 budget 
there had been no discussion of whether savings were 
adeq Lta te to meet planned borrowing. Rather, the Treasury 
had viewed the question from the perspective that only if 
taxation were increased would investors be forthcoming for 
government bond issues. As one contemporary put it, the 
budget '~ontrived to combine extensive borrowing with an 
impression of draconian orthodoxy."(257 ) 
(iv) 1939 budget 
Writing in early July 1938 Hopkins admitted that the 
1938/9 budget had been "drawn pretty tight", and that while, 
'--------------- --
within certain limits, defence Supplementaries could be met 
from bpJ:rowing, the "general course of trade and profits 
~ '. ---·. -
since the t~m~ ~he~ th~ Bu~get was prepared is_8~very 
inspiring and at present the_ Budget looks_ mo;r::-e _l.i.k~L_e..nd;ing 
in a deficit than in a surplus."(258 ) Deepening recession, 
\ as rearmament orders failed fully to compensate for the 
~~ecline in private sector demand, was to give a £12.7m 
deficit (Be) in 1938/9 or £137.2m (B) when account is taken 
of defence borrowing. 
* Provision was also made to cover further defence 
Supplementaries that year out of borrowed funds (335, 
H.C. Deb. 5s., 26 April 1938, col.61). 
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In order to maximise the amount of defence expenditure 
that could be financed from taxation further efforts were 
made to curtail the growth of civil expenditure. In June 
1938 Hopkins,* perturbed at the growth of total expenditure, 
recommended that Simon stress the urgency of economy upon 
the Cabinet. ( 259 ) Thus a month later Simon told the Cabinet: 
It was clear that we could not continue indefinitely 
to borrow for defence. It followed that we could 
maintain our financial stability only in one or other 
of the following ways: 
First, that we should obtain an increase in the yield 
from taxation on the existing basis, and no one could 
reckon on this happening. 
Secondly, that we should obtain additional revenue by 
an increase in the rate of taxation, or by putting on 
new taxes. 
Thirdly, that we should reduce Civil Expenditure. 
He was deeply concerned lest our finances should 
become unmanageable as a result of the growth of 
expenditure. 
He suggested that, when proposals for new expenditure 
were submitted, they should be considered from the 
point of view that another £25 millions represented 
6d. on the income tax. 
) Simon asked that the Cabinet stress the gravity of the 
situation to their departments, while Chamberlain suggested 
that serious thought should be given to actual reductions 
in civil expenditure.<260) 
The attack on civil expenditure was renewed in January 
1939. After some delay in collecting the necessary 
information, Hopkins in late March 1939 completed a 
memorandum on curtailing civil expenditure which he wanted 
Simon to circulate to the Cabinet at its meeting before the 
discussion of the budget proposals: "It seems to me to 
make a pretty good preliminary atmosphere for that 
/ function.''( 2 Gl) Simon agreed,<262 ) but although the paper 
* Hopkins noted that the growth of civil expenditure was 
itself sufficient to require a 3d. or 4d. increase in the 
standard rate of income tax in 1939/40. Amongst the 
economies being actively considered at that time were the 
lapsing of the Special Areas legislation, and curtailing 
road expenditure. 
\ 
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was circulated to the Cabinet for its budget meeting there 
is no record of its having been discussed. (263) 
A month later, however, Simon was impressing upon the 
Cabinet the view that: 
We must face hard facts. We cannot finance our-
selves by inflationary methods which, if they gave 
relief for a certain period to an embarrassed 
Exchequer, would be followed with certainty by a 
collapse in the purchasing power of our currency, so 
that the loans we could raise would represent little 
in buying power. We cannot continue to lose gold in 
great quantities indefinitely or we shall find our-
selves in a position when we should be unable to wage 
any war other than a brief one. There is a limit to 
the rate at which we can raise money, and that limit, 
to the best of my judgement, is already reached. We 
can go on for another six or nine months if there are 
no further additions or accelerations, but thereafter, 
unless something unexpectedly favourable happens, it 
may well be that the present rate could not be 
maintained. (264) 
At its meeting of 23 May, Cabinet approved Simon's paper and 
the suggestion that thenceforth financial control should be 
tightened . (265 ) 
By December 1938, as it became clear that revenue and 
expenditure would both fail to meet the estimates and that 
a deficit (B ) was in prospect for 1938/9, Phillips was 
c 
urging: "It is most important that we should not have a 
formal deficit for two years running and we ought to have 
a good margin therefore" in 1939/40. On present estimates, 
the 1939/40 budget would provide £232.5m out of revenue for 
defence, yet the annual maintenance costs of the services 
would be approximately £300m once the rearmament programme 
was completed, a gap of £70m which had to be met "or go 
bankrupt as a nation": 
I can see no prospect of obtaining any such sum except 
by further very heavy taxation of profits and by the 
imposition of a substantial turnover tax. The effect 
of such additional taxation on the scale required would 
be to depress general trade and in particular to reduce 
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the yield of the income tax and surtax. Nor is it 
quite the type of taxation which is suitable in present 
circumstances. 
At this point it would be well to consider what 
are the dangers we are running from our policy, now 
to be extended, of borrowing large sums for defence. 
It is commonly said that this means all round inflation 
and imperils the exchange value of the pound. The 
second of these statements is true but not the first. 
l 
There is not in fact grave danger of inflation until 
we shall be much nearer than at present to a state of 
full employment. 'Inflation' is a thing which is 
. inconsistent with the existence of 1,800,000 unemployed. 
-{::? But the danger to the pound is real. We are 
borrowing great sums and shall borrow more, to be spent 
largely on wage payments and increased profits to 
people who make munitions and aeroplanes. If the sums 
so disbursed are spent by the recipients on grouse 
moors and holidays at Blackpo'ol or even on Scotch 
whisky or English beer no great harm is done to the £. 
But we know that a substantial part will on the contrary 
be spent on increased imports, largely of a luxury type, 
from abroad, and that is where the danger lies. 
(Emphasis Added] 
Since it would be impracticable to raise an extra £70m 
immediately, Phillips believed that only £20m should be 
raised initially, the extra taxation being: 
(
applied where it is likely to help the other objective 
of strengthening the £. The obvious places to explore 
are such matters as increased h.p. duty on motors and 
increased duties on all foreign goods of a luxury 
type, wherever our commercial (agreements] leave us 
free. We shall of course be met by the type of 
argument that has been used in the past, for instance 
that a higher duty on tobacco would not produce any 
more money because manufacturers would put less 
tobacco in each cigarette. But these arguments are 
no longer valid, it seems to me, even if they ever 
were. Either an increased duty will produce more 
revenue, or it will check consumption and so reduce 
imports, or it will do a bit of one and a bit of the 
other. Any of these results would be to the good.* 
\ From these tentative suggestions were to follow the 
I first attempts actively to manage demand - in a Keynesian 
I sense - using the budget as an instrument of economic policy. 
- ~---
----
By the time of the April 1939 budget the Treasury was 
awaiting the achievement of full employment - induced by 
* Tl71/341, Phillips to Hopkins, 15 Dec. 1938; see also 
Hopkins to Fisher and Simon, 25 Jan. 1939. The proposal 
to increase the horse power duty on motor vehicles had 
first been suggested by the Committee on Economic 
Information (see p. 216 below). 
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the greatly expanded military outlays - for only then could 
taxation be significantly increased. Full employment, with 
its accompanying higher level of savings, would also permit 
greater borrowings from the non-banking sector.<266 ) These 
were important changes in fiscal policy; they were, however, 
' partially (and deliberately) obscured from public view as 
j the Treasury sought to maintain t~~--!:~J?~~ran~e of orthodoxy. 
j As with earlier periods, the objective at this time was to 
maintain confidence. The Treasury felt that the size of 
borrowing in 1939/40 was such that it could only be financed, 
without inflation, by raising aggregate demand; and while 
defence expenditure would, ceteris paribus, ensure this end, 
a collapse of confidence with its consequent adverse effect 
on private sector demand would jeopardise this increase and 
therefore the increase in current savings felt to be 
(267) 
necessary. The question of confidence thus assumed a 
new meaning. 
---In the months preceding the budget debate took place 
within the Treasury over the form of the required addition 
to taxation. From early 1939 Fisher took the view: 
To introduce a new and more realistic psychology, 
as well as an adaption of our 'economy' to the grim 
realities of today, I would: 
(1) deal effectively in the tax sphere with profiteering 
and if necessary make it a crime; 
(2) steepen considerably the super-tax; 
(3) make the standard Income Tax 6/- in the £, offset 
by improved allowances, especially the personal 
allowance; 
(4) increase the duties on tea, sugar, beer (and other 
alcohol), and tobacco; 
(5) use our protective system to hit luxuries ... with 
great severity. (268) 
By mid-February it had been decided that additional taxation 
\was to be '~n the nature of a gesture rather than a 
~substantial contribution to fill the gap", and it had been 
agreed (not only within the Treasury, but also by Chamberlain) 
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that the tobacco and motor vehicle duties, and surtax should 
be increase~, giving in total an additional £15m in 1939/40.<269 ) 
A month later, however, Hopkins felt that this was 
insufficient : 
In the face of recent German actions, can the 
Chancellor go to the House with so small a programme? 
Equally, can he announce still greater expenditure 
within the year on defence (as must undoubtedly be 
necessary) without making any provision at all out of 
Revenue for the increase? 
I feel disposed to recommend that the new taxation 
should be ... £m30 in the first year rather than 
£ml5, (and) that the extra £ml5 sh[oulJd be used as a 
supplementary margin for additional defence estimates. 
Hopkins suggested that this additional revenue should be 
obtained from the sugar and estate duties: he firmly 
opposed increases in either income tax or N.D.C. ·~n the 
present state of trade''.<270) Simon discussed the question 
with Hopkins and Phillips, both of whom concurred with 
Simon's view (as expressed in a letter to Horace Wilson) 
that: 
any effective step which would bring the spending 
Departments to face the appalling consequences of 
continuedmcreases in outlay would be very valuable 
But would another 6d. on the Income Tax produce 
this revolution of feeling in the spending Departments. 
I put 6d. on last year, and it did not produce the 
effect we anticipated. Much as I need an ally in 
trying to curb expenditure, I doubt very much whether 
this expenditure at this moment would operate as 
powerfully as you were inclined to think. 
([Th~-~sychological effect of an increase] might be 
very damaging. The announcement I made in February 
that I proposed to raise from revenue towards the 
£580 millions bill for defence not more than £230 
millions from taxes has undoubtedly been a most 
material contribution to the measure of recovery that 
has taken place since. I must as you know get more 
from taxes since the Defence bill is bigger still but 
my advisers here and I are greatly concerned at what 
would be the ~ffect of a further rise in the Income 
Tax rate. 
I have come to the conclusion that the 
economic reasons against an increase in the standard 
rate this year are too strong to be ignored. (271) 
Simon later justified the budgetary strategy as follows: 
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to choose a middle course between so severe an increase 
of taxation as would have crippled industry and 
destroyed confidence and, on the other hand, so 
exaggerated a recourse to borrowing as would have over-
strained our resources and dried up our reserves. The 
situation with which we had to deal could not have been 
solely met either by taxation or by loan, and to steer 
a course between the two was not only right but 
necessary . 
.. . even if it had been possible to cover the 
whole cost of rearmament by current taxation, this 
would have caused a tremendous dislocation of business 
in all directions, to say nothing of the over-whelming 
strain of so vast a burden suddenly imposed on the 
taxpayer. Borrowing, therefore, of a substantial 
amount was justified to enable the country to adjust 
itself more easily to the sudden increase in armament 
production. Rearmament must have priority, but, 
subject to this condition being satisfied, he stood 
for the view that the less normal economic arrangements 
were dislocated the better for the present and the 
future. (272) 
B:y~ the time the (April) budget was presented the defence 
Estimates had risen from £580m to £630m. With available 
revenue at £223.5m it was decided to borrow £380m (compared 
with £128.lm in 1938/9) and to raise an additional £24.3m 
from taxation, comprising motor vehicle duties (£6.3m), 
surtax (£4m), estate duty (£3m), tobacco (£7m), and sugar 
(£4m).<273 ) The increase in taxation was less than in the 
previous year, while total revenue was only providing 
£247.8m for defence in 1939/40 as compared with £272.lm in 
1938/9 (see Table 5.7). 
The Treasury's difficulties of 1938-9, those posed by 
the twilight between peace and war finance, were political 
as well as economic in character. The management of the 
proto-war economy, in particular the suppression of the 
inflationary pressures generated by the rearmament programme, 
ultimately could only be exercised with the full range of 
controls available, and politically acceptable, in war time.* 
*This point is particularly applicable to the government's 
wish, as early as 1938, to exercise controls over labour 
and the munitions industries (see Parker 1957: ch. III). 
ll' ; 
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Thus certain constraints were placed upon fiscal policy 
prior to the outbreak of war. Nevertheless, policy was not 
unsuccessful in this final phase. On the one hand, the 
Treasury recognised that since the effects of the rearmament 
programme on domestic demand were slow to appear, heavy 
\ increases in direct taxation were to be avoided in the 
initial stages of the programme; on the other hand, that 
confidence had to be maintained and the policy of extensive 
borrowing should, to some extent, be masked by the appearance 
of financial orthodoxy. Moreover, strictly financial issues! 
( 
were beginning to become subordinated to the problem of the 
a vailabi li ty of productive resources . Thus Phillips noted 
that the success of the rearmament programme: 
clearly depends on our ability to secure the fairly 
rapid passing into employment of unused labour 
resources and to increase the national income, and 
thus the yield of taxation. Nothing could be more 
absurd than deflationary tactics at this juncture 
merely from the fear that later on we may have to 
struggle against inflation. 
our position is that we have not yet got out of the 
depression, and to be frightened of inflation with 
unemployment as heavy as it· is is absurd. 
[The) essential point is that if and when we reach 
a stage of full employment and prices continue to 
rise without more labour being absorbed into work 
we must be ready to revert to all the usual controls, 
including heavier taxation, heavier customs duties, 
higher bank rate, a strong loan policy, reduction in 
floating debt and so on. There are two fallacies to 
be avoided here. First it may be argued that if 
inflation threatens we ought to take precautions ~· 
But if so we shall never get the unemployed to work, 
which is a condition for success in rearmament. The 
second fallacy is that it is inconsistent to aim 
consciously at a state of fuller employment having 
the intention if the plan comes off of imposing 
financial checks which would bring back unemploy~ent. 
But once full employment has been reached, the country 
can very well stand increased financial pressure 
without going back to a state of unemployment, and 
there will be no reversion to deflation unless the 
monetary authorities are ignorant of their job. (274) 
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4. Conclusions 
A few preliminary conclusions can now be drawn. A more 
complete analysis must await discussions of the effects of 
fiscal operations and the public works issue; these are 
considered in the two following chapters. 
We have seen that from 1937 onwards rearmament 
necessitated large scale borrowing and a relaxation of the 1 
strict tenets of financial control; that the Treasury 
recognised that rearmament orders were stimulating employ-
ment; and that the budget was being used as an instrument 
to manage demand by the eve of the Second World War.* 
That there were changes in budgetary policy over this 
period is not a matter of dispute. (275) The question at 
issue is the form of these changes and the underlying 
principles which guided them. In a later chapter it is 
shown that the Treasury's moves towards conscious economic 
management were less the result of deep-seated changes in 
its theoretical thinking, and rather more a pragmatic 
response to the political and economic problems generated 
by rearmament. (276 ) 
Furthermore, the rearmament phase saw but a temporary 
lapse from orthodoxy. The partial financing of rearmament 
by borrowing after 1937 was accompanied by an intensification 
of demands for greater expenditure (of both a military and 
* The budget was being used to manage both total demand and 
its composition. Thus in the 1938 and April 1939 budgets 
borrowing expanded more rapidly than taxation as the 
Treasury sought a recovery of demand. In addition, the 
increase in tobacco and horsepower duties (which had been 
recommended by the C.E.I. in December 1938- Howson and 
Winch (1977: 149) in April 1939 marked an attempt to 
redirect demand, improve the balance of payments, and set 
free industrial capacity for rearmament orders (see The 
Economist, 29 April 1939, pp.237-8)o Moreover, the 
Treasury records, especially those for the later 1930s, 
corroborates Bridges (1950a: 9) statement "that from the 
1920s onwards, the Treasury staff began to think of 
expenditure rather less in terms of the prospect of the 
spending of so much public money and rather more in terms 
of t:hA Amnl nvm.,;::>n+ ni' .... ..,..,.,~•· .... ~~~" 
civil nature). As had been predicted in the 1933 policy 
(277) debates over unbalanced budgets, the removal 6f the 
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balanced budget constraint made Treasury expenditure control 
more problematical. The rearmament phase also suggested two 
further lessons for the authorities: (1) the experience of I 
under-spending in the programme's initial stages reinforced 
the already existing belief that the rapid execution of a 
large public expenditure programme presented major technical 
difficulties; (2) the significant lag experienced before 
rearmament orders had beneficial effects on employment, and 
the narrowness of these effects in terms of the range of 
industries affected by rearmament, must also have 
strengthened the authorities' reluctance to embark, in the 
future, upon a large public works programme as an employment 
measure. And finally, the Treasury remained committed to 
a return to balanced budgets from 1942/3, when the rearmament 
programme was completed and borrowing powers terminated. 
Despite the absurdity by 1939 of the system of budget 
accounts ostensibly in force there were still no moves 
towards reform; nor had the Treasury begun to contemplate 
the necessary changes in the characteristics of the fiscal 
system which would have made the maintenance of balanced 
budgets less problematical in the face of severe autonomous 
f 1 t t · · · t . . t ( 278 ) \Vh. 1 t . t uc ua 1ons 111 econom1c ac 1v1 y. 1 s 1 was 
recognised that rearmament expenditures were directly 
stimulating employment,* this as such did not give validity 
to the policy prescriptions of the 'new' economics; rather, 
* Immediately prior to the outbreak of war the rearmament 
programme had grown to £2,100m over 1939/40-1941/2, of 
which it was planned to borrow approximately £1,190m 
(Cab 24/287, C.P. 149(39), 'Note on the Financial 
Situation', 3 July 1939, pp.3-4 
it highlighted and reinforced what the Treasury had always 
maintained: that public expenditure could only be used, 
and would only be effective, as an employment measure, in 
special circumstances, circumstances dependent on a 
favourable concatenation of political, economic, and 
psychological factors. 
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CHAPTER 6 
AN ASSESSMENT OF CHANGES IN FISCAL STANCE 1929-39 
Having completed our survey of 1930s budgetary history 
we can now proceed to more detailed issues: first!~ the 
measure employed in this study for assessing changes in 
fiscal stance (the constant employment budget balance); 
secondly, the characteristics of the fiscal system and their 
influence on the course of policy; and thirdly, the appli-
cation of the constant employment budget balance estimates 
to an evaluation of changes in the authorities' fiscal stance.* 
1. The constant employment budget balance 
It is now well established in fiscal policy studies that 
the actual ~post budget balance is an inadequate and 
misleading indicator of fiscal stance since it is subject to: 
the well-known difficulty that it does not distinguish 
changes in the budget balance caused by variations in 
tax rates or expenditure programmes from changes caused 
by movements in income and expenditure associated, for 
example, with autonomous variations in investment or 
exports. (1) 
The resulting inadequacy of movements in actual budget balances 
as a measure of changes in fiscal stance was particularly acute 
in the 1930s, when there were marked cyclical variations in 
unemployment rates. As soon as the dependence of tax receipts 
and endogenous expenditures on the level of aggregate income 
is acknowledged, it follows that variations in economic activity, 
* The present study was completed before my attention was drawn 
to Thomas (1981) in which a similar exercise, albeit of a more 
limited nature to the one reported here, is undertaken as 
part of an investigation into demand deficiency between the 
wars. Apart from minor differences, Thomas's estimates of 
the budget balance at a standardized rate of unemployment 
confirm our results; in addition, the fact that his 
estimation procedures differed from those adopted for the 
present exercise corroborates the usefulness of this method 
for assessing budgetary policy. 
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unless the authorities take countervailing action, will auto-
matically act on the budget balance. A fall in income, 
therefore, will cause the budget balance to deteriorate even 
when fiscal policy is contractionary, and vice versa.<2 ) 
Thus the inadequacy of the ~ post budget balance as a 
measure of fiscal stance stems from its failure to separate the 
effects of discretionary action from those of autonomous changes 
in economic activity; to distinguish the budget's influence on 
the economy from the economy's influence on the budget. To 
remedy this central defect, the concept of the full (or 
constant) employment budget balance was developed.(3 ) This is 
defined as the budget balance that would result (with the same 
nominal tax rates and public spending plans) if private sector 
demand was just sufficient continuously to maintain activity at 
a constant rate of unemployment. It is thus a measure of the 
budget balance which would have occurred had there been no 
deviation of economic activity from its trend path. Since 
such a measure will not be "af:fected by fluctuations in 
economic activity that shrink or swell the revenue base 
relative to that associated with the path of potential growth", 
it consequently provides a means "to focus on the policy actions 
that determine expenditure programs and tax rates, and to 
separate them from a consideration of the autonomous strength 
of private demand and of the posture of monetary policy."* 
The following identity is used for the constant employ-
ment budget balance, or fiscal stance: 
!!!. 
Y* 
t. Y* - G* 
Y* 
(1) 
* Okun and Teeters (1970: 78). The alternative approach has 
been to reject the use of a summary measure, and instead 
employ a model to describe both total variations in GDP and 
those which would have taken place in the absence of a 
government sector, the residual being the deduced impact of 
fiscal operations - see Neild (forthcoming) and Lotz 
(1971: 4-7); and for an example of recent empirical work, 
Pryor (1979). 
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where B* is the budget balance at constant employment, t the 
overall tax rate, Y* the constant employment level of GDP 
(i.e. the estimated value of what GDP at actual prices would 
have been if the percentage rate of unemployment had remained 
constant at the figure chosen for the exercise), and G* the 
value of central government expenditure at the constant 
employment level of incomes.* 
A change in B*/Y* between two periods indicates a 
discretionary change in fiscal policy (the fiscal stance)**; 
a higher constant employment balance denoting a more 
restrictive policy, and vice versa.*** The automatic 
stabilizing properties of the fiscal system are measured 
* In all cases the superscript * denotes the constant 
employment value of an i tern. See above P. 101 for the 
budget identity at actual employment. 
** Discretionary changes have usually been defined as those 
resulting from a change in tax rates or expenditure 
programmes, while automatic changes are those resulting 
from variations in economic activity. Such a definition, 
however, gives rise to the problem that with a progressive 
tax structure there is an automatic tendency for tax 
revenue to rise with the growth of income, and if that 
is not off-set by reducing nominal tax rates and/or 
increasing public expenditure, the fiscal stance will 
tighten. Hence, changes in nominal tax rates or 
expenditure programmes cannot be taken as evidence of 
a change in fiscal stance unless income is unchanged. 
Consequently, the more appropriate definition would seem 
to be that discretionary action is "any act which causes 
a change in fiscal stance, regardless of whether this 
is associated with changes in nominal rates of taxation 
or benefit" (Ward and Neild 1978: 3). 
***A number of writers have suggested- e.g. Lotz (1971: 
14,18); Chand (1977: 411)- that discretion is required 
in using the constant employment balance measure because 
a change in the budget balance resulting from a given 
fiscal policy change measured at constant employment 
may differ from that measured at actual employment 
levels, i.e. the measure implicitly assumes that the 
ranking of budgets at constant employment is invariant 
to the degree of capacity utilization. But, as Chand 
says, if '~he tax structure underlying one budget is 
more progressive than that underlying another budget, 
the ranking at actual output levels could involve 
reversals from the full-employment ranking, the 
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by the change in B (the actual budget balance) in relation 
to the change in Y (the actual level of GDP) when Y 
deviates from Y*. 
2. Constant employment GDP 
The rate of unemployment selected for the computation 
of Y*, the constant employment level of GDP for any year, 
will affect the value of B*/Y*, the constant employment 
budget balance, but will have a minimal influence on the 
changes exhibited year to year in the value of B*/Y*. Thus 
the value assigned to Y* is of secondary concern,* since the 
major focus for study is the yearly changes in B*/Y*. 
The series for Y* were calculated as follows: two base 
years, 1929/30 and 1937/8 , were selected when unemployment 
rates were approximately similar, at 10.8 and 11.1% 
respectively of the insured workforce, (4 ) while they also 
represented peaks in economic activity.(5 ) Following the 
likelihood of which increases, the further the economy 
is from its full-employment level. Thus, what might 
appear to be a more expansionary budget at full 
employment could, in reality, be a more contractionary 
budget at actual employment levels." This was not a 
problem in this study since the progressiveness of the 
tax structure did not change significantly over the 
period. 
* This is illustrated by a comparison of changes in the 
constant employment balance as a percentage of GNP for 
three recent years using different estimates based on 
different benchmark rates of unemployment. 
Changes in constant employment budget 
balance as% of GNP 
1974-5 1975-6 
Treasury 
(5% unemployment) -1.0 +2.7 
(3% unemployment) -1.3 +2.7 
National Institute 
(2.6% unemployment) +1.0 +2 .4 
Ward and Neild 
(2-2.5% unemployment) -0.9 +2.8 
1976-7 
+3.5 
+3.3 
+4.5 
+2.7 
Source: Calculated from Hartley and Bean (1978: Table 1) 
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Table 6.1 
Actual and constant em:eloyment GDPI 1929/30-1939/40 
GDP at constant factor cost GDP at current prices (£m 
Actual Constant Ratio Actual Constant 
{Y) emQlovment {Y*) {Y* f..Y 2 {Y) emeloyment {Y* 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1929/30 100 100 1.000 4245 4245 
1930/1 98.0 102.3 1.044 4146 4328 
1931/2 95.5 104.6 1.095 3872 4240 
1932/3 96.6 106.9 1.107 3783 4188 
1933/4 101.0 109.4 1.083 3831 4149 
1934/5 106.2 111.8 1.053 4054 4269 
1935/6 111.2 114.4 1.029 4236 4359 
1936/7 116.7 116.9 1.003 4438 4459 
1937/8 119.6 119.6 1.000 4777 4777 
1938/9 118.8 122.3 1.030 5068 5220 
1939/40 122.7 125.1 1.020 5668 5781 
Sources: col. (1) Feinstein (1972: Table 8) recalculated on 
to a financial year basis using the standard method. 
Figures for 1939 and 1940 are estimates derived from 
Ibid. Table 6 using the compromise estimates for GDP. 
col. (4) Ibid. Table 3 recalculated on to a financial 
year basis. 
method established by Cary Brown in his study of fiscal policy 
in the U.S. in the 1930s, ( 6 ) the actual series for GDP at 
constant factor cost were interpolated between the two base 
years assuming that the growth of Y* was the same as that of 
Y between the two base years. GDP at constant factor cost 
grew by 19.6% between our two base years, equivalent to an 
annual rate of growth of 2.25%. An index was calculated of 
Y* at constant factor cost using this annual growth rate 
(Table 6.1 col.2) from which the deviations of Y from Y*, 
termed the ratio (col.3), were obtained for each year. The 
series of money Y was then adjusted by the ratio to obtain a 
series for Y* at current prices (col.5). 
It is well established that in the short-run unemployment 
· 1 th t t d w1"th a t1"me lag.< 7 ) var1es ess an ou pu an Moreover, 
there are grounds for supposing that in a prolonged depression 
labour exhibits a tendency to transfer into the low wage, low 
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productivity service sector. A substantial movement of this 
* type appears to have occurred during 1929-32, and given the 
lower productivity growth of this sector relative to the 
industrial sector, ( 8 ) there are some grounds for stating that 
GDP in 1937/8 would have been somewhat higher if constant 
employment had been continuously achieved during the 1930s, 
and therefore that the trend rate of growth interpolated 
between the two base years understates the constant employment 
trend rate of growth. Whether this higher productivity trend 
should have been taken into account or not depends on the 
hypothesis that is made regarding the duration of the constant 
employment level of activity. If it were assumed that we 
were measuring the level of activity and the budget balance 
if constant employment had been continuously maintained 
throughout the period, then the higher productivity trend is 
a relevant consideration. A full counter-factual history, 
however, is not being postulated; instead, we are measuring 
the level of income and the budget balance if, immediately 
within a year, or from one year to the next, the economy had 
shifted from the actual to the constant employment position. 
In these circumstances, it is appropriate to use the actual 
productivity trend since it is valid to assume that, in the 
short-run, labour is slow to transfer between sectors and the 
effect on productivity is delayed. 
In calculating the constant employment level of GDP no 
adjustment was made to the composition of GDP between the 
broad categories of income that comprise the main tax bases 
* During the downtllrn of 1929-32 employment and output (at 
current prices) in the industrial sector fell by 10.5 and 
16.8% respectively, while in the service sector employment 
increased by 3.9% but output fell by 7.1%- Feinstein 
(1972: Tables 9 and 59). 
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(consumers' expenditure, income from employment and profits) 
since the elasticity of the major component of taxes on 
expenditure, Customs and Excise receipts (other than import 
duties), with respect to GDP (0.96-1.30) was of the same 
order of magnitude as the overall elasticity of receipts with 
respect to GDP (1.02-1.22). Hence, the effect of changes in 
the share of consumers' expenditure in GDP, within the range 
of variations observed in the 1930s, was found to be 
relatively unimportant, and other compositional effects were 
ignored. 
3. The characteristics of the fiscal system 
Summary measures of the response of the budget to income 
variations can be used to indicate the changing character-
istics of a fiscal system over time. For this purpose 
macro-marginal budget rates have been used, defined as the 
ratio of a change in receipts and endogenous expenditures to 
a change in income. ( 9 ) The advantage of macro-marginal 
budget rates over tax elasticities is that they incorporate 
the tax elasticity and also take account of the response of 
endogenous expenditures to income variations and the size of 
the budget in relation to GDP. 
The response of the budget balance to income variations 
depends on the form the variation takes: 
(1) growth of real GDP over time, at constant employment, 
resulting from productivity growth and the increase in the 
labour force ; 
(2) cyclical changes in real GDP; and 
(3) changes in the price level. 
Changes in the price level are not explicitly considered 
since the composition of the budget was such that these 
effects were relatively unimportant.(lO) Prices fell for 
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the greater part of the period but had insignificant effects 
on public expenditure, since only some public sector 
employees' wages and salaries were index-linked. As was 
noted earlier, (ll) the major influence came on taxes on 
expenditure, the yield of ad valorem duties falling relative 
to those duties levied on a specific basis. Two macro-
marginal budget rates, corresponding to (1) and (2) above, 
were calculated: 
b = c1B* = tlT* 
t !1Y* Ll Y* 
where bt is the macro-marginal budget rate with respect to 
trend growth.* Since, on trend, all expenditures are by 
(2) 
definition autonomous, this is identical to the macro-marginal 
tax rate, and measures the growth of central government 
receipts at the trend rate of growth of real GDP on the basis 
of nominal tax rates prevailing in each year. 
(B* - B) 
(Y* - y) 
where b is the macro-marginal budget rate with respect to y 
cyclical variations in GDP and is a measure of the automatic 
stabilizing properties of the fiscal system. 
Macro-marginal budget rates and aggregate tax 
(3) 
elasticities with respect to the trend rate of growth of real 
GDP at constant employment are given in Table 6.2. The trend 
macro-marginal rate rose markedly between 1929/30 and 1932/3, 
reflecting a rise in the aggregate tax elasticity and a 
significant increase in the average tax burden as the 
authorities attempted to achieve a target ~ post budget 
balance in the face of a cyclical downturn. Thereafter the 
macro-marginal rates fell to 1935/6 as taxes were cut, and 
* In accordance with our definition of discretionary 
act ion (above p. 221 ) bt may be taken as a measure of the 
extent of fiscal drag 1n the system. 
Table 6.2 Response of central government receipts to trend 
growth in real GDP, 1929/30-1939/40* 
1929l3o 1930[1 193Ii2 1932l3 1933i4 1934l5 1935i6 1936l7 1937l8 1938i9 I939l40 
Trend macro-marginal [~] 0.215 0.231 0.278 0.299 0.295 0.282 0.272 0.272 0.270 0.269 0.272 budget rate t::,Y* 
Tax elasticity [AI!. fM!.] 1.02 1.06 1.17 1.22 1.23 L22 1.20 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.21 T* Y* 
Ratio of receipts I~: J 0.211 0.218 0.238 0.245 0.240 0.231 0.227 0.227 0.223 0.221 0.225 to GDP 
Sources: Data taken from Financial Accounts and adjusted to a constant employment basis using the 
estimating procedure outlined in App.II. 
Notes: *Estimates are shown on a receipts basis, although they incorporate income and surtax estimated on 
----- an accruals basis to take account of the lag between earnings and assessment. Stamp and estate 
duties are excluded, their trend growth being negligible. 
Table GDP 
1929~_0 19}H>/_Ll~31D 193U3 l9~::V_4 1931/_S::-19~5/6 1939]7-_1937/8 1938Z9 1939/40 
Cyclical macro-
[B*-B J marginal budget .. 0.440 0.436 0.447 0.420 0.432 0.470 . . . . 0.356 
rate Y*-Y 
---
Ratio of autonomous 0.194 0.194 0.198 0.200 0.182 0.189 0.189 0.200 0.205 0.220 
expenditure to GDP** 
Sources: As for Table 6.2; data on unemployment benefits from working notes to Feinstein (1972). 
Notes: *Estimated on the same basis as the trend macro-marginal budget rate, account also being 
taken of the response of unemployment benefits to income variations. 
**Autonomous expenditure comprises all items considered to be invariant to changes in 
economic activity and equals total central government expenditure (G*) less outlay on 
unemployment benefits (SIFB*). 
0.330 
~ 
~ 
'I 
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then remained fairly stable until the end of the period. 
Tax rates were raised yearly from 1936/7 (although the fiscal 
stance continued to loosen as expenditure outstripped the 
growth of revenue), but the macro-marginal rate failed to 
rise while the ratio of receipts to GDP remained below its 
peak level of the early 1930s. During the later 1930s a 
number of influences seem to have been operating: 
(1) The failure of the aggregate tax elasticity to rise, as 
had occurred with the tightening of 1929/30 to 1933/4, is 
probably explicable in terms of (a) a reduction in the 
elasticity of taxes on income consequent upon a rise in the 
average effective rate of tax on personal and corporate 
incomes from 1936/7; and (b) discretionary increases in 
taxes on expenditure, especially in 1939/40, centred on those 
duties with a low elasticity with respect to GDP compared 
with the aggregate tax elasticity. 
(2) Simultaneously, the rise in the general price level (by 
10% over 1936-9) resulted in the yield of taxes levied on a 
specific basis (which comprised the bulk of taxes on 
expenditure) falling relative to those levied on an ad 
valorem basis. 
At the beginning of the period an increase in GDP of 
£100m would, at constant employment, have led to a rise in 
central government receipts of nearly £22m; by 1932/3 this 
would have risen to £30m, and by 1937/8 it had fallen back 
to £27m. If real GDP had grown at 2.25% per annum- the 
assumed constant employment growth rate - receipts would have 
grown by approximately the same amount in 1929/30, but by 2.8% 
in 1932/3 and slightly less in 1937/8, thus providing scope 
for increased expenditure and/or remission of taxation whilst 
maintaining an unchanged fiscal stance. In the absence of 
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such countervailing action, the fiscal stance would have 
tightened. 
Table 6.3 gives estimates of the cyclical macro-marginal 
budget rate and the ratio of autonomous expenditure to 
constant employment GDP. Difficulty in obtaining a satis-
factory statistical relationship for outlay on unemployment 
benefits against GDP has meant that estimates cannot be 
provided for all years, (l 2 ) while stamp and estate duties 
have been excluded because of the difficulties of estimating 
a stable relationship between asset prices (the tax base for 
these duties) and GDP. Since they were highly cyclical their 
inclusion would raise the cyclical macro-marginal budget rate. 
The evidence suggests the cyclical macro-marginal rate 
rose between 1929/30 and 1930/1 as the increase in 
eligibility for unemployment benefits, introduced in Y~rch 
1930, made endogenous expenditure more responsive to income 
variations. The fall in 1931/2 reflected the return to the 
previous eligibility conditions and the reduction in benefit 
rates, while the increased rate in 1932/3 resulted from 
changes in the response of receipts - an increase in the 
cyclical macro-marginal tax rate more than compensating for 
a decline in the response of endogenous expenditure. There-
after, the macro-marginal budget rate fell, rising temporarily 
in the mid-1930s with the extension of the unemployment 
benefits system, down to 1938/9. 
On the basis of these estimates, it can be seen that the 
extent of automatic stabilization fell over the period; a 
deviation of GOP of £100m from its benchmark level would have 
resulted in a change in the budget balance of £45m in 1932/3 
and £36m in 1938/9, i.e. a 5% deviation in GDP would cause a 
change in the budget balance of 2.3% of GOP in the former year 
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and 1.8% in the latter. From comparison with estimates of 
the cyclical macro-marginal budget rates for the contemporary 
British economy, (l3 ) it would seem that the extent of auto-
matic stabilization has changed only marginally over the past 
forty years, although the ratio of autonomous expenditure to 
GDP has more than doubled over the intervening period and 
thus exerts a greater stabilizing function than in the 1930s. 
The explanation of this surprising conclusion lies in 
conflicting developments on the receipts and expenditure 
sides of the budget. On the receipts side the aggregate 
tax elasticity (see Table 6.2) was roughly comparable to that 
of the postwar period, (l4 ) but since the ratio of receipts to 
GDP is approximately twice as high in the later period, the 
cyclical macro-marginal tax rate has been significantly 
higher. On the other hand, on the expenditure side, the 
cyclical macro-marginal rate appears to have fallen because 
of changes in the response of unemployment to income 
variations. Since the level of unemployment benefits in 
relation to the average wage was lower before the war than 
after, and outlay on unemployment benefits only constituted 
between 1.0 and 1.9% of constant employment GDP, the response 
of unemployment to a change in GDP must have been greater in 
the 1930s. 
Ward and Neild calculate (for the late 1970s) that a 1% 
deviation in Y from Y* would result in a change in unemploy-
ment (within the first year) of only 0.22% of the labour 
force, and further that a cyclical deviation of as much as 10% 
from its trend value only gives rise to a change in outlay on 
unemployment benefits of 0.5% of GDP.< 15 ) The situation in 
the 1930s differed significantly: for example, in 1930/1 
the 4.4% deviation in Y from Y*, after a year of no deviation, 
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resulted in a rise in the numbers unemployed of 7.5% of the 
insured labour force and an increase in outlay on unemployment 
benefits of 1.2% of GDP. Unemployment was thus more responsive 
to changes in GDP than in the postwar period: not only did 
unemployment adjust more speedily to a change in GDP but a 
relatively greater proportion registered as unemployed than 
in the postwar period, trends that reflect the different 
characteristics of the labour market between the two periods. 
In particular, a significantly higher pressure of demand in 
the postwar period, relative to that of the interwar period, 
has resulted in a marked fall in the output-employment 
elasticity. 0.6 ) 
The conclusion suggested by these estimates is that 
during the 1930s adherence to the balanced budget rule was 
made more problematical by a budget sensitive to cyclical 
variations; the higher the cyclical macro-marginal budget 
rate the stronger the automatic stabilizing properties of the 
system and the greater the tightening that is necessary in 
the face of a cyclical downturn if a target budget balance is 
to be achieved. 
4. The fiscal stance 1929-39 
During the 1930s Britain alone among the major western 
industrial economies eschewed '~esort to a policy of budget 
deficits to promote internal recovery'';(l 7 ) instead reliance 
was placed on an active monetary policy, tariff protection, 
devaluation, and specific intervention at a microeconomic 
level.(lS) As was shown in earlier chapters, the r81e 
accorded to budgetary policy as a stabilization instrument 
was limited: the principal objective was the maintenance of 
domestic and international confidence in the authorities' 
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economic policies, and this dictated adherence to balanced 
budgets and orthodox financial principles. Consequently 
budgetary operations were potentially destabilizing, for the 
contemporary practice was to attempt to balance revenue and 
expenditure with little regard for autonomous fluctuations in 
economic activity. 
As a subject for detailed study, the influence of fiscal 
operations on the course of economic activity during the 
1930s has been somewhat neglected by scholars. With few 
exceptions, previous studies have tended to be rather cursory 
and superficial so that it is difficult to speak of a 
'traditional interpretation' of budgetary policy during these 
years in any meaningful sense. Nevertheless, a consensus 
exists that policy was limited in its scope and objectives, 
and destabilizing in its operation. Richardson, one of the 
few writers to have attempted a serious assessment of the 
question, summarised his conclusion as follows: 
[The] government did not have a fiscal policy as such 
in the 1930s. The nearest it came to an attempt to 
control the public finances with a view to recovery 
was its stress on a balanced budget, not with the 
direct aim of stabilization but rather to restore 
business confidence at home and confidence in sterling 
and the government's ability to meet the crisis abroad 
[Broadly] speaking, fiscal operations were 
destabilizing in their effects over the 1930s as a 
whole. The budget was balanced at the trough of 
depression, and this failed to impart a direct stimulus 
because expenditure was not increased. Later in the 
decade, when the economy was entering boom conditions 
there was a tendency for a budget deficit to develop 
because of the requirements of rearmament expenditure. 
This was the opposite of what was desirable on 
stabilization grounds. On the other hand, high levels 
of expenditure on rearmament and other items acted 
counter-cyclically in the recession of 1937-8, though 
this was not a conscious policy . . . British experience 
in the 1930s hardly provides a model of a counter-
cxclical fiscal policy. (19) [Emphasis Added] 
A number of general features of budgetary policy during 
the 1930s have been identified by previous writers who have 
used the conventionally defined budget balance (B in Chart 
c 
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6.1 and Table 6.4) as an indicator of the setting of the 
budget : 
Chart 6.1 
Budget deficit as %of GDP, 1929/30-1938/9 
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SOURCES: As Table 6.L}. 
(1) Budgetary policy was slightly reflationary in 1929 and 
1930, the early stages of the depression, for despite 
increased taxation, expenditure growth was more rapid and the 
budget deficit widened. 
(2) The severe tightening of revenue and expenditure necessary 
to balance the budget in 1931/2 (the trough of the depression) 
was highly deflationary, but these adverse effects were 
partially mitigated by the restoration of confidence, which 
fullowed from the restrictive measures, and the concomitant 
effects on business expectations. 
(3) The delay in remitting taxation and restoring the cuts in 
expenditure most probably retarded the onset and pace of recovery. 
(4) As a consequence of rearmament, rather than of a deliberate 
stabilization policy, budgetary policy became markedly 
Table 6.4 Central government recei2ts, ex2enditure, and budget balll.nce, 
actual and constant em21oyment, 1929L:30-1939L:40 
A. ~% of GDP2: 
(Tc/Y) (Gc/Y) (Bc/Y) (T/Y) (G/Y) (B/Y) (T'"/Y'") (G'"/Y*) 
1929/30 19.2 19.5 -0.3 21.1 20.7 +0.4 21.1 20.7 1930/1 20.7 21.2 -0.6 22.1 22.7 -0.6 21.8 20.7 1931/2 22.0 22.0 0.0 23.6 24.8 -1.2 23.8 21.3 1932/3 21.9 22.7 
-0.9 23 .9 25.2 
-1.3 24.5 21.5 1933/4 21.1 20.3 +0.8 23 .2 22.3 +0.9 24.0 19.8 1934/5 19.8 19.7 +0.2 22.2 21.6 +0.6 23.1 19.9 1935/Ei 19.9 19.9 +0.1 22.1 21.7 +0.4 22.7 20.7 1936/7 20.2 20.3 
-0.1 22.3 22.0 +0.3 22.7 21.9 1937/8 19.9 19.3 +0.6 22.0 22.3 
-0.3 22.3 22.3 1938/9 19.9 20.1 -0.3 22.0 24.7 
-2.7 22.1 23.7 1939/40 20.0 24.8 -4.9 21.9 35.1 
-13.2 22.5 34.7 
B. (£m.): 
(Tc) (Gc) (Be) (T) (G) (B) (T*) (G*) 
1929/30 815.0 829.5 
-14.5 893.9 876.5 +17 .4 893.9 876.5 1930/1 857.8 881.0 -23.2 915.1 939.3 
-24.2 941.7 894.6 1931/2 851.5 851.1 +0.4 914.5 960.2 -45.7 1008.8 902.1 1932/3 827.0 859.3 -32.3 903.9 954.1 
-50.2 1024.6 900.1 1933/4 809.4 778.2 +31.2 890.0 856.7 +33.3 997.5 823.3 1934/5 804.6 797.1 +7.5 899.3 873 .5 +25.8 986.8 848.8 1935/6 844.8 841.8 +3.0 935.7 919.7 +16.0 988.5 902.7 1936/7 896.6 902.2 -5.6 990.0 975.3 +14 .7 1011.7 974.3 1937/8 948.7 919.9 +28.8 1051 .5 1067.2 -15.7 1063.5 1067.2 1938/9 1006.2 1018.9 -12.7 1114.1 1251.3 -137.2 1155.1 1235.8 1939/40 1132.2 1408.2 -276 .o 1241.0 1990.2 -749.2 1303 .8 2007.9 
Sources : The actual figures are drawn from Financial Accounts and the working notes to 
Feinstein (1972); for the computation of the constant employment estimates 
see App.II. 
(B*/Y*) 
+0.4 
+1.1 
+2.5 
+3.0 
+4.2 
+3.2 
+2.0 
+0.8 
0.0 
-1.6 
-12.2 
(B*) 
+17 .4 
+47.1 
+106. 7 
+124.5 
+174.2 
+138.0 
+85.8 
+37 .4 
-3.7 
-80.7 
-704.1 
~ 
c,.) 
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expansionary from the later 1930s and ensured that the 
recession of 1937-8 was of short duration, and further, that 
the problem of abnormal unemployment of the interwar years 
was beginning to be resolved. 
Using the constant employment budget balance as a 
measure of changes in fiscal stance permits a more precise 
and systematic exegesis of budgetary policy to be presented 
than the interpretation outlined above; moreover, the results 
obtained (summarised in Table 6.4) would seem, at least for 
part of the period, to be at variance with the accepted view 
and thus suggest that some reinterpretation is appropriate. 
For the period as a whole two general features are shown 
in Chart 6.1 and Table 6.4: 
(1) the differences between the budget balance at actual and 
constant employment, respectively B/Y and B*/Y*, are large, 
reflecting a variation of over 13 percentage points in 
unemployment rates amongst the insured labour force between 
the peak and trough years. 
(2) changes in fiscal stance were extensive (a maximum change 
of approximately 6 percentage points between 1933/4 and 
1938/9 in B*/Y*), a result not of attempts to stabilize 
activity by fiscal means, but of firstly, striving to attain 
a balanced budget in the face of severe cyclical fluctuations 
in activity, and secondly, the imperative of rearmament which 
necessitated large scale borrowing from 1937 onwards. 
(i) Depression 1929-33 
Between 1929/30 and 1932/3 the budget balance (B/Y) 
deteriorated by 1. 7 percentage points of GDP. In contrast 7 
the constant employment balance moved into substantial 
surplus as the authorities attempted to balance the budget in 
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the face of declining economic activity. This tightening 
(3.8 percentage points of GDP over 1929/30-1933/4) continued 
almost unabated until 1933/4, the remission of taxation in 
1933 being insufficient to compensate for the severe 
tightening in 1931 of both receipts and expenditure. 
The change in fiscal stance was achieved almost entirely 
by raising the ratio of receipts to GDP. In this respect it 
was comparable to the tightening of the period 1967-70 which, 
until recently, was the most severe of the postwar period -a 
change in the constant employment balance of nearly 7 
percentage points of GNP, the expenditure ratio only falling 
(~0) 
marginally. But since the size of the budget in relation 
to GDP was only half that of the postwar period, a given 
change in fiscal stance of (say) 2 percentage points of GDP 
required nearly a 10% change in receipts in 1931/2 but less 
than 5% in 1967. 
The extent of the perverse fiscal action during the 
depression years can be said to depend on: 
(1) the percentage fall in GDP; 
(2) the response of the budget, as measured by the cyclical 
macro-marginal budget rate (b ), to a change in GDP; and y 
(3) the extent to which discretionary action could be avo~ded 
by fiscal window-dressing. 
GDP at constant factor cost fell by only 5% over 1929-32, 
but the marked cyclical sensitivity of the budget to income 
va~iations ensured that even this small change resulted in a 
significant deterioration in the budget balance, although 
this was partially mitigated by increased taxation yearly 
from 1929 and cuts in expenditure in 1931. The increasingly 
deflationary stance adopted by the authorities in their 
attempts to maintain a balanced budget (B ) was, however, 
c 
significantly tempered by fiscal window-dressing - over 
1929/30 to 1933/4 revenue (T ) included £59.5m of non-
e 
recurrent receipts while £39.lm was borrowed. The 
authorities were thus able to avoid discretionary action 
totalling nearly £90m, a figure approximately equivalent to 
an additional 6d. on the standard rate of income tax over 
the period. Following upon the already severe tightening 
that had occurred, the consequences of such a further 
increase in taxation would have been extremely serious. 
The increased taxation and expenditure cuts (estimated 
full year effects of £80m and £70m respectively) imposed in 
September 1931 have generally been viewed as the most 
deflationary budget of the ~1ole interwar period; their 
continuation is also seen as having retarded recovery:(2 l) 
an impression substantiated by the change in the constant 
employment balance of 1.4 percentage points between 1930/1 
and 1931/2 and a further 1.7 percentage points by 1933/4. 
Many contemporaries, however, believed that by 
restoring confidence amongst business circles and the 
international financial community in the government's 
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financial policy, the budget achieved a psychological 
stimulus which outweighed the direct restrictive effects.< 22 ) 
As was noted earlier,< 23 ) confidence cannot be accurately 
specified or measured, and therefore the importance of 
this factor is difficult to establish; on somewhat 
stronger grounds, the authorities, (24 ) and many writers 
since, believed that the balancing of the budget (B not 
c 
B which continued to move into deficit until 1932/3) in 1931 
and the consequent restoration of confidence 
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permitted the cheap money policy,* which many see as the 
mainstay of recovery in the 1930s.C25 ) Thus the 1931 budget 
was neutral or: 
reflationary only because it led to the War Loan 
conversion and was accompanied by circumstances which 
caused or greatly assisted recovery. These circumstances 
were unusual and are unlikely to recur. In general, a 
policy of cutting expenditure and raising taxes will not 
alleviate but deepen a depression. (26) 
Furthermore, the war loan conversion permitted the large 
fall in debt charge on the budget - a reduction of 30.4% 
from £322m in 1931/2 to £224m in 1933/4 (see Table 5.6) -
which formed the basis of the loosening of fiscal stance 
that occurred from 1934 onwards. 
Whilst the dictates of a balanced budget restricted the 
scope for fiscal operations to be stabilizing in a depression, 
the central government's deflationary policies could have been 
partially offset by an expansion of public investment and 
local authority expenditure, both of which were outside the 
coverage of the conventionally defined budget. Gross fixed 
capital formation by public and semi-public authorities 
exerted a stabilizing influence during 1929-31, expanding 
(at 1930 prices) from £167m to £198m and thus nearly 
compensating for the decline in capital formation by the 
private sector from £266m to £229m. Thereafter, public 
investment was cut back sharply in 1932-3 as a consequence 
of the economy campaign, and thus in the two most critical 
years when fiscal stance was tightening public investment 
*For example, Nevin (1955: 69, 76-82) partially attributes 
the recovery of bond prices in early 1932 - a recovery 
which aided the transition to cheap money - to the recovery 
of confidence engendered by the balancing of the budget 
and the formation of the National Government. Against 
these beneficial effects, however, must be placed the 
possibility that the 0.6% fall in consumers' expenditure 
over 1931-2 -as compared with a rise of 2.6% over 1929-31 
-resulted from the tightening of fiscal stance. 
(Calculated from Feinstein 1972: Table 5) 
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was destabilizing.<27 ) Total expenditure by local authorities 
followed a similar course, expanding during the first two years 
of the depression and then being seriously curtailed during 
1931-4. (2 S) Nor should the expansionary effects of these 
expenditures of 1929-31 be overstated, for much of the 
increased capital expenditure was financed out of additional 
current expenditure and new borrowing was partially offset by 
simultaneous repayment of debt, (29 ) while, in addition, 
expenditure was lowest in those areas with the highest 
unemployment . (3 O) 
(ii) Recovery 1933-7 
Although there is disagreement over the precise impact of 
the government's deflationary policy in 1931-2, a consensus 
exists that the crisis measures were maintained too long, for 
once "confidence had been restored, conditions were such that 
a reflationary fiscal policy could have materially assisted an 
early recovery."(3 l) Within the constraint imposed by the 
prevailing orthodoxy, the timing of budgetary relaxation was 
delayed by two factors: firstly, the yield of taxes on 
income (which constituted 30 to 40% of total receipts) was slow 
to respond to recovery, and secondly, whilst in the early stages 
of the recovery the total numbers unemployed fell rapidly, there 
was a proportionately smaller effect on outlay on unemployment 
benefits charged to the budget as conventionally defined. The 
first factor is explicable in terms of the lag between earnings 
and assessment for income and surtax; (32 ) the see:ond derives 
from the rather complex administrative arrangements governing 
outlay on unemployment benefits. 
Unemployment amongst insured persons reached a peak of 
2.979m in January 1933, falling rapidly to 2.288m by the end 
of the year,(33) a reduction of 23.2%. This fall was 
accompanied by a marked reduction in total outlay on 
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unemployment benefits, but because of the nature of the· 
central government's contribution to the unemployment 
benefits system, its contribution fell proportionately less 
than the reduction in outlay of the system as a whole. 
From October 1931 onwards central government contri-
butions took three forms: 
(1) payments to the Unemployment Insurance Fund on the basis 
of equal thirds contributions from the state, employers, and 
employees; 
(2) responsibility for the whole cost of transitional 
payments (unemployment assistance from 1935); 
(3) the debt of the Unemployment Fund having reached its 
statutory maximum of £115m, the Exchequer was obliged to 
meet by a deficiency grant any shortfall in revenue relative 
to expenditure. (34 ) 
Between March and December 1933 that part of the 
unemployed for which central government was fully responsible 
fell far less (by 11.9%) than those receiving benefits from 
the Unemployment Insurance Fund (a reduction of 28.2%) for 
which only part of the charge was borne by the budget.<35 ) 
The burden of unemployment charges on the budget was thus 
slow to respond to recovery:(3 G) while the average numbers 
unemployed fell by 24.3% between 1932/3 and 1934/5, the 
unemployment charge on the budget only fell by 15.5%. 
As a surplus began to accrue to the Unemployment Fund 
this had to be allocated to redemption of the Fund's debt.* 
* The Treasury estimated that for every O.lm by which the 
Live Register fell below 3m there would be a saving of 
approximately £3.8m to the Budget, but that when the 
register had fallen to 2.4m the saving from any further 
reduction in unemployment would go primarily to reducing 
the debt of the Unemployment Fund and relief to the 
budget would be small (Tl71/296, Hopkins to Fisher and 
Chamberlain, 16 Nov. 1931). 
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Given the budget identity in use, such transactions did not 
appear in the budget accounts, just as in 1929-31 borrowing 
had also been excluded. A surplus began to accrue from June 
1933 onwards so that the burden of the deficiency grant no 
longer fell on the budget, the net effect on the budget being a 
result of two factors: (1) the numbers of insured unemployed 
(corresponding to the short-term unemployed) fell faster 
than those receiving transitional benefits (essentially the 
long-term unemployed), a usual occurrence in a cyclical 
upturn;(37 ) and (2) the effect of the change in eligibility 
for insurance benefits introduced in October 1931 were 
beginning to lead to the transference of the unemployed from 
insurance benefits to transitional payments. 
Revenue adjusted for non-recurrent receipts (T) continued 
to be depressed until 1934/5, falling by 2.7% over 1931/2 to 
1933/4, but expenditure (G ) fell far more rapidly (by 8.6%) 
c 
over these years, so that a substantial surplus (Be) was 
achieved in 1933/4 which permitted a loosening in fiscal 
stance from 1934 onwards. This change was occasioned solely 
by the reduced debt charge on the budget, resulting from 
lower interest rates and the near abandonment of sinking fund 
payments. Remission of taxation and restoration of the 
expenditure cuts followed gradually in the budgets of 1934 
and 1935, but the scope for relaxation remained very tight, 
for although receipts were beginning to reflect the recovery 
of economic activity, they were outpaced by the growth of 
expenditure as rearmament began to dissipate the gains that 
should have followed from recovery. 
The extent of this relaxation is measured by a 2 
percentage points change in the constant employment balance 
between 1933/4 and 1935/6, far less than the tightening of 
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the previous period. This change in fiscal stance resulted 
almost equally from variations in the ratio of receipts and 
expenditure to GDP, the former reflecting remission of 
taxation, the latter the restoration of the expenditure cuts 
and the growth of rearmament expenditure. Overall the direct 
contribution of fiscal policy to recovery was extremely 
limited; by 1935 fiscal stance had changed comparatively 
little since the depression years, the relaxation had been 
delayed until long after the onset of recovery, and public 
investment had been destabilizing in the early stages of 
recovery.* Against these factors, however, must be placed 
the undoubted contribution to recovery of the restoration 
of confidence and the cheap money policy, both deriving 
from the apparent adherence to budgetary orthodoxy. 
(iii) Recession and rearmament 1937-9 
The final phase of budgetary policy was inextricably 
connected with the needs of rearmament. Total defence 
expenditure increased from £136.9m in 1935/6 to £265.2m in 
1937/8 and had reached £1,142m by 1939/40, when it 
constituted 19.8% of constant employment GDP (see Table 6.5). 
The growing importance of rearmament expenditure was 
reflected in the change in fiscal stance over these years; 
the period of economic recovery 1932-7 had seen a limited 
relaxation in fiscal stance, a change in the constant 
* The later stages of recovery, however, were supported by 
a revival of public sector investment. Between 1935-7 
gross fixed capital formation (at 1930 prices) by public 
and semi-public authorities rose from £175m to £220m, 
an increase of 25.7%, while capital formation by the 
private sector rose from £311m to £328m, an increase of 
only 5.5%. (Feins·tein 1965: Table 3.34). There was also 
an expansion of local authority expenditures over this 
period (Peacock and Wiseman 1967: Table A. 20). 
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employment balance of just over 4 percentage points of GDP, 
while the years 1937/8 to 1939/40 saw a change of over 12 
percentage points. The ratio of receipts to GDP remained 
constant over this period, although tax rates were increased 
yearly from 1936, and the change in fiscal stance reflected 
yhe rise in the expenditure ratio as military outlays were 
greatly expanded. 
1929/30 
1930/1 
1931/2 
1932/3 
1933/4 
1934/5 
1935/6 
1936/7 
1937/8 
1938/9 
1939/40 
Table 6.5 
Summary figures of defence expenditure, 
1929/30-1939[40 
Total Defence Expenditure* 
as % of central as % of constant 
(£m) government employment 
113.0 
110.5 
107.3 
103.0 
107.9 
113.9 
136.9 
186.2 
265.2 
400.2 
expenditure (G*) GDP 
12.9 
12.4 
11.9 
11.4 
13.1 
13.4 
15.2 
19.1 
24.9 
32.4 
2.7 
2.6 
2.5 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
3.1 
4.2 
5.6 
7.7 
(April) 
(Sept.) 
628.8 
1,249 
1,142 ( o utt urn) 56.9 19.8 
Figures for defence expenditure from: Statistical 
Abstract for the United Kingdom, 1924-1938, Cmd. 
6232 (1940), Table 151; Central Statistical Office, 
Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1935.-46, 84 (1948), 
Tables 253-4; Tl71/349, 'Review of 1939-40', 
undated; GDP data from Table 6.1. 
*Expenditure covered by revenue, borrowing under the 
Defence Loans Acts, 1937 and 1939, and the Vote of 
Credit granted on 3 September 193 9. In addition to 
the expenditure of the three defence forces, 
expenditure on civil defence and food storage also 
included. 
The timing of this chang·e in fiscal stance was most 
fortunate; despite the absence of a formal commitment to 
an active counter-cyclical fiscal policy by the authorities, 
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fiscal operations acted to mitigate the recession of 1937-8.* 
Nevertheless, the growth of rearmament expenditure and the 
decline in private sector demand were not exactly synchronized 
and the recession was able to develop for some months before 
fiscal operations became sufficient first to stabilize 
activity and then to stimulate recovery.<3 S) By the spring 
of 1939 both the authorities and economic commentators were 
agreed that recovery was proceeding rapidly and that the 
abnormal unemployment, the 'intractable million•,<39 ) which 
had plagued the interwar economy, was being reduced as a 
result of rearmament, (4 0) for not only did it stimulate 
aggregate demand but it also had marked effects on the 
depressed areas where defence contracts had been specifically 
placed. ( 4 l) The change in fiscal stance between 1938/9 and 
1939/40 ensured the achievement of full employment towards 
the end of 1940. There is evidence, however, that full 
employment would have been attained some months earlier had 
it not been for the outbreak of war which temporarily halted 
the progress of recovery. Unemployment had fallen rapidly 
from 2.134m to 1.295m between January and August 1939, but 
had risen thereafter as a consequence of the disruption 
produced by the onset of war, and it was not until March 
1940 that unemployment had recovered to its August 1939 
level. (42 ) 
5. Conclusions 
The overall effic~cy of budgetary policy during this 
period is difficult to evaluate since current objectives 
* It has been estimated that unemployment might have risen 
as high as 3m compared with its actual figure of 1.6m if 
the authorities had decided to balance the budget in 1938/9 
rather than borrow over £120m for rearmament - Bretherton 
et al (1941: 92). 
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and targets of budgetary policy are at variance with those 
of the 1930s. Within the limited role accorded at the time 
to budgetary policy as a stabilization instrument, budgetary 
policy can be judged to have been not unsuccessful, for, 
with the exception of the debacle of 1931, fiscal operations 
provided a stable environment for business and permitted an 
expansionary monetary policy, conditions conducive to 
recovery.* It is when budgetary policy is appraised with 
reference to modern objectives of budgetary policy, 
objectives formulated and developed during the 1930s in 
response to the limitations and unsatisfactory macroeconomic 
impact of the existing policy, that its deficiencies and 
destabilizing characteristics become evident. 
The foregoing study suggests that the traditional 
interpretation of budgetary policy during this period 
requires modification on two counts: 
(1) The budget balance at actual employment (B or B) was 
c 
shown to be an extremely misleading indicator of changes in 
the setting of the budget since in the early years of the 
depression it appears to signify a loosening of fiscal 
stance whereas, in fact, as indicated by changes in the 
constant employment balance, budgetary policy was becoming 
progressively more restrictive. 
(2) The traditional interpretation, that the direct 
deflationary effects of the 1931 budget were outweighed by 
the restoration of confidence, whilst intuitively appealing, 
should be subject to serious scrutiny; the extent of the 
* As Sabine (1970: 285) concluded, budgetary policy was 
"pitched in a minor key but played a vital, if 
unspectacular part in the limited recovery of 1933 to 
1936 by a delicate combination of inflatory and 
deflatory measures". 
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tightening in the depression and early recovery periods was 
severe, and consequently any recovery of private sector 
demand induced by the restoration of confidence would have 
had to be considerable to compensate for the contraction of 
public sector demand. 
In conclusion it should be stated that while in recent 
years doubts have arisen regarding the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy as a stabilization instrument, in the conditions 
of the 1930s, with its heavy unemployment and falling price 
level, few would disagree "that recovery proceeded less 
strongly and rapidly that it would have done with more 
enlightened budgetary policies."(4J) In earlier chapters, 
we saw that such policies were not pursued because of 
adherence to budgetary orthodoxy and an implicit faith in 
the potency and eff,icacy of market forces. Other factors 
were also of importance, for had more 'enlightened' policies 
been adopted the nature of the unemployment problem of 
these years was such that fiscal policy would have had to 
be supplemented by selective demand management measures. 
In particular, an active regional policy would have been 
required while, in the circumstances of the abnormally 
depressed level of world trade, a higher level of activity 
would have resulted in balance of payments problems. 
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CHAPI'ER 7 
CONCLUSIONS: THE 'TREASURY VIEW' AND PUBLIC WORKS 
In studying the interaction between economic thought 
and policy during the interwar years research has primarily 
focused on the gradual evolution of Keynes's policy 
prescriptions and theoretical writings, culminating in the 
General Theory (1936), and their accepta'nce and adoption by 
the Treasury, as instanced by Kingsley Wood's 1941 budget 
and the 1944 Employment Policy White Paper, (l) the 
explanation being couched in terms of the Treasury, guided 
solely by economic objectives, succumbing by the force of 
reason to the theoretical correctness of the 'new' economics. 
From the foregoing investigation of 1930s fiscal policies, 
we can conclude that such an approach is not incorrect, 
merely incomplete, for it excludes the political dimension 
of these developments: that is during the 1930s the 
Treasury and governments objected to the 'new' economics, 
and more generally to those advocating a more enlightened 
and active fiscal policy, on grounds not only economic in 
character but more fundamentally political and administrative, 
while the acceptance of the 'new' economics during the war 
years is explicable in terms of a change in political 
attitudffiand prevailing administrative conditions, as well 
as the conversion to the Keynesian theoretical position ~2 ) 
The purpose of this final chapter is to examine the 
fiscal policy debate from a rather broader perspective than 
that of previous chapters, to comment on the public works 
issue and the 'Treasury view'~ro and to suggest possible 
reasons for the ultimate failure of the case for a more 
expansionist fiscal policy. 
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1. Public works and the 'Treasury view' 1929-31 
The proposal that, in a depression, public works might 
provide a useful employment stimulus has a long lineage.<4 ) 
In Britain, their first active use on any substantial scale 
came in the 1920s;(5 ) conceived of as a purely temporary 
relief measure, there later developed dissatisfaction with 
their effectiveness, and increasingly they were opposed on 
theoretical grounds. By the later 1920s, this opposition 
had supposedly hardened into a dogma,(6 ) the so-called 
'Treasury view', whereby loan financed expenditures were 
regarded as diversionary or inflationary and thus provided 
no net addition to employment.( 7 ) 
Our analysis begins in 1929, with the rejection of the 
Liberal Party's proposed £250m two year public works 
programme, (B) a rejection that has traditionally been 
ascribed rather more to the dominance and stultifying 
influence of the 'Treasury view',( 9 ) and rather less to 
the programme's technical deficiencies, and the widespread 
distrust of it as a mere electioneering stunt.(lO) The 
'Treasury view', as expressed in the White Paper Memoranda 
on Certain Proposals Relating to Unemployment, (ll) has. 
further been interpreted as deriving from classical 
economics, with its implicit assumption of full employment 
and a fixed fund of savings.(l2 ) Yet, this interpretation 
has been too readily acciepted: as will now be suggested, 
the theoretical basis of the 'Treasury view' has been 
misconstrued, and the whole 1929 policy debate interpreted 
too narrowly. 
It is generally held that the "heart of the White Paper 
lay in the Memorandum prepared by the Treasury", and that 
this '~omprise(d] a rag-bag of objections to public works 
which (gave) the impression of proving too much."(l3 ) In 
.fact, the White Paper, although a coherent unity, divides 
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distinctly into three parts: a consideration of the labour 
supply available for public wor~s; a comment on the 
practicality of the proposed schemes; and the Treasury 
memorandum on the finance of the proposed programme. This 
document represented a general Whitehall view, rather than 
a purely Treasury view; it reflected the "past experience 
of public works ... (and was] a description of what in fact 
ha(d] been found often to happen."(l4 ) Nor would the 
available evidence support the view that these practical 
objections were without substance, a mere screen for more 
fundamental, and largely indefensible, theoretical 
objections. (lB) 
In chapter l it was suggested that, apart from the 
well-defined period of general demand deficiency (1930 to 
mid-1933), the characteristics of interwar unemployment were 
such as to cast doubt on the suitability of a centrally 
directed public works programme as a means of effecting a 
(16) Eermanen! stimulus to employment. Such was also the 
opinion of the Ministry of labour in its contribution to 
the White Paper: reference was made to the Liberal's 
overstatement of the current level of cyclical unemployment, 
their misunderstanding of the dynamics of the labour market, 
the difficulty of matching (both occupationally and geo-
graphically) the available labour supply to the labour 
required for the schemes, and the failure to specify the 
microeconomic linkages whereby public works aided the 
export industries and permanently stimulated other 'normal' 
channels of industry (i.e. promoted structural change).<l7 ) 
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The other departments' memoranda, on the various works 
projects, concerned themselves with more administrative 
(and ultimately political) i~sues: the technical problems 
associated with the implementation of such a large works 
programme over such a short time-period, they concluded, 
would prejudice normal expenditure controls, force the quite 
unacceptable overriding of private interests, and threaten 
the autonomy of local authorities.(lS) 
The 'Treasury view' embraced these wide-ranging 
technical, administrative and political objections: they 
constituted the disruptive intermediary which prevented 
the theoretical potentialities of public works from being 
translated into practical and effective results, the 
neutralising mechanism being as outlined in earlier 
chapters,<l9 ) whereby a large public works programme caused 
a loss of confidence, leading to an adverse change in 
liquidity preference, and resulting in psychological 
crowding-out. In this interpretation of the 'Treasury 
view', a large loan financed public works programme would 
still have no substantial net effect on employment, but 
the sequence of events and causes of crowding-out were 
rather different from those accepted hitherto. 
In an earlier chapter the theoretical basis underlying 
adherence to balanced budgets was shown to have been mis-
{20) 
interpreted by certain earlier writers; this would 
also seem to have been the case for the 'Treasury view' on 
public works. At no time did the Treasury doubt, ceteris 
paribus, that in the short-term state expenditure could 
raise aggregate demand and employment. Rather, their 
objections were twofold: firstly, as argued above, they 
contended that a number of constraints would operate to 
251 
neutralise the favourable effects of state expenditure if 
it was on the scale envisaged by the Liberals (objections 
not applicable to smaller scale projects); and secondly, 
such a course was undesirable because it failed to offer 
a permanent solution to heavy unemployment. It was here, 
with the second set of factors, that in 1929 and thereafter, 
there were deep-seated theoretical differences between the 
Treasury and the 'new' economics. 
It has generally been argued that the Treasury's 
theoretical analysis ignored both the multiplier effects 
of, ( 2 l) and social rate of return on, public investment.< 22 ) 
Whilst the multiplier was not formally specified until 
1931, ( 23 ) it was undoubtedly implicit in much of earlier 
economic literature; (24 ) a similar judgement can also be 
(25) 
made about the social rate of return. Hopkins, in pis 
evidence before the Macmillan Committee, ( 26 ) showed an 
awareness of both concepts, but nevertheless discounted 
them as inapplicable, given the current facts of unemployment, 
and inoperative, when considering a programme of the 
magnit-ude and type proposed by the Liberals . 
Hopkins's analysis took as its starting point the 
difficulties of the staple export industries, difficulties 
which had been exacerbated by the characteristics of the 
depression after 1929. (27 ) F'rom this standpoint, two 
objections were advanced against large scale public works: 
firstly, even assuming that the schemes were feasible, they 
'~ould concentrate employment in a marked degree upon 
individual trades which [were] neither unsheltered nor 
unprosperous ... and while increasing employment and profit 
making there would be little or nothing for the depressed 
basic trades'';(2 S) and secondly, this concentration of 
employment would result in supply bottlenecks, generating 
cost pressures, which would then be transmitted throughout 
the economy. The final effect would be a worsening of the 
already diminished competitiveness of the export sector, 
and perhaps also increased import penetration, serious 
consequences given the then prevailing gold standard 
regime, (29 ) and precarious external balance. 
In turn, these objections followed from two central 
tenets of interwar Treasury economic thinking. Firstly, 
the Treasury were antipathetic towards the notion, implicit 
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in Keynes and others' writings, of the homogeneity of demand 
impulses, a reflection of their essentially micro-economic 
or structural diagnosis of the unemployment problem and of 
the way in which they viewed income generation. The concept 
of 'industry', in the aggregate, was rejected as a mere 
abstraction, one that led to potentially destabilizi~g policy 
actions. (3 0) Secondly, and not unconnected, was the belief 
in what might be termed the 'normal channels of trade', the 
policy implications of this being that public investment was 
a complement to that of the private sector, not a substitute 
for it. Here the textual evidence is far from conclusive, 
but it would appear that the Treasury held a position 
whereby public works on any substantial scale distorted 
the course of economic activity from its normal channels 
(determined by relative prices), made the ultimate transition 
to normal employment patterns more difficult, and forced 
periodic reflationary stimuli in order to permanently sustain 
the higher level of employment. (3 l) Such a position bore a 
strong resemblance to Hayek's writings at that time, (32 ) 
and thus had a certain intellectual pedigree. 
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Finally, we return to the Treasury's dismissal of the 
economists' contention that a public works programme gained 
additional justification from its positive social rate of 
return. The Treasury's reasoning should by now be clear: 
while they accepted the logic of this argument at the level 
of the individual project, they questioned its validity at 
the macro level, where a general reaction against the 
programmes might be expected, this leading to the establish-
ment of forces which acted to neutralise at the national 
level any local benefits accruing from the schemes. 
It remains to discuss briefly the public works 
programmes of the 1929-31 (minority) Labour government. These 
differed substantially from the Liberal's proposed programme; 
they were financed from current revenue, undertaken by local 
authorities (with little central planning), and had to be 
remunerative projects.<33 ) Thus their magnitude was limited 
\ 
from the outset,<34 ) but even given these constraints, the 
policy was deemed to have been unsuccessful:(3 S) their 
employment effects were judged to have been small in relation 
to expenditure, they had taken a long time to come into 
operation, and the stock of available remunerative projects 
was quickly exhausted. By June 1930, a full year after 
taking office, schemes approved only totalled £110.lm, (36 ) 
while even a year later, at their peak, schemes actually in 
operation totalled but £107.7m (on an annual basis).<37 ) 
These gave primary direct employment to 61,165 persons; 
assuming an equal amount of primary direct to indirect 
employment and an employment multiplier of 1.5, employment 
equivalent to only 10.9% of the total numbers unemployed 
had been generated after two years sustained effort. 
These results were criticised by Lloyd George, Mosley 
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~nd others as totally inadequate, a reflection of the 
Government's conservatism, obstructionism, and lack of real 
commitment to the policy.<3 B) Within Whitehall, however, 
where it was believed with some justification th~t the 
policy had been pursued to the fullest extent possible, 
the conclusion drawn was that the programme's poor results 
vindicated Whitehall's earlier objections to large scale 
public works. Thus the 'Treasury view' was reaffirmed, and 
for the rest of the 1930s the case for public works was to 
be prejudiced by the actual experience of 1929-31.<39 ) 
2. The 'Treasury view' 1931-9 
As with the refusal to promote recovery by deficit 
finance, Britain alone amongst the major western countries 
decided against an active public works programme as part of 
its domestic recovery policy after 1931. (4 0) The previous 
public works experiment terminated with the emergency budget 
measures of September 1931, (4 l) and thereafter was not 
repeated, this despite both widespread opposition to the 
apparent embargo on public works and the regained freedom 
afforded by the quietus of previous policy constraints (such 
as the gold standard). 
The tenacity with which ministers and officials continued 
to oppose public works throughout the 1930s has long been 
attributed to the pervasiveness and diuturnity of the 
'Treasury view', and as evidence of the fact that '~he ideas 
of Keynes had almost no effect on Government policy in this 
country before 1939."(42 ) Recently, however, this view of 
Whitehall's continued theoretical orthodoxy has been 
challenged, and substantially modified, first by Howson 
(1975), and later by Howson and Winch (1977). Such a 
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revision can be taken too far; while the evidence does not 
support Hutchison's sweeping statement "that both the 
Treasury and the Bank were largely converted to 'Keynesian 
policies' ... at least a year before the publication of The 
General Theory", (43 ) there is sufficient evidence for the 
more limited conclusion, that, in the realm of monetary 
policy, Treasury economic thinking was increasingly 
influenced by Keynes and other economists' policy advice. 
As regards fiscal policy, and public works in particular, 
Howson and Winch have established that by the later 1930s 
the Treasury were prepared to countenance public works as a 
stabilization instrument in any possible future recession.<44 ) 
By contrast, Peden's researches led him to conclude that 
prior to the Second World War "the Treasury remained sceptical 
about the use of public works as a cure for unemployment."(45 ) 
As will now be shown, there is no necessary contradiction 
between these two views: the case rests on the motives 
for, and permanence of, the change in Treasury policy. 
The National Government's unemployment policy came under 
serious and concerted attack in 1933 and 1935, as represented 
by the reflationary programmes proposed by Keynes in his 
'Means to Prosperity' articles<46 ) and Lloyd George in his 
'New Deal'. (47 ) On both occasions, the government's 
response was to allow a limited expansion of public works 
expenditures, (4 S) whilst rejecting the general case for 
large scale loan financed expenditures. (49 ) This relaxation 
of Treasury opposition was thus more apparent than real: it 
was largely a response to certain political pressures - the 
need to mollify the more progressive government backbenchers, 
pacify the Opposition, and be seen to be taking account of 
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the change in public opinion since the 1931 crisis measures 
- and an acknowledgement of the opportunities afforded by 
gradually improving economic conditions. There was no 
discernible lessening of the theoretical objections to 
public works; on the contrary, the Treasury's internal 
discussions of Keynes's 'Means to Prosperity' programme 
reveal the genesis of a new theoretical objection, one 
concerning the monetary prerequisites for effecting a 
stimulus to demand by fiscal means. 
There is strong evidence(SO) to suggest that the 
Treasury had anticipated the debate that was to occur 
between Keynes and Robertson on the question of the 
validity of the comparative equilibrium approach of the 
General Theory. (Sl) Throughout the General Theory, the 
explanation of an increase in aggregate demand generated 
by loan financed expenditure was couched solely in terms 
of current savings; the other two potential sources of 
finance - idle balances and an increased money stock -
were excluded from consideration. As Trevithick says, 
this "jeopardised ... the internal consistency of the 
General Theory" for it introduced "an unfortunate 
circularity of reasoning in the analysis": if current 
savings are the sole source of finance then: 
an increase in investment requires an increase in 
savings before it can become effective, but the 
increase in savings will only be forthcoming as a 
~lt of an increase in income. 
Thus "an additional, though temporary, source of finance" was 
required '~o permit the process of expansion to get under 
way." The Treasury had long maintained such an argument -
that an increase in the money stock was required; a point 
finally admitted by Keynes, after a long and interesting 
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debate with Robertson, in which Keynes changed the emphasis 
of his argument away from the "simple 'investment determines 
savings' formula towards a more complex position which 
acknowledges the interaction between money, saving and 
investment in a process of disequilibrium adjustment." 
Thus Keynes eventually held that crowding-out, or as he put 
it "congestion in the capital market", would result unless 
the policy calculated to permanently raise activity actually 
came in two stages: 
Increased investment will always be accompanied by 
increased saving, but it can never be preceded by 
it. Dishoarding and credit expansion provides not 
an alternative to increased saving, but a necessary 
preparation for it. It is the parent, not the twin, 
of increased saving. (52) 
This theoretical position continued to guide Treasury 
thinking until at least the end of the 1930s. (53 ) In 
addition, underlying the Treasury's extreme reluctance, 
first, to allow the resumption of work on the projects 
temporarily abandoned in late 1931, and then to support a 
radical change in policy involving the use of public works 
as a recovery device, was the fear that such a course of 
action would conflict with the government's monetary policy 
(both in its domestic and international aspects) and 
consequently jeopardise recovery. Thus the question of 
confidence continued as a major obstacle for those seeking 
to advance the theoretical case for public works, an obstacle 
which was largely insurmountable, given its imperfectly 
specified determinants, and the visible benefits accruing 
from cheap money. 
Later however, in 1937, a change in Treasury opinion 
has been identified, a change which has been attributed to 
the growing influence of Keynesian policy prescriptions. <54 ) 
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This concerned the Treasury's approval (in theory) of a 
counter-cyclical public works programme to combat the 
recession that was anticipated as following, first, the 
run down of house-building, and later, the end of the 
rearmament programme. On the basis of~ priori logic a 
change in official attitudes towards public works at this 
time would appear perfectly plausible, given that economists 
had become more united in their support for, and more 
convincing in their theoretical justifications of, public 
works, while the favourable effects of rearmament 
expenditures on employment could be taken as a demonstration 
of the legitimacy of the general case for deficit financing. 
The empirical basis of these influences has been well 
documented, ( 55 ) but their actual influence on the course of 
events has by no means been proven, for the question at 
issue is not so much that the Treasury came to support what 
appears to be a Keynesian policy measure (a policy in fact 
never pursued because of the war), but whether in actuality 
this was a change of any particular long-term significance, 
and whether the operative forces at this time were rather 
less theoretical developments and rather more the inter-
action of changing political and economic circumstances 
occasioned by rearmament. 
In pursuing these arguments, our starting point is 
with the form of the public works programme approved by 
the Treasury and Cabinet. After investigation by an inter-
departmental committee, ( 56 ) it was concluded "that the 
contribution which the Government (might] make towards 
stabilising employment by a skillful timing of the capital 
expenditure for which it is responsible is not unimportant; 
though on the other hand it is not on so considerable a scale 
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as to solve the problem", and that with 'normal' public 
investment at £250m per annum discretionary adjustments of 
-£20m and +£30m might be made in years of "abundant 
employment" and "depression" respectively. (57 ) The 
programme finally approved in January 1938, ( 5S) some 4 
months after the onset of recession, (59 ) was thus small in 
relation to any likely cyclical disturbance: there were 
to be no substantial additions to the volume of planned 
public investment, merely an alteration in its medium-term 
time profile; it was to be financed by local authorities 
as previously, not by a large central government loan; and 
the commitment remained to balanced budgets once the 
rearmament programme was completed. The only policy 
innovation of any substance was the May 1938 circular to 
local authorities which requested that they compile 5 year 
forward investment plans. This has been seen as a "great 
advance", a first step in the lessening of administrative -
constraints. ( 6 0) Yet, at the time, commentators were rather 
less sanguine, believing that it was indicative not so much 
of a commitment to counter-cyclical public works as to an 
attempt to expedite more speedily the rearmament programme 
by controlling local authority investment on the basis of 
the information acquired as a result of the circular. ( 6l) 
By mid-1937 sustained pressure for contra-recession 
measures was being generated by both the economists and a 
more broadly based, and ultimately more significant, body 
of political opinion. ( 62 ) A future recession was widely 
forecast, and the view that it could at least be partially 
mitigated by government action had gained wide currency. 
This wider opinion, of course, was in part formed by the 
contemporaneous (theoretical) debates amongst economists; 
it was also, however, deeply influenced by empirical 
considerations, namely the recognition that the measures 
of 1929-31 had been fatally flawed by overhasty planning 
(forced by the necessity for immediate action) and easily 
overwhelmed by the strength of autonomous deflationary 
forces, whereas if such measures were planned in advance 
their future effectiveness would be improved accordingly. 
These various pressures were most clearly and 
effectively expressed in House of Commons debates from 
the autumn of 1937 onwards, ( 63 ) debates which became more 
acrimonious as recession became apparent rather earlier 
than originally feared, as government failed to respond 
with a satisfactory policy statement on public works, and 
instead gave the appearance of "relying upon the 
acceleration of the defence programme to fill the growing 
gaps in private enterprise"(64 ) while giving no real 
consideration to the period after the ending of the 
programme. Nevertheless, as we have seen, government was 
not inactive. It was, however, cautious: the Treasury 
were anxious that any statement about public works should 
lay stress upon: 
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the need to avoid adding to the already excessive 
demands upon labour in the building & allied trades 
& not upon the need to have something in store for 
the 'slump'. Experience shows how easily business 
sentiment is influenced & if anything is said that 
leads to the feeling that the Gov[ernment] agree with 
those economists who see an imminent slump, many 
people may shift their plans accordingly and bring 
about the very thing we all want to avoid. (65) 
Once the onset of recession had been recognised, the 
government's tactics were modified: pronouncements were 
now made that this was but a temporary setback,<66 ) and, 
implicitly, reliance was placed upon rearmament expenditures 
to stabilize activity 1938-9. Had war not then intervened, 
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contra-recession measures would almost certainly have been 
applied when necessary after 1941. The decision to finance 
rearmament partly by borrowing had created a precedent with 
serious political repercussions: "If you can do that for 
armaments you are going to have great difficulty in 
persuading the working men of the country that it is a 
wrong policy to borrow for real assets in public works."(67 ) 
The prospect of a general election in late 1939 or 1940 
gave added leverage to those pressing for the forward 
planning of contra:-recession measures. (68 ) 
Treasury documents for 1938-9 show, however, that any 
such public works effort would have been of limited 
magnitude, ( 69 ) that the individual projects would have had 
to be 'productive', ( 7 0) and that the Treasury were far from 
accepting the argument that the example of rearmament 
expenditures served to vindicate the general case for large 
scale public works. ( 7l) Whilst the favourable employment 
effects of rearmament were not in dispute £er ~' (72 ) it 
was contended that the higher level of employment could not 
be permanently maintained without further reflationary 
t . 1' ( 73 ) . dd. t. f 1 b . d s 1mu 1; 1n a 1 1on, ears were a so e1ng expresse 
in various quarters that the rearmament programme was 
retarding structural change and exacerbating the long-term 
difficulties of the depressed areas.< 74 ) 
By the eve of the Second World War, at least on the 
issue of public works, there were still substantial 
differences between the Treasury and Keynesian views: 
the meeting of minds did not come until after the onset of 
war. But even then, there remained residual doubts about 
pLtblic works, doubts which stemmed from the interwar 
experience of this policy instrument.< 75 ) 
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3. Conclusions 
In concluding the dissertation reference should first 
be made to some of the personalities involved in the economic 
policy debates and attack on Treasury orthodoxy. Two are 
particularly noteworthy : Lloyd George and Keynes . The 
former who had been the architect of grandiose employment 
schemes in 1929 and 1935, and an unwavering critic of 
government generally throughout the period, was disliked 
and mistrusted, especially by the two key politicians of 
the age- Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain.< 76 ) Keynes 
was similarly tainted by his involvement with Lloyd 
George, ( 77 ) whilst in addition. his arrogance and lmpatience 
with bureaucrats and politicians, <78 ) was responsible for 
the unsympathetic reception given to many of his policy 
prescriptions and theoretical writings, the General Theory 
in particular, acceptance of which may have been unnecessarily 
delayed. In this respect, Phillips's comments on Keynes 's-
1939 'Crisis Finance' articles< 79 ) is particularly 
interesting; for although he was in sympathy with much of 
Keynes's reasoning he felt compelled to make the observation 
that the articles were marked by "Keynes' customary 
optimism, over-emphasis and neglect of ulterior consequences. 
It is almost as though he sets himself out to instil distrust 
in his readers."( 8 0) 
Secondly, the form of the fiscal policy debate requires 
comment. ( 81 ) In view of the practical and administrative 
problems involved in implementing a public works programme 
it is somewhat surprising that exponents of the 'new' 
economics placed so much emphasis on expenditure and so 
little on discretionary changes in taxation or on automatic 
stabilizers. On strictly economic grounds there were valid 
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reasons for the economists' preference for adjustments in 
expenditure rather than taxation: firstly, government 
expenditure is exhaustive on the first round and thus the 
multiplier effects are greater than for a given change in 
taxation; and secondly, since Keynes's diagnosis of under-
employment equilibrium centred on a deficiency in investment, 
the preferred remedy (increased expenditure) was one that 
acted directly on investment, rather than taxation which 
operated on consumers' expenditure and only indirectly on 
investment. Discretionary action on taxes, however, would 
have probably been more acceptable to the business community 
- an important consideration given that maintaining 
confidence had been elevated to a policy objective -, and 
could have been subject to shorter implementation lags 
than was the case for expenditure. ( 82 ) 
As regards automatic stabilizers, these can reduce 
the problem of time lags, (83 ) and when compared with 
discretionary action, are in some sense politically neutral, 
in that technically it would have been possible to construct 
a fiscal constitution (with a long-term balanced budget rule) 
where compensatory adjustments for autonomous fluctuations 
in activity were effected by automatic stabilizers, the 
characteristics of which were that they responded speedily 
to a change in income and were of sufficient importance to 
prevent cyclical fluctuations becoming unacceptably large. 
In an earlier chapter estimates were presented for 
cyclical macro-marginal budget rates;( 84 ) these showed 
that the endogenous properties of the 1930s fiscal system 
were such that the extent of automatic stabilization was 
marked. With slight modifications, this system would have 
been eminently suitable for the use of automatic 
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stabilizers to reduce the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations. 
Moreover, although such a course would have involved a 
breaching of the balanced budget rule, it did have the 
advantage that at least the old rule could be replaced by 
some sort of safeguard calculated to prevent government 
overspending. This might have done much to mollify 
Treasury opposition. 
One reason why this approach towards stabilization 
policies was never adopted by the advocates of the 'new' 
economics may have been the unfamiliarity on the part of 
most British economists with the continental tradition of 
public finance studies;< 85 ) public finance in Britain at 
this time was a branch of economics studied independently 
of the political process through which decisions on the 
two sides of the budget were taken.< 86 ) Almost alone amongst 
advocates of the 'new' economics, James Meade gave the 
question of automatic ~tabilizers serious consideration.<87 ) 
In general, however, Keynes, on exclusively economic grounds, 
remained sceptical of their effectiveness, ( 88 ) and undoubtedly 
failed to appreciate the political significance of such an 
approach to Treasury orthodoxy. 
The questions raised by the possible political and 
operational advantages of automatic stabilizers leads us to 
a discussion of our third concluding theme: that of the 
continued belief in balanced budgets. Keynes's attack on 
this orthodoxy was not confined to the economists; indeed 
as a proselytiser, he was probably at his most effective 
in his newspaper articles where he reached and influenced 
a much wider audience.< 89 ) But it is doubtful that even 
Keynes, with all his persuasive skills and dazzling literary 
gifts, could overthrow this doctrine; for too long financial 
integrity had been perceived as the bedrock of British 
democracy. ( 90) Something more fundamental was required: 
it is the irony of history that this profound change of 
opinion could only come through the practical experience 
of successful deficit financing, and that this was to be 
provided by the Second World War, when the rationale was 
not full employment as such but the maximum war effort. 
Indeed this is the key to the whole question, for doubts 
about unbalanced budgets were only dispelled when deficit 
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financing could be seen to be successful, when it generated 
full employment without unacceptable political and economic 
costs. We have seen in the postwar period, and particularly 
since the early 1970s, that were that success to be in 
question, were the policy to be seen as imposing unacceptable 
costs (such as accelerating inflation), the balanced budget 
doctrine can quickly reappear for it has a simple and 
eminently logical appeal as an explanation of the root 
cause of Britain's difficulties. 
Fourthly, mention should be made of the complexion of 
interwar civil service administration, the administrative 
climate in which economic policies were debated and 
implemented. The point should be admitted that arguments 
couched in terms of administrative impracticability are the 
usual plea of a defensive bureaucracy, and no doubt this 
was partly the case for the Treasury in the 1930s. 
Nevertheless, when the Treasury were far from convinced 
of the fundamental correctness of the 'new' economics, both 
in theoretical terms and in its applicability to the current 
unemployment problem, there was an understandable reluctance 
to institute the major administrative reforms necessary for 
the adoption of large scale public works, for this would 
have involved bringing a greater volume of public invest-
ment under direct central control and establishing a 
planning agency to formulate long-term plans and supervise 
their execution, ( 9 l) changes which would have had a 
profound influence on the structure and operation of 
British politics. 
Mo..re generally, however valid be Keynes's specific 
accusations against the civil service, that it was ruled 
by those '~rained by tradition and experience and native 
skill to every form of intelligent obstruction", ( 92 ) it 
is clear that the amateurism of the British civil service 
was becoming increasingly inappropriate to the range and 
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complexity of problems confronting interwar bureaucracy and 
governments. It is to be regretted that the higher civil 
service, as it evolved under Fisher's direction, stood 
"aloof from some of the most significant contemporary 
developments in the study of public administration", that -
it was "far more concerned with developing the e,spri t de 
corES of the civil service than with administration per 
11 (93 ) 
~· 
Finally, the questions under consideration also need to 
be seen in a wider context. An all pervasive feature of the 
interwar fiscal policy debate was that the form of debate, 
by all parties concerned, was such as to obscure many of 
the real issues requiring analysis. This followed 
inevitably from the fact that the debate was condbcted 
within a limited ambit: economic policy questions were 
approached from the 'Establishment' point of view, with a 
number of built-in assumptions which begged a large part 
of the arguments - assumptions, in particular, relating to 
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the inviolability of the prevailing political system and 
1\ the role of government. The Second World War caused an 
immediate and profound reappraisal of these assumptions. 
The emergency which overtook the whole nation was deemed 
to justify a radical modification of existing administrative 
and political systems. It could have been argued that the 
emergency which overtook the unemployed in the 1930s was 
just as pressing for them as anything that threatened the 
nation as a whole in the war, ( 94 ) but of course no such 
arguments were articulated. Unemployment was deemed not 
to constitute such an emergency and thus did not justify 
any radical changes, changes which were a necessary pre-
condition for a successful solution to Britain's 
unemployment problem. 
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APPENDIX I 
Government borrowing and non-recurrent revenue 
Reference was made in an earlier chapter (above pp.l00-02) 
to a number of adjustments made to receipts (T ), expenditure 
c 
(G ), and the budget balance (B ), in order to obtain an 
c c 
unchanging, and economically more significant, definition of 
the budget balance (B). A brief discussion follows of the 
items constituting these adjustments. 
1. Government borrowing 
On the expenditure side of the national accounts the 
consolidation of the social insurance funds and the removal 
of sinking fund payments needs no further explanation. The 
explanation of the other adjustments (set out in Table IA) 
is as follows : 
(a) Ca.J2.i tal_ £.XJ2.endi:t_ur_e_ 'be!..o~ th£_ !i!!_e'. This, the only 
item in the budget accounts specifically shown as capital 
expenditure, covered expenditure on Post Office develop-
ment, it being considered permissible to finance such 
expenditure by borrowing because the assets acquired 
were remunerative in an accepted accounting sense. Other 
capital items were incorporated in capital expenditure 
'above the line', e.g. expenditure on road programmes. 
(b) Other_ ~x.12.end!._tg_r~ ;tig_ag_ced_by_ bor_rQ.wing_. This includes 
two items: (1) borrowing to meet interest on the 
encashment of savings certificates; and (2) borrowing 
in 1932/3 to cover the cost of the War Loan conversion 
operation. Both items properly belong to expenditure, 
being charges that in normal circumstances would have 
been met within the budget. 
(c) De£e!!.C£. bo£rQ.wing_. This item constitutes borrowing under 
the Defence Loans Acts, 1937 and 1939, and needs to be 
incorporated as part of our adjustments since Gc only 
included defence expenditure financed out of revenue. 
2. Non-recurrent revenue 
These items (set out in Table IB), which came under the 
head 'Miscellaneous Revenue' in the financial accounts, can 
be considered under two headings: 
(a) Ca.J2.i1.a.!_ ac£.oun!_s 
Old Exchange Account 
War Loan Depreciation Fund 
National Debt Commissioners - Death Duty Account 
(b) Mi~c~llag_eQ.U§.. E_und~ 
Road Fund 
Rating Relief Suspense Account 
Profits of the Bank of England note issue 
Enemy Debt Clearing Office - Surplus 
Items falling under the former heading were taken into 
receipts (Tc) for a variety of reasons, but in general the 
accounts had become obsolete and could be presented as 
containing capital sums which might be thus appropriated. 
In general, these sums had usually been put to debt 
redemption, and thus the transactions were a convenient 
facade for masking fresh borrowing.* 
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Under miscellaneous funds, account is taken of 'raids' 
on the capital balances of the Road Fund, the fictitious 
resources of the Rating Relief Suspense Account, which was 
merely an earmarking of past surpluses, and two miscellaneous 
items: profits of the Bank of England note issue and the 
surplus of the Enemy Debt Clearing Office, there being 
evidence that they were included according to necessity.** 
* See, for example, Tl71/287, Hopkins to Snowden, undated 
(but abo-ut 19 March 1931); Tl71/309, Treasury Memorandum, 
'War Loan Depreciation Fund', undated (but late March 1933). 
** See Tl71/296, Hopkins, 'Budget Estimate: 1932', 15 March 
1932; Tl71/315, Waterfield to Hopkins, 4 April 1936. In 
the case of the profits of the note issue, the sums 
included in Table IB are estimates of the discretionary 
element of total payments, i.e. payments above the average. 
Table IA 
Expenditure adjustments - sinking fund payments and government expenditure charged to capital, 
1929/30 - 1939/40 (£m) 
Sinking fund (SF) 
Capital expenditure (CE) 
Other borrowing (OB) 
Defence borrowing (DB) 
Total adjustments 
Sources: Financial Accounts. 
1929/30 1930/1 1931/2 1932/3 1933/4 1934/5 1935/6 1936/7 1937/8 1938/9 1939/40 
-47.7 
+10.5 
+4.8 
-32.4 
-66.8 -32.5 
+11.0 +9.7 
+8 .4 
-55.8 -14.4 
-26.3 
+7.5 
+25.9 
+7.1 
Table IB 
-7.7 
+6.5 
-1.2 
-12.3 -12.5 -13.1 
+7.5 +10.5 +13.5 
-4 . 8 -2 . 0 + 0 .4 
-10.5 -13.2 -7.2 
+17.0 +22.6 +22.1 
+64.9 +128.1 +491.7 
+71.4 +137 .5 +506 .6 
Revenue adjustments- non-recurrent receipts included in 'Ordinarv and Self-Balancing Revenue', 
1929/30 - 1939/40 (£m) 
Old Exchange Account 
War Loan Depreciation Fund 
National Debt Commissioners -
Death Duty Account 
Road Fund 
Rating Relief Suspense Account 
Profits of Bank of England 
note issue 
Enemy Debt Clearing Office -
Surplus 
Total adjustments 
1929/30 1930/1 1931/2 1932/3 1933/4 1934/5 1935/6 1936/7 1937/8 1938/9 1939/40 
-12.8 
-10.0 
-5.8 -1.5 -1.5 -1.4 
-4.5 -5 .3 -3.6 
-16.0 -4.0 
-3.7 -0.6 -8.9 
-3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.0 -3 .5 -o. 7 
-3.5 -23.2 -20.9 -11.9 -10.0 -8.0 -11.8 -5.1 -1.5 -1.4 
Sources: As Table IA; Road Fund Accounts; T239/25-7, Treasury Register of Daily Receipts. 
~ 
-..:r 
0 
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APPENDIX II 
Estimating procedure for receipts and expenditure 
1. Central government receipts at constant employment 
Central government receipts at constant employment (T*) 
are shown in Table IIA according broadly to the five main 
categories of revenue. 
(i) Ta~e~ Q_n_e:?fPendi!_U!:_e 
(a) Customs and Excise other than import duties. 
Separate elasticities were calculated for taxes on spirits, 
beer, tobacco, sugar, hydrocarbon oils, and a residual 
category, using a method adopted from that employed in 
previous studies of tax elasticities (Bretherton 1937; 
Edelberg 1940). The first step was to take account of 
changes made in the rates of duty, by applying the estimates 
given in the budgets of the time of the effects of these 
changes on revenue, to obtain revenue series on a constant 
rate basis. An elasticity of revenue with respect to GDP 
at current prices was then calculated, taking the change in 
revenue against the change in GDP between the two constant 
employment base years. This method yielded the following 
results: 
Spirits 
Beer 
Tobacco 
Sugar 
Hydrocarbon oils 
Other Customs and Excise 
Elasticity 
0.80 
0.32 
1.22 
0.27 
2.96 
1.49 
It is possible to compare these results with those of 
Bretherton and Edelberg. The former took account of 
discretionary changes in calculating tax elasticities, 
constructing hypothetical tax yields which were then related 
to national income, for three periods: the upswing of the 
1920s, the downturn of the early 1930s, and the subsequent 
recovery period (to 1935/6). Bretherton's indices of 
hypothetical yields for spirits, beer, tobacco, and sugar 
conform well with our estimates on a constant rate basis, 
despite the fact that his starting point was 1922, not 1929, 
while his estimates of tax elasticities for the upswing and 
recovery phases correspond fairly closely with our results. 
Edelberg used the percentage employed (i.e. 100% less the 
unemployment rate) as his cyclical index of activity, and 
related tax yields to employment to derive indirectly a 
measure of the income elasticity of demand, but did not 
correct for discretionary changes in tax rates. Conse-
quently, there is ljttle correspondence between our results 
and no further account is taken of them. 
Using the above elasticities the actual yields were 
adjusted to a constant employment basis by applying the 
ratio (Y*/Y). 
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(b) Import duties. A similar method was used, but the 
adjustments were complicated by the fact that a general 
protective tariff was introduced in 1931-2 (increasing the 
revenue under this head from £4.8m in 1931/2 to £28.8m in 
1932/3) which precluded direct comparison between our end 
years on a constant rate basis. Hence the actual values 
for 1930/1 and 1931/2 were roughly adjusted (by the ratio) 
to derive their constant employment values, while the yields 
for 1932/3 and subsequent years were adjusted to a constant 
rate basis, again using the official estimates of the effect 
of the authorities' discretionary action. An elasticity of 
revenue with respect mGDP was then calculated for the 
period 1932/3 to 1937/8, allowance being made for the extent 
to which GDP was below the constant employment level in 
1932/3. The elasticity of import duty revenue with respect 
to GDP was found to be approximately 2.1. 
(c) Motor vehicle licence duties. These duties were 
first recalculated on to a constant rate basis, and an 
elasticity of revenue with respect to GDP of approximately 
2.1 was obtained, which corresponded closely with Bretherton's 
estimate. 
(d) Stamp duties. Revenue from these miscellaneous 
taxes upon the transfer of assets was cyclically highly 
sensitive, with turning-points one year in advance of GDP, 
but largely insensitive to trend growth: revenue on a 
constant rate basis peaked in 1928/9 and 1936/7 at £30.lm 
and £31m respectively. It was assumed that at constant 
employment these duties would have yielded £30m per annum, 
thus implying that stock exchange prices would have remain-ed 
constant at constant employment - an approximate but not 
absurd assumption for a period during much of which the 
general price _level is assumed to have fallen (in line with 
the actual course of prices), while output is assumed to have 
been rising.* 
(e) Post Office surplus. This was included as a 
revenue item since it was subject to government control, 
but was treated as autonomous (see below). 
(f) Other. A residual item of miscellaneous taxes 
which were small in magnitude (about £2m per annum) and 
largely invarient to changes in income, and therefore not 
adjusted. 
(a) Income and surtax. Their constant employment 
values were obtained by calculating an aggregate tax 
elasticity relating changes in their yield at actual 
* There was no clear relationship between changes in asset 
prices and variations in GDP and hence it was decided to 
exclude this duty when calculating macro-marginal budget 
rates. A similar problem was encountered with Estate 
duties. 
employment to changes in GDP,* which were then applied, 
using the ratio, to their actual values. 
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A number of general problems were encountered. Firstly, 
income tax was levied one year and surtax two years in 
arrears,** so that separate elasticities had to be calculated 
taking into account the differential lags. Secondly, the 
official ex ante estimates of the change in revenue resulting 
from discretionary changes had to be used, but on occasions 
changes in revenue from year to year were associated with 
changes in GDP of the opposite direction. Fortunately, such 
occasions were rare. 
The actual yields of income and surtax were adjusted to 
a constant rate basis for comparison with any two consecutive 
years.*** Allowing for the lags, changes in yields were then 
related to changes in GDP and elasticities year by year were 
obtained. Ignoring the perverse results referred to above, 
means of observations were taken and found to be 1.60 for 
income tax and 3.71 for surtax. 
The estimate for income tax almost exactly corresponds 
to Edelberg's estimate of 1.61 for the years 1927-37, despite 
the fact that his correlation analysis only took account of 
changes in the standard rate, and not changes in allowances, 
etc. Comparison with Bretherton's estimate is precluded 
because, unlike Edelberg, he did not lag receipts against 
GDP. Other contemporary evidence, however, suggests that an 
elasticity of 1.60 is of the right order of magnitude for a 
fully progressive income tax and given the technical details 
of its levy (Hicks 1938: 292, 300). 
Verification of our surtax elasticity proved more 
difficult. Surtax introduced progression into income tax 
for the higher income groups, the incomes of which were 
undoubtedly reduced by depressions and expanded by booms 
in greater proportion than those with moderate incomes.**** 
Thus one would expect a large, positive elasticity, but the 
result obtained (i.e. double that of income tax) is very 
* This method has been used most successfully by Prest (1962). 
** Hicks (1938: 303); see also Edwards and Black (1938) 
and Hicks (1941) for details of the full implications of 
these lags. 
*** This method was favoured because estimates of the effect 
of discretionary action for these taxes were probably 
more susceptible to inaccuracy the further away from 
the base year than estimates ~or other taxes. 
**** See Stamp (1936). Inland Revenue data shows that not 
only did the distribution of surtax incomes change 
with the cycle but that there was a marked trend over 
the period towards a greater equalization of incomes. 
Surtax - distribution of incomes (%) 
Incomes (£) 1925/6 1929/30 1932/3 1937[8 
2,000 - 6,000 
6,000 - 25,000 
25,000+ 
44.0 
36.6 
19.4 
100.0 
46.7 
35.7 
17.6 
100.0 
53.1 
33.4 
13.5 
100.0 
50.9 
34.9 
14.2 
100.0 
Source: Reports of the Commissioners of His Majesty's 
Inland Revenue, 1928, 1933, 1935, 1946 
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high, primarily because of our observations for 1931/2 to 
1932/3.* If this is omitted, the elasticity is reduced to 
2.72; this revised elasticity was used in our adjustments, 
but since surtax was small in relation to total receipts 
the difference is not important. 
(b) National Defence Contribution. This, a profits 
tax introduced in 1937, was first levied for the accounting 
period ending 1937/8. The technical details of the tax 
(see Charge of National Defence Contribution, Cmd. 5485 
(1937) enable us to assume that its yield at constant 
employment would not have differed significantly from its 
actual yield. Hence no adjustment was made. 
(c) other. This class of revenue consisted of two 
profits taxes levied during and immediately after World War 
I, which continued to yield small amounts during the period. 
Since they were levied on profits earned before 1929, 
adjustment is unnecessary. 
This head comprises estate duty which showed a high 
cyclical sensitivity because asset prices fluctuated more 
than national income, and the duty was progressive. As 
with stamp duties, estate duties were insensitive to trend 
growth: on a constant rate basis, the yield in our two 
base years was almost identical - £79.8m in 1929/30 and 
£80.lm in 1937/8. Consequently, the constant employment 
values were interpolated between the actual values for the 
two base years, taking into account rate increases in 
1930/1 and 1939/40. 
(a) Unemployment. A statistically significant relation-
ship was found between private sector contributions to the 
Unemployment Fund and the level of GDP. The actual 
contributions were therefore adjusted by the ratio.** 
(b) National Health and (c) Contributory Pensions. 
The same method was used and found to be satisfactory. 
Thus, for private sector contributions to all three schemes, 
* Owing to the "heroic efforts" of direct taxpayers in 
1931/2 who had paid their surtax promptly, the yield 
was significantly above the estimate. With few arrears 
to collect the following year, the yield was considerably 
below the estimate (see 264, H.C. Deb. 5s. 19 April 1932, 
cols.l415-17; 277, H.C. Deb. 5s. 25 April 1933, cols. 
34-5). Thus, for a given change in GDP, there was an 
unrepresentative change in yield, and consequently the 
very high elasticity for 1931/2 to 1932/3 is spurious 
and should be left out of account. 
** This method was tested by standardizing contributions on 
to a 1931 constant rate basis, adjusting them by the ratio 
to derive constant employment values, and then, by 
regression analysis, relating them to constant employment 
GDP. The only year of any marked divergence.from the 
relationship, 1939/40, is explained by the growth of the 
armed forces (which, under §.41 (1) of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act, 1920, did not contribute directly to the 
Unemployment Fund) and the decline of civil employment 
cJ llA i-n +h.,. tiomon..:l<::! ,..of! +J...~ ···~- --------
a unitary elasticity with respect to GDP was implicitly 
assumed. 
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This was the residual item in the revenue side of the 
budget accounts, covering a number of miscellaneous tax 
and non-tax receipts and the income of the Post Office 
(less the surplus, included in taxes on expenditure). The 
revenues varied markedly over the period, but this is 
explained by the fact that they included: (a) reparation 
receipts and the sale of war property during the years 
1929/30 to 1931/2; and (b) non-recurrent receipts which, 
as shown above, varied markedly. Removal of such items 
leads to a fairly stable revenue series, and hence these 
revenues were assumed to be autonomous.* 
2. Test of accuracy of revenue estimates 
It is possible to cross-check our results for one year 
with some estimates published by Kaldor (1944) of the full 
employment yield of taxes in 1938, derived by a different 
approach. Kaldor estimated that the achievement of full 
employment (3% unemployment) would have raised the net 
national income by 10.7% and been associated with an increase 
in central government receipts of 11.6%. This gives an 
aggregate tax elasticity with respect to national income of 
1.08, while our method (7.6-8.0% unemployment) yielded a 3.1% 
increase in revenue corresponding to an increase in GDP of 
3.0%, thus giving a marginally lower elasticity of 1.03. 
The similarity between the two results provides 
corroborative evidence of the probable accuracy of the 
revenue side of our estimating procedure. The difference 
between the two aggregate tax elasticities is explained by: 
(a} Kaldor's estimate for direct taxes was (implicitly) on 
an accruals basis, whereas ours was on a payments basis, 
assuming a lag for income and surtax against GDP. 
(b) The major part of the growth of employment was assigned 
by Kaldor to a growth in incomes of the primary and 
secondary sectors so that, because of the productivity 
difference between these sectors and the service sector, 
output and employment were increased significantly for a 
given increase in employment. 
(c) The significant difference between average and marginal 
shares of undistributed profits in income (7 and 23% 
respectively) used by Kaldor resulted in a substantial 
proportion of the increase in income resulting from the 
attainment of full employment being put to a tax base whose 
elasticity with respect to income was markedly above the 
average for the fiscal system as a whole. Consequently, a 
given increase in incomes resulted in large increases in 
total receipts. 
* The only constituent of this item which could be expected 
to vary with income was the trading receipts of the Post 
Office. No correction has been made to its revenue (or 
expenditure) since it was a trading enterprise, and, from 
inspection of its figures, it appears to have had a target 
surplus which it would achieve (roughly) despite variations 
in the actual level of employment. 
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3. Central government expenditure at constant employment 
Transfer payments to the unemployed through the 
unemployment Insurance Fund and transitional payments (later 
undertaken by the Unemployment Assistance Board) were the 
only items of endogenous expenditure adjusted,* although 
there were a number of other expenditures which were 
unemployment-related. These were not adjusted since their 
magnitude was small (reaching a peak of £11.5m in 1931/2), 
and at our assumed rate of unemployment there would have 
remained a residual unemployment problem of some serious-
ness, necessitating expenditure on, for example, the 
depressed areas where unemployment rates were significantly 
in excess of the national average. 
Outlay on unemployment benefits at constant employment 
were calculated as follows:** the total numbers unemployed 
and numbers claiming benefits were assumed at constant 
employment to have grown steadily year by year with the 
growth of the labour force.*** These figures were inter-
polated between the two base years to give their constant 
employment values. Three assumptions were then made: 
(i) Average benefits per claimant would have remained 
unchanged at constant employment. 
(ii) The distribution of claimants between the two unemploy-
ment payments schemes would have remained unchanged. 
(iii) The numbers claiming benefits as a ratio of the total 
numbers unemployed would have remained constant (at 0.83). 
The results obtained by this method appear to pick up 
both discretionary changes and the effect of the growth in 
the numbers unemployed. Their reliability was tested by 
varying assumptions (ii) and (iii). 
With regard to (ii), the short-term unemployed 
essentially fell within the ambit of the unemployment 
insurance scheme while the long-term unemployed received 
their payments from the transitional payments/unemployment 
assistance scheme. The average cost per claimant was higher 
in the latter scheme, and hence a change in the average 
duration of unemployment could be expected to lead to a 
change in total outlay on benefits. 
* Benefits paid by the other social insurance schemes were 
assumed to be autonomous. Eligibility for health and 
pension benefits were largely unaffected by unemployment 
(Davison 1938: 60-61), while early retirement was not 
used as a means of mitigating unemployment. 
** The calculation of a satisfactory series for outlay on 
unemployment benefits presented innumerable difficulties. 
It proved impossible to derive a satisfactory statistical 
function relating the level of unemployment to outlay on 
unemployment benefits, nor was there a direct relation-
ship to changes in GDP. It seems that a conflation of 
unemployment duration effects and numerous discretionary 
changes in benefit rates and eligibility for unemployment 
benefits were responsible for these difficulties. 
*** Whilst the numbers unemployed increased, the unemployment 
~remained within the range 10.8 to 11.1% of the 
insured labour force. 
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Between 1929 and 1937, the two constant employment 
base years when unemployment rates were approximately , 
similar, there was a marked increase in the average 
duration of unemployment - the proportion of all applicants 
for unemployment benefits who had been unemployed for over 
6 months (i.e. long-period unemployed) rose from 10.9 to 
34.3% (Beveridge 1944: Table 8)- largely as a consequence 
of the intervening depression. If constant employment had 
been continuously achieved during these years it is likely 
that the observed duration of unemployment would have been 
rather different, and this might have affected outlay on 
unemployment benefits. To test this hypothesis, the ratio 
of unemployed receiving benefits under the insurance scheme 
to the other schemes was varied and it was found that the 
effect on total outlay was negligible: a 5 percentage 
points change in the ratio of claimants between the two 
schemes leading to an average change of only £0.52m in 
total outlay on benefits at constant employment. 
Assumption (iii) was also found to have a minimal 
influence on our results: only in 1930/1 and 1938/9 would 
the constant employment outlay have been higher than our 
estimate if the actual ratio of claimants to total numbers 
unemployed had been left unadjusted, whilst for the rest of 
the period they would have been lower. The effect in each 
case was unimportant. 
Total central government expenditure, at both actual 
and constant employment, is given in Table liB. 
Table IIA: Central government receipts at constant employment, 1929/30- 1939/40 (£m) 
1929L3o 19-3-oLl 1931Z:2 1932l3 1933L4--1934Ls 193SL6 1936L7 1937/8 1938l9 1939L4o 
1. Taxes on expenditure 
Customs and Excise 247.3 256.3 280.7 325.9 318.1 310.6 315.3 321.3 335.6 354.8 411.0 
Motor vehicle licences 26.8 30.4 33.0 34.2 3!3.1 35.0 32.7 32.9 34.6 37.8 35.5 
Stamp duties 25.7 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Post Office surplus 9.2 10.1 u.s 10.9 13.1 12.3 ll. 7 ll.O 10.5 9.5 3.8 
Other 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Total 3l1.2 328.9 357.4 403 .o 399.3 390.0 391.9 397.3 412.7 434.1 482.3 
2. Taxes on income 
Income and surtax 293.8 323.9 384.3 357.7 334.3 325.4 320.8 330.4 361.0 398.9 478.6 
N.D.C. - - - - - - - - 1.4 21.9 26.9 
Other 2.3 3.0 2.5 2.2 1.8 2.3 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.6 
Total 296.1 326.9 386.8 359.9 336.1 327.7 322.1 331.4 363.4 421.7 506.1 
3. Taxes on capital 
Estate duties 79.8 82.7 87.9 87.9 87.9 88.0 88.0 88.0 89.0 89.0 94.2 
4. National insurance 
contributions 
Unemployment 31.4 31.5 37.4 43.3 43.5 45.2 45.9 44.2 44.6 47.0 46.7 
National health 26.4 27.6 28.9 29.6 28.9 29.0 28.9 29.4 30.2 31.7 31.9 
Contributory pensions 24.5 25.0 25.5 25.5 25.6 25.6 27.0 31.9 33.1 34.1 33 .9 
Total 82.4 84.1 91.8 98.4 98.0 99.8 101.8 105.5 107.9 l12 .8 l12 .5 
5. 'Miscellaneous Revenue' 127.9 142.3 105.8 87.3 86.2 81.3 92.7 101.3 95.6 99.0 110.1 
6. less non-recurrent receipS 3.5 23.2 20.9 l1.9 10.0 - 8.0 11.8 5.1 1.5 1.4 
Total receipts {T*l 893.9 941.7 1008.8 1024.6 997.5 986.8 988.5 1011.7 1063.5 1155.1 1303.8 
Source: Calculated from the actual figures on the basis of the estimating procedure outlined above. 
Table I IB: Central g_o_v~rnment_el(pendij;ur~~j:::!:l.la.1~1ld con~:tant eJIIPloyment, 1929/30 - 1939/40 (£m) 
1929/30 1930/1 193_1/2 1932/3~331~_1934/!>_1935/6_ l!t36/7 I_93_7/8_19:f8L9 1939/40 
1. Total Ordinary and Self-
Balancing Expenditure (Gc) 829.5 
2. Expenditure adjustments -32.4 
881.0 
-55.8 
851.1 859.3 778.2 
-14.4 +7.1 -1.2 
797.1 841.8 902.2 919.9 1018.9 1408.2 
-4.8 -2 .o +0.4 +71.4 +137.5 +506.6 
3. Total benefits paid by 
social insurance funds +155.9. +214.4 +239.8 +235.6 +221.0 +220.0 +222.9 +214.0 +220.7 +242.3 +220.1 
4. Government contributions 
to social insurance funds 
5. Total expenditure at 
-76.5 -100.3 -116.3 -147.9 -141.3 -138.8 -143.0 -141.3 -144.8 -147.4 -144.7 
actual employment {G) 876.5 939.3 960.2 954.1 856.7 873.5 919.7 975.3 1067.2 1251.3 1990.2 
6. Adjustment to constant 
employment* - -44.7 -58.1 -54.0 -33.4 -24.7 -17.0 -1.0 - -15.5 +17.7 
7. Total expenditure at 
constant emplovment {G*) 876.5 894.6 902.1 900.1 823.3 848.8 902.7 974.3 1067.2 1235.8 2007.9 
Sources: (1) Financial Accounts ;--~pp-:-r'rable -IA;-(3)-(4) Working notes to Feinstein (1972,. 
~: * Total unemployment benefits at actual employment less total benefits at constant emolovment. 
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